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CAVEAT 
Following the HoNESt research approach, the empirical basis of this deliverable consists of the 
so-called ‘short country reports’ (SCR) produced by HoNESt historians that are experts of the 
history of nuclear energy in a specific country. The aim of social science research in HoNESt 
Work Package 4 is to analyse these reports in terms of perception and engagement. In this 
process we are only occasionally able to refer to original references since these are usually not 
accessible e.g. for language reasons. Given this, it is all the more important to mention that, at 
this stage, these ‘short country reports’ are still in a draft status and not yet approved by the EC. 
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PREFACE 
This document Deliverable 4.3 ‘Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms 
for effective interaction with civil society: selected case studies’ is an update – in response to the 
HoNESt midterm review – of the previous version of D4.3 which was submitted in March 2017. 
The revision consists of four elements: 
1. Update of country studies: The first issue of D4.3 had to be based on preliminary versions of 
HoNESt historians short country reports. In the meantime, the final draft versions of these reports 
are available, which offered the opportunity to amend D4.3 social science country studies in the 
light of the latest versions of the short country reports which, however, are not yet approved by 
the EC. 
2. USA country study: Following the emphasis put on US nuclear developments by the midterm 
review, D4.3 will be enhanced by an additional country study analysing the US case. 
3. State of the art: In order to improve the theoretical framework and the justification of the 
analytical dimensions, an extensive literature review has been done to detail the state of the art 
regarding public perception and engagement in nuclear issues. 
4. Completing the in-depth analysis: In the first version of this report, only the phase of 
classification of the information could be presented (due to the lack of data in the first SCRs 
versions). Now, however, in the light of the complete reports, it has already been possible to carry 
out the complete analysis, making connections between variables and dimensions, and testing 
the working hypotheses arising from the literature review and the proposed theoretical 
framework..  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This deliverable (D4.3) summarizes the key findings from the selected case studies of the 
HoNESt project in terms of societal perception and societal engagement. Reports from eight 
countries were selected from a total of twenty, according to the following key criteria: geography 
(location), political system evolution, and degree of public acceptance. The completed analysis 
reveals a broad overview of how actors have perceived nuclear developments over the past 
decades, and which types of engagement tools and mechanisms have been used in each case 
studied.  
According to our theoretical proposal, the perception of nuclear energy is composed of four 
dimensions: health & environment, economics, socio-cultural, and political-institutional. In each 
specific case, these dimensions may have different weights in their influence on the opinions, 
attitudes, or behaviours of the population and of the promoters and public authorities. In this way, 
we not only distinguish between proponents or opponents of nuclear energy, but are able to 
identify the specific dimensions that underlie actors’ support or rejection of nuclear technologies. 
This will allow us to better explain the frequent ambivalences related to nuclear developments. 
Additionally, the relationships between the four analytical dimensions are not linear. Our analysis 
is based on the assumption that nuclear energy is a technology with different degrees of public 
acceptance in different countries, depending on the perceived risks and benefits (which are 
mostly included in the health & environment and economic dimensions). These risks and benefits 
depend on the social trust of the institutions in charge of managing and/or regulating it (political-
institutional dimension), all of which are a function of a series of socio-cultural factors generated 
by the social climate over time (socio-cultural dimension).  
The analysis demonstrates that the perceived risks and benefits are very similar in all the 
countries sampled. The most frequently mentioned risks are those related to the possibility of 
accidents and radiation contamination; in both cases these include damages or losses that may 
affect human health or the environment (especially aquatic, fluvial or marine environments). 
There are also concerns about the safety of nuclear facilities, as well as references to episodes of 
stress and anxiety in some people when confronted by the possibility of such risks materializing. 
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A majority of the references to health and environmental concerns related to nuclear power were 
reported in the period 1970-1990, although some references can also be found in other periods. 
In all the countries studied, there are actors who argue that nuclear energy will bring benefits of 
different types, including: economic benefits (jobs, socioeconomic development, inexpensive 
electricity and/or a guarantee of energy supply), environmental benefits (to a lesser extent), and 
even benefits to human health (i.e., medical helthy uses, as reported in Michelsen & Harjula, 
2017). Regarding these benefits, changes can be small and are observed over time, specifically 
with respect to environmental benefits. In the first two phases (1950-1970 and 1970-1990), some 
actors talk about the positive environmental impacts of nuclear energy production. These include 
temperature increases that could favour certain ecosystems and economic activities (i.e. 
advantatges for the farmers of the touristic destinations, as said in the Spanish case, in Rubio-
Varas et al., 2017) and the fact that nuclear energy produces less pollution than other industries 
(as said in the Swedish report, in Kaijser 2017). However, since 1990, there are no more 
references of this type; and instead, more is spoken about the benefits of nuclear energy in the 
fight against climate change.  
So, although the perceived risks and perceived benefits are very similar in all the countries 
studied, the social and institutional responses are very different. In order to give an answer to this 
enigma we first need to understand how people perceive their relationships with institutions 
(social trust, or what we have considered here as the political-institutional dimensions), as well as 
what kind of socio-cultural factors are part of the context in which the nuclear technology is 
perceived. 
According to our analysis, the main political-institutional factors identified in the SCRs shaping 
social trust are the following:  
- Low institutional trustworthiness, which draws attention to the fact that the behaviours of the 
institutions in charge of managing or regulating nuclear energy have been perceived as not 
worthy of trust by certain social sectors. In the SCR there are many examples of these types of 
behaviours generating mistrust.  
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- Political games (i.e. elections affected decision making, political parties changed their opinion 
about nuclear developments when governing, fights between pro and anti-European parties, etc.).  
- Dependency of other countries conditioned decision making, leading national governments to 
adopt certain behaviours in order to gain energy autonomy or to avoid dependency. 
The analysis found that the main socio-cultural factors shaping the perceptions of risks, benefits, 
and social trust are the following: 
- Conflicts of values: social conflicts related to preferences for different lifestyles, different 
economic and social development models, different attitudes towards pacifism / warmongering 
that nuclear development may entail, concerns about how future generations will judge current 
ones because of their management of nuclear energy, etc. These are elements that respond to 
different ideologies or ways of understanding how society and its evolution should ideally be. 
- National scientific pride (and national military pride too). 
- Territorial identity conflicts (territorial comparative grievances; conflicts between economic 
activities and land uses, etc.). 
- Subjective attributes of risk: perception of difficulty of calculating risks, perception of low 
controllability of risk, unwillingness of being exposed, familiarity with the technology (and coping 
with similar risks in the past). 
These factors are also unevenly distributed among the different countries, and therefore would 
help to explain the different social responses to nuclear energy. The articulation of this complex 
set of factors in our analysis leads to the emergence of three main groups of countries: 
a) Countries where nuclear energy plays a key role in national independence. This independence 
has conditioned both public opinion and management spheres and has led to a situation where 
the perceived benefits (in terms of national independence, pride, etc.) are higher than the 
perceived risks. Bulgaria, Ukraine, and to some extent Finland, would be part of this typology. 
b) Countries where the nuclear issue was instrumentally used for political and electoral purposes, 
and where the behaviour of some institutions (promoters and/or public authorities) was perceived 
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as low trustworthiness. F.R. Germany, Sweden, and to some extent Spain, would be included in 
this typology. 
c) Countries with higher public trust towards institutions (regulators / public authorities), conflicts 
between economic activities and land uses due to nuclear developments, and conflicting values 
related to the use of nuclear weapons and the risk of war. These countries share a strong 
national scientific (and military) pride, which has inevitably influenced the public perception of 
risks and benefits, as well as the trust in institutions. The UK and the USA would share this 
typology.  
Regarding engagement practices and mechanisms, the analysis shows a long list evolving 
through the different temporal phases: 
- During the first period (1950-1970), the communicative practices related to the expression of 
nuclear promises (popular films, etc.) predominated, but some countries also activated 
consultation processes (public opinion surveys in UK, USA, Finland) or participative mechanisms  
(public meetings in the UK, a study group in Sweden). These countries were facing public opinion 
pressures due to earlier incidents (Windscale in the UK, Fermi in the USA) and/or nuclear 
weapons debates.  
- In the second period (1970-1990) communicative strategies continued, but also cases of 
secrecy and misinformation related to nuclear incidents and accidents appeared (i.e. the case of 
Chernobyl was poorly handled in communicative terms by public authorities in Bulgaria and 
Ukraine, with restricted and biased information). But the most relevant engagement activity during 
this phase is the increase of consultation activities, especially through public opinion surveys (that 
became periodic in most of the countries), information centres and meetings (as in Ukraine or 
Sweden) or even referenda (done in Sweden, and proposed in some states of the USA). In the 
UK, the public inquiries mechanism played an interesting participative approach. Public-initiated 
engagement rose dramatically during this period in all of the countries (the SCRs refer to mass 
mobilization protests, collected signatures, press interventions, etc. from local communities and 
national social movements). 
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- The third period (1990-2015) is characterised by an intensification of the consultation 
mechanisms: public opinion surveys, referenda (mainly at the local level, in Bulgaria, Sweden, 
and Ukraine), participative processes as public hearings (in Ukraine and Sweden), local 
informative committees, local joint commissions (Spain), voluntary candidature processes to 
siting nuclear installations (as in Sweden and Spain), citizen’s panels (UK), etc. Regarding 
communicative mechanisms, during this phase Internet began to play a key role in transmitting 
information to the public, allowing more transparency and accountability of the nuclear sector, 
and also being used for consultative purposes. 
Finally, the analysis shows how each of the countries’ typology is broadly related with different 
engagement processes over time: 
- The ‘institutional confidence’ countries (UK and USA) seemed to be the first in promoting 
communicative strategies to cope with early nuclear incidents, and to spread (broadcast) the 
benefits of nuclear development among the public. Progressively, they developed consultative 
strategies to measure public opinion over time, while introducing participative mechanisms to 
deliberate and collect the diversity of voices and points of view on nuclear issues at both a local 
and national level. In general, most of these strategies seemed to be applied in a pro-active way 
(more in the UK than in the USA). 
- The ‘political instrumental’ countries (F.R. Germany, Spain and Sweden) started later but 
followed the same path. They introduced processes and mechanisms that were progressive, 
communicative, consultative, and participative, but mainly in a re-active way. These countries 
were trying to cope with the massive protest against the nuclear siting of developments. Perhaps 
Sweden was somewhat different because the idea of national scientific pride and modernization 
was actively present in the public debate on nuclear issues. 
- The ‘national independence’ countries (Bulgaria, Finland and Ukraine) also followed the same 
path. This path was especially needed since they had to manage information and public opinion 
protests after the Chernobyl accident. Distrust in how the public authorities and nuclear promoters 
managed this serious situation was later balanced by the consideration of nuclear energy as 
something necessary for national sovereignty, leading to a kind of resigned acceptance mixed 
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with national pride. The case of Finland is perhaps slightly different than the other countries 
because trust in Finnish institutions has remained quite high throughout the nuclear period. 
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1. Introduction 
This deliverable (D4.3) summarizes the key findings from the selected in-depth case studies of 
the HoNESt project in terms of societal perception (public perceptions, reactions, social 
movements, etc.) and societal engagement (actors, practices, mechanisms, etc.). 
This report is based on HoNESt deliverable D4.2 which described the key factors underlying 
societal perception and engagement with nuclear development in selected European countries. 
D4.2 used a systematic approach to scrutinize a series of country reports using an overall 
evaluation framework for the analysis of historical narratives of nuclear developments and 
outstanding events related to the use of nuclear energy. Moreover, the validity of our concepts 
about public perception and public engagement in different national nuclear environments were 
tested. 
Analysing and selecting the relevant Short Country Reports (SCRs) helped us identify which 
kinds of concepts and indicators were most useful in describing and understanding the available 
data. In the present deliverable, D4.3, we have updated and reclassified the theoretical concepts 
in order to better describe and understand the key factors underlying public perceptions and 
engagement actions.  
For the present analysis, eight in-depth country reports were selected from a total of twenty. We 
adopted a pragmatic approach, the selection was made based upon the following key criteria: 
 Geography (a balance of different locations across the European cases) 
 Exploring different political systems, cultural and democratic norms. 
 Different levels and types of public acceptance and social movements of opposition 
 
Resulting from the selection, the following eight countries are reviewed based upon these 
simplified criteria in Table 1: 
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Table 1 - Country Sample 
Country Geography (location) Political system 
Public 
Acceptance 
Bulgaria East Europe Soviet regime + Democracy High 
Finland Scandinavia Democracy  High 
F.R. Germany Central Europe Democracy Low 
Spain Mediterranean Europe Dictatorship + Democracy Low 
Sweden Scandinavia Democracy Medium 
Ukraine East Europe Soviet regime + Democracy Medium 
United Kingdom West Europe Democracy High 
USA North America Democracy Medium 
Source: own depiction 
 
2. Theoretical definitions on ‘public perception’ and ‘engagement’ 
The central objective of HoNESt is to identify and analyze the core explanatory factors of societal 
interaction with nuclear applications, based upon the historical data. This interaction – described 
in what follows as 'nuclear-societal relations' – includes three closely interrelated components: 
- Perception: It is crucial to identify and assess the importance of the factors underlying the 
societal perception of nuclear developments. 
- Civil society’s engagement with nuclear energy: Such perceptions have significantly motivated 
civil society’s varying engagement with this technology (from implicit or tacit support to active 
opposition). It is important to consider that citizens and civil society groups also played an active 
role in engaging with the technology. 
- Policy-makers’ and industry’s engagement with civil society: This is the main focus of the study: 
How did industry and policy makers – among other relevant actors – try to engage citizens and 
civil society? The goal here is to examine the different mechanisms and instruments used to 
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engage with society, in order to arrive at recommendations for an affordable, secure, and clean 
energy production. 
Nuclear-societal relations are embedded – and this is the core assumption underlying this 
research project –  in complex historical, political, economic, societal and cultural contexts. Only 
by taking seriously the varying importance of these contexts throughout time and space, it will be 
possible to understand controversies around nuclear energy, why these differ across countries, 
and what can be done to adequately engage society. 
We will describe here how the literature has addressed the study of public perception of 
technological risks in general, and of nuclear energy in particular, in order to identify the main 
underlying dimensions and their interrelationships with public engagement strategies and 
mechanisms. Grounded in these dimensions we have developed a theoretical model which will 
allow us to analyse the selected Short Country Reports. This model includes perceived benefits 
and risks of nuclear energy, societal trust in institutions, and other related socio-cultural, 
psychosocial, moral and political factors. Later we will relate these findings with several public 
engagement strategies. 
 
2.1. Public perception 
When defining public perception concepts, the same basics as established in deliverable D4.2 
have been followed. In that process, we learned how to better adapt our framework to ensure that 
most of the relevant data of the country reports were properly gathered and interpreted. 
Public acceptance and/or opposition to nuclear technologies reveal interplay between numerous 
complex factors influencing and shaping perceptions and values. These include factors such as 
institutional trust, procedural fairness, risk tolerability, availability of scientific information, and – 
most recently – nuclear power’s role in mitigating anthropogenic climate change (Besley, 2012; 
Parkhill et al., 2010; Pidgeon et al., 2008; Poortinga et al., 2006; Visschers/Siegrist, 2012). Such 
complex factors go beyond simple direct interactions with government and the nuclear industry 
and reflect a spectrum of interactions within local communities and within wider society (Whitton 
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et al., 2016). These complex factors can be traced in the main theoretical approaches of social 
theories of risk, such as the psychometric paradigm (Slovic 1993, 2000), affective approach 
(Slovic and Peters, 2006), the cultural theory of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982), the 
interpretative (Horlick-Jones et al. 2009, 2012; Wynne 1996) and the governance approaches 
(Renn 2008). Taking into account the experience of the inductive exercise involved in producing 
the D4.2 deliverable, all these factors have been integrated here in an updated analytical 
framework. 
In D4.2, we identified eight categories for evaluating public perceptions of nuclear energy: trust, 
national economics, consumer economics, local impact, environmental impact, social & ethical 
impact, health impact, and risk of catastrophic accident. Furthermore, we analysed public 
perceptions from just one actor category: the ‘receptors’ (or affected people). In order to include 
also the perceptions from other categories of involved actors in nuclear interaction contexts (such 
as the ‘promoters’ and the ‘regulators’), we have further developed our framework and re-
classified our conceptual categories into four general dimensions: health & environment, 
economics, socio-cultural, and political-institutional (see below).  
These conceptual assumptions, i.e. our integrated theoretical framework, allow us to better 
distinguish the structure of the perceptions of the actors related to nuclear energy. In this way, we 
not only distinguish between proponents or opponents of nuclear energy, but also are able to 
identify the specific dimensions that underlie actors’ support or rejection of nuclear technologies. 
This will allow us to better explain the frequent ambivalences related to nuclear developments, 
such as when (for example) an actor agrees that nuclear energy constitutes an economic benefit 
while at the same time, considers it unacceptable because it imposes threats to certain local 
identities, is linked to undesired uses of the territory, or because of a lack of trust in the managing 
institutions. This analytical approach could be very useful to better understand actors’ 
perceptions, and therefore to better understand the engagement activities in which they are 
involved. 
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2.1.1. The research on public perception of technological risk 
Research on public perception of risks first appeared and developed in the 1970s, and responded 
to the increasingly urgent need to understand and mitigate public protests about certain industrial 
activities and technologies (such as nuclear energy, waste disposal sites, etc.). Priority was given 
to identifying what kind of perceptions of risk people have, in order to be able to make decisions 
aimed at reducing the differences of opinion between members of the public and experts (and 
political and industrial managers). Much of the voluminous literature on risk perception and risk 
communication has addressed the differences between expert and lay assessments of the 
potential impacts of environmental and technological hazards. Though the evidence for 
differences of perceived risk magnitude between these groups is mixed (Flynn et al., 1993; Rowe 
and Wright, 2001). Where differentials in risk perception are prevalent, it is also notable that some 
hazards fail to motivate protective behaviour despite official warnings (e.g. Krimsky and Golding 
1992, Pidgeon et al. 2003), – thus we can understand risk perception as being based upon a 
range of different factors, not simply a rational assessment of the likelihood of harm. This is 
because individual psychological components such as the systematic biasing of risk information, 
the use of mental shortcuts (heuristics), and the way that risk information is presented, interpreted 
and understood can influence the public perceptions (Williamson et. Al, 2005),. Yet, despite an 
academic understanding that risk messages are interpreted through heterogeneous 
understandings, biases and heuristics, there is a persistent underlying logic amongst many 
technical and policy authorities to try and influence lay actor behaviour  towards risk by assuming 
that ‘people would behave responsibly if only they knew the facts’ (Horlick-Jones & Prades, 2009) 
– that risk perception is a matter of information or knowledge deficit (Sturgis and Allum, 2004).  
This deficit risk communication model led to the introduction of the concept of acceptable risk, 
which served to indicate the threshold on the basis of which people, in line with experts, could 
make a rational calculation of costs and benefits, and thus encourage them to stop opposing 
certain technological installations. Starr (1969), who is usually cited as the initiator of this 
economically grounded research perspective, carried out studies on the social acceptability of 
different sources of risk and developed a method of evaluation of the accepted level of risk in 
relation to the benefits produced by the technology. With this proposal, Starr tried to offer 
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scientific bases to establish normatively acceptable risk thresholds that could be used in the 
decision making process. From the observation and verification of what people do, he deduced a 
series of preferences, and supposed that society is able to achieve an optimum balance between 
the risks and benefits associated with each activity or technology. 
This proposal had soon been questioned from the field of cognitive psychology, leading to a 
series of research strategies that would later come to be known as the psychometric paradigm, 
one of the most prominent perspectives in the study of public perceptions of risk. This research 
strand aimed to resolve the methodological and conceptual deficiencies of Starr's proposal by 
identifying people's preferences on the basis of empirical data and controlled experiments, in 
order to find out the various attributes of risks that make people give them a greater or lesser 
weight (Fischhoff et al. 1978; Slovic et al., 1982, 1984; Slovic 2000). Grounded on the tradition of 
cognitive psychology and the theories of rational decision-making, the psychometric paradigm 
incorporates a multidimensional concept of risk in which the possible consequences of a risk are 
not only physical damage, but also other aspects including (amongst other components) 
psychological harm, fear and social loss. Psychometric studies revealed that people include into 
their judgments other elements beyond strict scientific data, thus divergences between expert 
assessments and lay perceptions did not have to do only with ignorance of probabilities and 
magnitudes of risk (as they have been defined by scientists). The research focused on 
discovering other elements or attributes of risk, and developed a taxonomy that could be used to 
understand and predict how society responds to risks (Slovic et al., 1984). The results of their 
empirical work have, for example, shown that, contrary to what Starr proposed, there is little 
correlation between risks and the benefits received. On the other hand, while Starr concluded that 
the voluntary nature of risk exposure was key to the acceptance of risk, psychometric paradigm 
research has shown that there are other equally influential factors. Thus, for example, Fischhoff 
et al. (1978) found that several basic attributes of risk could be reduced to two dimensions. One 
dimension discriminated between high- and low- technology activities, with the high end being 
characterized by new, involuntary, poorly known activities, often with delayed consequences. The 
second dimension reflected the certainty of death given that adversity occurs. Consideration of 
these two factors in addition to perceived benefit made acceptable risk judgments relatively 
predictable. However, in contrast to what had been suggested by Starr, correlations between the 
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acceptance of risks and the benefits perceived are more ambiguous, indirect and complex than 
expected. 
The other dominant strand of risk perception research during the last decades had been the so-
called cultural theory. The cultural theory ‘grid-group’ school (Douglas 1992) had sought to 
understand risk perception and risk-related behaviour in terms of the lifestyles (or, more 
accurately, the cultural allegiances) of those doing the perceiving. Anthropologists and 
sociologists have observed that various social and cultural groups differ regarding the importance 
they attach to particular risks, and they develop attitudes and behaviors that correspond to those 
ways of understanding the risks. The contributions of cultural studies on risk (Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Dake, 1991; Rayner, 1990, etc.) aim to explain this phenomenon by combining 
structuralist and constructivist theoretical approaches. From this perspective, beliefs, attitudes 
and values shared by certain groups (institutions, social groups, cultural groups) are considered 
to affect the selection of what they perceive to be a risk, and, therefore, people will be especially 
concerned about those events or aspects that mostly can affect or endanger their belief and value 
systems, their way of understanding and enacting their social relationships. With these 
assumptions in mind, the intention of the cultural theory of risk is not so much to focus on what 
risks people fear to a greater or lesser extent, but rather to find out what kind of social groups are 
concerned about certain risks and why.  
Douglas (1996) posits that risk perception research has been preoccupied with a focus upon 
individuals rather than institutions. From this theoretical standpoint, assumptions about 
environment and risks are supposed to be constructed (and selected) socially with the implicit 
purpose of maintaining group or institutional coherence (of maintaining models of predominant, or 
ideal social relationships). The systems of beliefs are seen as tacit expressions of the dominant 
social values and serve to construct social structures that are presented to individuals as if they 
were natural and inevitable. Institutions (or groups) select and use risks to control the uncertainty 
of human behavior, reinforcing the rules and facilitating internal coordination of the group. 
According to Douglas (1996), the threat of a catastrophe fulfils the function of activating certain 
mechanisms to renew the commitment of the members with the objectives of the organization, 
playing thus a role in the definition of social identities.  
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Both psychometric and cultural theory perspectives have faced a number of conceptual 
challenges, whilst empirical attempts to explore the interface between these approaches have 
produced interesting, if mixed, results (e.g. Marris et al. 1996, 1998, Sjöberg 1997, Slovic and 
Peters 1998).  
During recent years, greater emphasis has gradually been put on perspectives of a more 
integrated nature that, besides individual risk perception factors and lifestyles, also consider the 
social, political and cultural contexts in which processes of the perception and communication of 
risk occur (Horlick-Jones & Prades 2009; Wynne 2005; Renn 2008). So, for example, Otway and 
von Winterfeldt (1982, 1992) demonstrated that differences in perceptions of risk between 
individuals belonging to different social groups have a great deal to do with the existence of 
different beliefs about the technology or activity that generates the specific risk, beliefs that they 
consider to be integrated in broad systems of values through which the various groups attempt to 
maintain consistent social identities. 
In relation to this, some scientists have studied lay understanding of technological risks in the 
context of their development and application. Irwin, Walker and Simmons (1999) proposed that, 
rather than presenting local knowledge as fixed or separable from cultural practices, places and 
social world views, it is better to examine the relational and active construction of risk 
understandings, emphasizing the significance of such factors as local memory, observation and 
evidence, definitions of expertise, risk and credibility, and moral discourses. The perception of 
risk and benefits takes place in concrete contexts of everyday life, full of power relations, 
symbols, etc., that can influence such perceptions. Examining this theme in greater depth, Wynne 
(1980, 1989, 1992, 1996, 2005) suggested that the social perceptions of and responses to risk 
were not so much directly related to perceptions or evaluations of any objectively existing object, 
but rather to the relationships that people maintained with the institutions responsible for the 
management of said risk.  
As expert estimations of risk contain many and high levels of uncertainty, it is perfectly rational for 
people not to limit themselves merely to these when evaluating the magnitudes of risks. In short, 
perceptions of risk imply some element of judgement about the quality of the institutions involved, 
which is where Wynne (1996) argues the institutional dimensions of risk become relevant. In 
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other words, dimensions such as the trustworthiness of an institution (responsible for managing a 
risk), the existence of dependent relationships with that institution, its (perceived) independence 
with respect to other social agents, the perceived justice of its actions, its (perceived) legitimacy, 
its (perceived) competence, etcetera, become important criteria. 
From a social interpretativist approach, the categories of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ people are 
problematized drawing upon hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions; perspectives which 
recognise the central roles of meaning and interpretation in structuring social interaction and 
being (Horlick-Jones & Prades, 2009). Beck’s and Giddens’ Risk Society (or reflexive 
modernisation) Model (Beck et al. 1994) gave a fitting general sociological framework to the rise 
of these institutional and interpretative approaches. However, although these approaches provide 
interesting insights, serious questions exist about their capacity to capture the full diversity of risk-
related practices that may be observed in real-world settings.  
A broad sociological literature providing evidence of situationally-specific logics entailed in risk 
reasoning and practice across a range of organisational and social contexts has been emerging 
and should be taken into account in this context (Lupton 1993, White 1999, Jaeger et al. 2001, 
Prior 2001, Candlin and Candlin 2002, Espluga et al. 2009, 2014, Lupton and Tulloch 2002, 
Maynard 2003, Horlick-Jones 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, Horlick-Jones et al. 2007, Myers 2007, 
Poumadère 2016, Prades López et al. 2008).  
Renn’s work (2005, 2008) proposes a broad integrative governance approach, trying to take 
advantage of both a more contextual understanding of risk and a more traditional technical and 
analytical approach to risk (Klinke and Renn, 2002). From this perspective, public perception of 
risk is conceived as a selection process guided both by cultural values and institutional order, and 
also by systematic and technical-scientific reasoning (such as probability theory estimating 
damage potential and distribution). Thereby risk is conceived as constituted by both 
physical/material and social/cultural elements. The underlying argumentation is grounded on the 
assumption that although it is analytically possible to separate values and evidences, social 
norms and factual knowledge, analysis and deliberation, in practice there is a need for better 
integration of these separate entities. From this perspective, social science and natural science 
need to cooperate better and researchers and lay people need to cross-fertilize their different 
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understandings of risk, and Renn’s work is therefore devoted to finding a way that integrates 
different kinds of knowledge – namely an analytic-deliberative approach that brings together 
competing knowledge perspectives from technical and non technical actors (Renn, 1999). 
 
2.1.2. A conceptual model of factors underlying public perception of nuclear power 
The different perspectives of analysis depicted above respond to different theoretical and 
methodological (even ideological) positions, which are not always compatible with each other, but 
that have generated a strong body of knowledge useful to be used in understanding public 
perceptions and responses to technological risk. Most of these theoretical perspectives have 
been applied to the study of nuclear energy, showing how many of the mentioned factors 
influenced the public perception on this issue. So, a first phase of risk research from the 70’s to 
the 90’s of the past century focused on the factors underlying social responses to nuclear energy 
in general (and the proliferation of nuclear weapons), and towards the siting of nuclear plants in 
particular (i.e. Rothman & Lichter 1987).  
Based upon the analysis of the literature on nuclear perceptions, in what follows we will be 
suggesting a conceptual model of the factors and their interrelations shaping the public 
perception of nuclear power. As a first step, we shed light on main theoretical assumptions to be 
derived from the literature on nuclear perceptions:  
1. The degree of public acceptance (or toleration) of nuclear energy issues is mainly related to 
the perception of certain types of benefits and risks.  
2. The perception of risks and benefits is strongly influenced by the degree of trust that people 
have in the institutions and companies promoting and regulating nuclear power and sites.  
3. At the same time, both benefit/risk perceptions and social trust are influenced by a set of 
antecedent variables including affective feelings, 'affective imagery', values or beliefs and 
ideological and political orientations (e.g. pro-environmental ideological orientation). In addition, 
the conformation of previous attitudes towards nuclear energy tends to condition the possibility of 
changing these in the future, since a certain psychosocial inertia is a familiar phenomenon. 
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These assumptions can be combined to a theoretical model that is graphically represented in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Factors influencing public perception on nuclear power issues. (Source: own depiction based on literature analysis) 
 
In the following we will discuss how the nuclear perceptions literature has defined and 
implemented the elements of the model. 
 
a) Perceived benefits / risks 
It is difficult to define what ‘counts’ as a risk or benefit of nuclear energy, and to separate these 
two characteristics. The same factor can display both at the same time. For example electricity 
supply can be understood as an obvious benefit and as a shortage risk (if there are no nuclear 
plants). Similarly, governmental investment in new nuclear plants is simultaneously a community 
financial benefit from job creation, and a tax-payer liability – it is both benefit and risk at the same 
time.There is, therefore, no clear relationship between the perception of benefits and of risks. For 
instance, significant correlations between perceived benefit and perceived risk have been found 
in the literature (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Frewer et al., 1998; Gregory & Mendelsohn, 1993), but 
the opposite has also been found by other scholars (such as Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000). 
This may indicate that relationships between the perception of benefits and of risks could be a 
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context-dependent issue of each case studied. Moreover, When it comes to risks, we can 
understand them as often being transferred between types, locations or temporal scales. A new 
nuclear power station may for example transfer energy generation risks away from a community 
living with a coal-powered production facility, or reduce the long-term risks associated with 
anthropogenic climate change, whilst increasing potential radiation exposure risks to current or 
future generations from accidents or long-term spent fuel storage (Shrader-Frechette, 2000). 
Whether nuclear power is perceived as socially beneficial is therefore dependent (in part) upon 
framing effects in language (Barthe, 2009; Renzi, Cotton, Napolitano and Barkemeyer, 2017) – 
language influences the ways in which problems are constructed and presented to public actors, 
alongside technical and policy actors. 
The main types of benefits and risks related to nuclear power identified in the literature could be 
classified in the following categories: 
- Energy supply: Risk and benefits of nuclear energy relate to the capacity (or not) of 
covering energy needs (Keller, Visschers & Siegrist, 2012) and of guaranteeing 
continuous and sufficient electricity supply (Kılınç, Boye & Stanisstreet, 2013; Visschers, 
Keller & Siegrist, 2011; Corner, Venables, Spence, Poortinga, Demski & Pidgeon, 2011). 
Potential energy shortages are also considered as a perceived risk in some studies 
(Stoutenborough, Sturgess & Vedlitz 2013). The relative advantages and disadvantages 
of nuclear energy compared to other alternative energy options are mentioned by some 
scholars (Li, Brossard, Anderson, Scheufele & Rose 2016). The debate about the energy 
consumption levels and the convenience of reducing these is also present in the 
literature (Löfquist 2015). 
 
- Economic growth: Benefits and risks of nuclear power are related also to countries’ (and 
companies’) economic growth, emphasis on economic priorities (Van der Pligt, Eiser & 
Spears, 1984) and nation’s prosperity (Ylönen, Litmanen, Kojo & Lindell, 2017). 
Economic losses due to nuclear programs are also mentioned (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & 
Roth 2000). 
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- Safety issues: Some scholars focus on safety as a factor underlying positive attitudes 
towards nuclear power (Elam & Sundqvist, 2009; Ylönen, Litmanen, Kojo & Lindell, 
2017), in other cases accidents are reported as a key factor in changing attitudes (Keller, 
Visschers & Siegrist 2012). In fact, there is a large amount of data showing that 
acceptance of nuclear power decreased after the Fukushima nuclear accident. (Huang, 
Zhou, Han, Hammitt, Bi & Liu 2013). Risk of terrorist acts has also been taken into 
account in some studies (Kim, Kim & Kim 2014) 
 
- Environment and health effects: Health impacts on living organisms, including humans, 
living nearby (Kılınç, Boye & Stanisstreet 2013), and environmental impacts are 
considered here (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth 2000) (Keller, Visschers & Siegrist 2012). 
In fact, some studies show that governmental stakeholders are primarily concerned with 
the environmental and local impacts of nuclear fuel cycles. (Li, Brossard, Anderson, 
Scheufele & Rose 2016).  Besides, concerns related with the radioactivity potentially 
released (and its correlative chronic health and environmental risks) are reported by 
some studies (Keller, Visschers & Siegrist 2012). 
 
- Environmental benefits: The potential contribution of nuclear energy for climate change 
mitigation is widely analysed in recent risk perception literature (Visschers, Keller & 
Siegrist, 2011; Pidgeon, Lorenzoni & Poortinga 2008; Corner, Venables, Spence, 
Poortinga, Demski & Pidgeon, 2011). In fact, acceptance is mainly influenced by 
perceived benefits for a secure energy supply, and, to a lesser extent, by perceived 
benefits for the climate (Visschers, Keller & Siegrist (2011). But some studies show that 
people see both climate change and nuclear power as problematic in terms of risks, and 
express only a ‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power as a ‘solution’ to climate change 
(Pidgeon, Lorenzoni & Poortinga 2008). While higher proportions of the public are 
prepared to accept nuclear power if they believe it contributes to climate change 
mitigation, this is a highly conditional view, with, given the choice, very few actively 
preferring this over renewable sources (Corner, Venables, Spence, Poortinga, Demski & 
Pidgeon, 2011). However, when nuclear power was given an explicit ‘reluctant 
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acceptance’ framing – allowing people to express their doubts for nuclear power 
alongside their conditional support – concerns about climate change and energy security 
became positive predictors of support for nuclear power.  
 
- Military use of nuclear power is conceived as a risk in the literature (Keller, Visschers & 
Siegrist 2012), mainly because it is understood that nuclear power development entails 
some degree of nuclear weapon proliferation risks (stemming from uranium enrichment 
or reprocessing of spent fuel) (Lehtveer & Hedenus 2015). 
 
- Territorial and NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) effects are mentioned in different studies 
related with nuclear waste disposal (Kraft and Clary, 1991; Keller, Visschers & Siegrist 
2012), siting decisions being one of the main mentioned problems for the nuclear 
development in many countries (Cotton, 2017). 
As we will see later, our data analysis has allowed a more nuanced view of different benefits and 
risks related to nuclear developments in the selected countries, adding more complexity into the 
analysis and results. 
 
b) Social trust 
According to the literature, increased trust in the nuclear governance institutions reduces 
perceived risk of nuclear power, and higher trust and lower risk perceptions would predict positive 
attitudes toward nuclear power (Whitfield, Rosa, Dan & Dietz 2009). It is assumed that social trust 
can significantly influence local acceptance (Visschers, Keller & Siegrist 2011; Guo & Ren (2017), 
and the degree of trust earned by the several actors involved in nuclear processes is an important 
underlying key factor. For instance, it is said that trust in inspection authorities (Kim, Kim & Kim 
2014) is crucial for the decision between opposition and reluctant acceptance, whilst trust and 
honesty of industry and scientists, and their “competence” (confidence), are key factors in nuclear 
acceptance (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth 2000). The credibility and status of non-governmental 
organizations (Lehtonen 2010) has also been taken into account and proved to be a key factor.  
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An important part of the studies about social trust in risk issues are based on the ‘salient values 
similarity theory’, assuming that people who perceive that they share similar views with an actor 
(i.e. the managing agency) tend to trust this actor more than those who do not (Siegrist et al. 
2000; Cvetkovich and Winter 2003; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003; Walls et al. 2004). 
A factor strongly related to social trust is ‘fairness’. On the one hand, some scholars have shown 
that while individuals’ self-interest appeared to be a key underlying factor in cases of acceptance 
(Miller, 1998), believing that decision makers are fair is also important at the interpersonal level 
(Besley 2010).On the other hand, some scholars distinguish between outcome fairness and 
procedural fairness impacts, both being important, in some cases more the first ones and in 
others the second ones, in increasing decision acceptance (Visschers & Siegrist 2012). In 
general, procedural fairness in nuclear decision processes may be a key variable in the sense 
that those people who believe a procedure is fair are willing to accept a decision (Besley 2010). 
Some studies suggest that the influence of procedural fairness is even stronger for persons who 
hold high moral convictions (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth 2000). 
Hocke and Renn (2009) found that the inability of the parties to link the technical, political, and 
procedural issues into an integrated approach explained part of the public opposition to nuclear 
decisions (i.e. waste siting). These scholars warn that neglecting of democratic procedures and 
public involvement may be also an important factor related with public opposition.  
Finally, it is worth pointing out that frequently the development and siting of nuclear power 
appears to be linked to an unjustified distribution of risks and benefits (Löfquist 2015), which 
relates to lack of social trust in institutions and companies involved in nuclear developments. 
The literature refers also to trust in information sources, and it seems clear that the associations 
between trust and perceived risk and benefits of nuclear power varied according to the type of 
information source (i.e. when talking about the role of nuclear power in mitigating climate change) 
(Vainio, Paloniemi & Varho 2017). These scholars showed that trust in different information 
sources was also influenced by political party support and other ideological background variables. 
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c) Psychosocial, moral and political factors 
There is a growing consensus on the idea that taking into account broader socio-cultural factors 
whilst maintaining the necessary emphasis on safety, technological development, economics and 
environmental sustainability, is needed (Goodfellow, Williams & Azapagic 2011). Therefore, 
public perception on nuclear power is also related to more general beliefs and values which 
conform personal ideological systems, such as emphasis on economic versus social priorities, 
attitudes to technology and environmental concerns (Van der Pligt, Eiser & Spears, 1984), the 
social meaning of economic growth, or beliefs about the centralization of decision making (Van 
der Pligt, Eiser & Spears, 1984).  
In general, it is known that individuals express greater or lower support for nuclear power, 
depending on their adherence to certain social values (such as traditional, altruistic, etc.) 
(Whitfield, Rosa, Dan & Dietz 2009), and that people are more likely to protest in favor of or 
against nuclear energy when personal norms are strong (De Groot & Steg 2010). Besides, 
concern about the local community is also an important determinant, a fact that may be related to 
nuclear power issues being conceived as general, rather than personal, matters (Sjöberg & 
Drottz-Sjöberg 2001). People who expressed greater concern about climate change and energy 
security and exhibited higher environmental values were less likely to favour nuclear power 
(Corner, Venables, Spence, Poortinga, Demski & Pidgeon 2011).  
The Fukushima nuclear accident was followed by a significant amount of research on public 
perception of nuclear issues. Most of this work showed that changes in public views following the 
accident were moderated by political ideology (i.e. environmental views) over time (Besley & Oh 
2014, Poumadère 2014, 2016). Preconceived notions about nuclear energy influenced support 
for the promotion of nuclear energy (Stoutenborough, Sturgess & Vedlitz 2013). It has been 
suggested that change in acceptance since Fukushima could mainly be explained by prior 
support for nuclear power (Visschers & Wallquist 2013; Siegrist & Visschers 2013), in the sense 
that prior acceptance levels seem to have a central role in people’s acceptance of the technology 
after a nuclear accident. 
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Emotional identification can significantly influence local acceptance (Guo & Ren 2017). Affective 
feelings about nuclear power appeared to be a key factor (Visschers, Keller & Siegrist 2011), and 
those people who were opposed to nuclear power plants mainly associated nuclear power plants 
with negative feelings (Keller, Visschers & Siegrist 2012). 
Political games are also relevant in explaining people’s attitudes and behaviours. For instance, 
very frequently nuclear power and radioactive waste mangement issues are used by proponents 
and opponents as a strategic battleground to promote their respective perspectives, leading to a 
great social and political polarization (Hocke & Renn 2009). 
It therefore seems difficult to detach the issue of nuclear energy from questions about the kind of 
society in which people want to live (Van der Pligt, Eiser & Spears 1984, Poumadère 2014). In 
this sense, Löfquist (2015) argues that closing down nuclear power plants cannot be done without 
large disturbances in ordinary people’s lives, and therefore where this is deemed socially 
desirable, a reduction of energy consumption should take progressively place. 
 
2.2. Engagement 
Understanding public perceptions is an important step in attempts to engage with citizens about 
nuclear energy. There is no single successful risk communication/engagement process, although  
a number of rules and best practices have emerged such as those proposed by Covello and 
Sandman (2001), systematically recognizing the need to understand public perception and trust-
related issues (Slovic, 2000; Siegrist et al, 2000; Sjöberg, 2001). Here we have added the 
sociocultural framework in which people’s values and beliefs are rooted. 
Empirical research has further illustrated the insufficiency of purely technocratic approaches to 
risk communication (e.g. Horlick-Jones and De Marchi, 1995), and two-way engagement 
(including actively seeking the public involvement in decision-making) has become increasingly 
institutionalised in contemporary technology governance. 
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As stated in D4.2, based on the flow of information between participants and promoters, i.e. those 
who have commissioned the engagement initiative, we differentiate between three engagement 
types (Rowe and Frewer 2005). 
 Public communication refers to a process where information is transferred from the 
sponsor of an initiative to the public. There is no involvement of the public per se, i.e. 
public feedback is not required or sought. 
 Public consultation refers to a process of conveying information from members of the 
public to the sponsors of the initiative, following a process initiated by the sponsor. In this 
process, there is no formal dialogue between individual members of the public and the 
sponsors. 
 Public participation means the existence of knowledge exchange between members of 
the public and the sponsors. The most significant feature of a participatory engagement 
is that there is some degree of dialogue in the process. The flow of information is two-
way, with the exchange of information opening up the possibility of perception change in 
both the sponsors and the public. 
These three categories have proven to be effective in capturing and classifying nuclear-related 
engagement activities initiated by state authorities or industrial organisations. However, it turned 
out that beyond such ‘official engagement’ in the history of nuclear-society interactions the public 
and/or its representatives have often created and conducted their own participation activities. We 
suggest designating engagement actions directed from the public to regulators or nuclear 
companies as ‘public-forced communication’ or, better, ‘public initiated engagement’.  
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2.2.1. Nuclear communication and engagement 
In the area of nuclear developments a large amount of research about public perception can be 
found. Research on nuclear public engagement seems to be less frequent, although during 
recent years an increasing literature on nuclear waste repositories siting includes engagement-
focussed analysis. Since the 80’s, public involvement in techno-science largely focused on 
information provision, public relations, and public education. This led to ‘deficit model’ thinking, 
treating opposition towards nuclear technologies as something typical of misinformed people in 
need of the right data, whereby giving the correct information to the public was seen as the 
means to ameliorate public opposition to scientific and technological developments (Gregory and 
Miller, 1998; Horlick-Jones, 2009; Kurath and Gisler, 2009).  
During the history of nuclear development the ‘deficit model’ seemed to be the hegemonic 
approach, and Palmer & Schibeci (2014) show that deficit models (based on one-way information 
dissemination) still prevail within nuclear communication, although there is some evidence of 
movement towards more deliberative and participatory models. Kasperson (2014) concludes also 
that the design and implementation of risk communication practice seems little changed over 
recent decades. Simis, Madden, Cacciatore & Yeo (2016) suggest that the persistence of the 
deficit model may be a product of current institutional structures, and it could be related to the 
way in which scientists conceptualize ‘the public’ (according to the belief that public audiences 
would process information in a rational manner, as they themselves were trained). 
Kasperson (2014) calls for more pluralistic and deliberative modes of communication that are now 
required to respond to declining societal trust and ongoing difficulties in communicating 
uncertainty (i.e. cases in which it is difficult to calculate damage probabilities due to lack of data 
or due to different dimensions of damage such as technical, social, economic, etc.). This scholar 
argues for risk communication to be (a) more ambitious and sustained over time; (b) broadened 
to encompass values and lifestyles in risk issues; (c) more aware of which uncertainties matter in 
risk terms and which can be reduced; and (d) cognisant of the effect of limited trust on the nature 
of communication. 
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2.2.2. The key role of trust 
Trust plays a key role when designing communicative processes. A substantial part of the 
literature shows that when people trust the promoter and regulator institutions of nuclear 
developments, communicative and consultative strategies tend to work quite well. For instance, 
Lidskog & Sundqvist (2004) described the historical development of nuclear waste management 
in Sweden, showing that it has been carried out with explicit reference to scientific findings, and 
instead it is better understood as an active adaptation to demands from different stakeholders (in 
the sense that sometimes the social and political context has a greater weight than the scientific 
findings in shaping the public acceptation).This adaptation, however, has basically been of a 
strategic kind, aiming to pilot an already formulated policy rather than open it up for negotiations 
and substantial changes. According to Lidskog & Sundqvist (2004), the waste manager (SKB) is 
able to interact directly, face-to-face, with the local population and establish a specific framing of 
the issue, gaining knowledge on what matters to local stakeholders, and being able to develop a 
communication strategy sensitive to local issues at the same time as its discursive understanding 
of the issue is disseminated. 
Several studies demonstrate also that one-way information seems only to work when trust 
already exists (as shown in the analysis of the British nuclear waste management program made 
by Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2004). When there is a lack of trust, researchers claim that this could be 
created through opening up risk assessments and management processes to wider public 
involvement and greater public scrutiny (Irwin, 1995; Poumadère, 2014; Renn et al., 1995). In this 
way, it is argued that decisions would better reflect social values, thereby building rather than 
eroding public confidence.  
Mah & Hills (2014) studied policy making processes and outcomes (with particular reference to 
the 2007 UK nuclear consultation exercise), and they found that the government approach paid 
insufficient attention to ‘trust’ and some other normative ‘values’ underpinning participatory 
governance, contributing to undesirable outcomes relating to policy legitimacy and public distrust. 
They suggest the significance of paying more attention to the interaction that can occur between 
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different rationales for participation. In the same vein, Kinsella, Andreas & Endres (2015) 
explained how nuclear power involves a complex discursive terrain encompassing competing 
promotional and oppositional narratives; ambiguous relationships to different problems (such as 
climate change or energy security); varied forms of negotiation and rhetorical boundary work; 
fragmented and often-incommensurable discourses and forms of knowledge (Kinsella et al. 
2013); and organizational, institutional, and political challenges related to managing and 
governing a presumed high-risk technology. The concept of ‘rethorical boundary work refers to 
the social construction of boundaries between differents spheres (economic, political, technical, 
etc.). As Kinsella (2013) argues, insufficient resonance between scientific, economic, and political 
communication systems can produce situations where system rationality increasingly loses its 
claim to be world rationality. Thus the rhetorical production and reification of boundaries 
separating these domains can, itself, be a source of risk. 
In every case, the main actors involved in nuclear processes (promoters, regulators and public 
authorities, and affected people or receptors) interact and try to dominate the discourse based on 
the ability to influence the decision-making process and to mobilize public support (Jaeger et al. 
2001; Renn 2008; Hocke & Renn, 2009). 
A two-way relationship between communication and trust is argued. Good communication needs 
good trust as a prerequisite. But wrong communication can erode or promote the loss of (pre-
existing) trust. In this sense, Fahlquist & Roeser (2015) argue that communication about nuclear 
risks is a complex territory, especially after the Fukushima event, requiring not only 
considerations about effectiveness, but also about ethical legitimacy. They stated that 
problematic effects of poor communication can be a lack of trust or a sense of hopelessness and 
passivity. 
 
2.2.3. The difficult path towards participatory management in nuclear 
issues 
In fact, during the last two decades there has been an international trend towards public 
participation, under the assumption that this could become the mechanism through which nuclear 
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decisions could be made socially robust (Flueler and Sholtz, 2004). This confirms that a top-down 
approach, including one-way communication, is not productive when there is a lack of trust, and 
that what is needed in these cases is a strategy characterized by dialogue, discussion and 
deliberation, where social learning – that all participants have to learn about each other’s ways of 
perceiving and evaluating risks – have a central role.  
In this sense, public participation has been recognized as a means to cope with local opposition 
towards nuclear projects (especially in disposal siting processes). Advocates promoting extensive 
public participation suggest various, mostly distinct, involvement techniques that are claimed to 
cover all needs. For instance, Krütli, Stauffacher, Flüeler & Scholz (2010) distinguished four 
discrete levels of public participation, namely information, consultation, collaboration, and 
empowerment, each one fitting the corresponding technical and non-technical requirements of 
the different phases of the process. 
But the apparent consensus about the importance of participation in building social trust is not so 
easy to put in practice. It seems to be more a discursive wish than a true practice. For instance, 
Short & Rosa (2004), using the example of the failure to site a high-level nuclear waste (HLW) 
repository in the USA, stated that although widely regarded as a necessary condition for success, 
the principles underpinning stakeholder involvement are often violated in practice. They refer to 
key principles such as actors’ representativeness, the recognition of the inevitability of uncertainty 
and agreed-upon ways of dealing with it; the development of ‘communities of fate’ and of trust 
among all stakeholders; the building on common values related to the environment and to the 
well-being of future generations; or the adherence to the rule of law (Short & Rosa, 2004). 
Another deficit detected among real participative practices is that most of the bodies doing it are 
engaging with professional communities, more than with the broader social community (Palmer & 
Schibeci 2014). 
Other scholars (such as Sundqvist & Elam 2010) warned about the fact that the introduction of 
participatory approaches (the so-called ‘participatory-deliberative turn’) in the nuclear sector have 
been focusing too strongly on procedural matters while deflecting attention away from the 
possibilities of using participation as a more genuine means of enabling public issues and 
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concerns to reach a more complex level of structuration. According to this point of view, public 
engagement tends to be treated as a good in itself instead of a means to favour the discussion 
together with the public and stakeholders, avoiding public concerns to be merely seen as 
troubles. 
 
2.3. An analytical framework based on the social dimensions of risk and 
their relation with engagement mechanisms 
Coming back to the technical concept of risk (Renn, 1992), this refers to a situation where 
something negative can happen, a hypothetical future possibility that can be scientifically defined 
by calculating the ‘probabilities’ and by estimating the magnitude of the potential ‘consequences’ 
(understood as harm or losses, or its reverse, benefits). From a technical perspective, risk is a 
combination of probabilities (from low to high) and consequences (from low to high), during a 
period of time. Diagrams combining probabilities and consequences are well known among risk 
analysts (i.e. Curtis & Carey 2012; and Cox 2008 for limitations) as a tool in guiding risk 
assessment in real-settings. 
The ‘probabilities’ can be calculated taking into account historical data about failures, incidents 
and accidents. When these data are not available we will face some degree of ‘uncertainty’. High 
levels of uncertainty could make difficult the decision-making about the technology in question. 
Different groups (companies, social movements, lobbies, etc.) can argue ‘uncertainty’ in order to 
discuss the acceptability of a certain technology, infrastructure or activity. 
The ‘consequences’ of a technology can range from trivial impacts to serious or high severity of 
losses or harms, and can also be estimated according to historical data of failures, incidents and 
accidents. Usually, science can provide these data, but sometimes consequences are (still) 
unknown or hypotheses about potential losses are not fully tested yet (sometimes causal 
connections between risk factors and harms cannot be established because evidences are 
weak). Decision-making about the technology, infrastructure or activity becomes more complex, 
as several actors claim legitimacy to ask for their vision to be included in the process. 
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We would like to note that disparities between different actors’ visions are also grounded on the 
existence of different perceptions regarding the type of ‘consequences’ at stake. This is a key 
point in our analysis. According to the above social science literature overview, several 
dimensions of risk can be identified.  
In D4.2, we identified eight categories for evaluating public perceptions of nuclear energy: trust, 
national economics, consumer economics, local impact, environmental impact, social & ethical 
impact, health impact, and risk of catastrophic accident. Furthermore, we analysed public 
perceptions from just one actor category: the ‘receptors’ (or affected people). In order to include 
also the perceptions from other categories of involved actors in nuclear interaction contexts (such 
as the ‘promoters’ and the ‘regulators’), we have further developed our framework and re-
classified our conceptual categories into four general dimensions: health & environment, 
economics, socio-cultural, and political-institutional. These general dimensions can be defined as 
follows: 
- Health & Environment dimension: This dimension includes the perception of positive 
and/or negative effects related to human health (acute or chronic effects) and to 
environmental issues (water, soil and atmosphere pollution, loss of biodiversity, climate 
change effects, etc.), and also safety concerns and other control-management related 
factors. Former categories derived from D4.2 include ‘health impact’, ‘environmental 
impact’ and ‘risk of catastrophic accident’, which here represent different sub-dimensions 
(among others).  
- Economic dimension: This dimension refers to the perception of factors related to 
economic issues, in positive and/or negative ways. It encompasses topics such as 
potential (or actual) job creation, new business related to the construction or 
management of nuclear infrastructures, potential economic losses due to nuclear 
incidents, security of supply, industrial progress, resource requirements, concerns about 
energy prices, etc. Former D4.2 categories included (partially) in this dimension are ‘local 
impact’, ‘national economics’ and ‘consumer economics’. 
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- Socio-cultural dimension: This dimension refers to several factors identified in two 
different theoretical approaches - namely the psychometric paradigm and the cultural 
theory of risk. The basis for the first approach is evidence that, as opposed to what might 
be expected, there is not always a linear relationship between the perception of benefits 
generated by an activity or technology and the perception of the risks it involves 
(contributions of psychometric approach and cultural theory would support this 
dimension). The D4.2 categories ‘local impacts’ and (partially) ‘social & ethical impacts’ 
are included in this new general socio-cultural dimension, along with other aspects, such 
as local social networks, territorial identities, locally unwanted land uses, life styles, 
cultural traditions, values, beliefs, world-views, etc. 
- Political-institutional dimension: In order to understand people's responses to a risk, it is 
not enough just to know about their perceptions. There is also the need to analyse the 
context of the social relations in which these responses take place, taking into 
consideration pertinent institutional dimensions like credibility, trust, perception of 
injustice or inequality, governance issues (etc.) (Wynne, 1996; Renn, 2008). From this 
perspective, there is a need to consider that when people evaluate a potential hazard, 
they implicitly make an evaluation of the institutions that promote and manage it, and 
generate a judgement about the credibility or trustworthiness that these deserve. 
Categories such as ‘trust’ (already identified in D4.2), but also credibility, perception of 
injustice, equity, confidence in institutions, governance issues, etc. are part of this 
general dimension.  
These conceptual assumptions, i.e. our integrated theoretical framework, allow us to better 
distinguish the structure of the perceptions of the actors related to nuclear energy. In this way, we 
not only distinguish between proponents or opponents of nuclear energy, but also are able to 
identify the specific dimensions that underlie actors’ support or rejection of nuclear technologies. 
This will allow us to better explain the frequent ambivalences related to nuclear developments, 
such as when (for example) an actor agrees that nuclear energy constitutes an economic benefit 
while at the same time considers it unacceptable because it imposes threats to certain local 
identities, is linked to undesired uses of the territory, or because of a lack of trust in the managing 
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institutions. This analytical approach could be very useful to better understand actors’ 
perceptions, and therefore to better understand the engagement activities in which they are 
involved. 
The relationships between the four analytical dimensions are not linear. Following the literature 
review (Whitfield, Rosa, Dan & Dietz 2009; Visschers & Siegrist 2013; Huang, Zhou, Han, 
Hammitt, Bi & Liu 2013; Tsujikawa, N., Tsuchida, S., & Shiotani, T. 2016), we are proposing a 
particular mode of interaction between the dimensions of risk (figure 2), inspired by the main 
assumptions identified in the literature review. 
 
  
Figure 2: Relationships between the dimensions of risk (Source: authors) 
 
We argue that this model has impacts in the engagement strategies to be implemented in every 
case-study. In each case, the first task will be to identify the arguments used by each actor to 
justify it’s proposal, strategy, or opinion. Based on this, we can find several situations, and in each 
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one the relationship between perception and engagement will be different while at the same time 
being shaped by the following three general principles: 
It is obvious that if the dispute relies on concerns about safety, health or environment, or on 
economic issues, data to achieve agreements, to deny arguments, or to convince the contrary 
could be found and discussed.  
But if the dispute focuses on the people’s lack of trust or confidence in the institutions in charge of 
managing nuclear issues, things become more complex. Although many objective data could be 
provided, it will still be difficult to achieve an agreement. In these cases, what is under discussion 
are not objective data, but rather the capacity of institutions or companies to be trustworthy. 
Trustworthiness is not only composed by technical values (expertise), but also by a subjective 
dominant dimension (fairness) which is very difficult to manage (especially when it has been lost).  
Finally, if the arguments in controversies revolve around questions of social identities, values and 
beliefs, etc., then the communication of objective data will also probably be unfruitful (although it 
has to be done anyway) since what the actors are looking for is some kind of recognition on the 
part of others (claiming status, dignity, etc.). The difference with what is said in the previous 
paragraph is that, while there the reason for the dispute lies in the relationship between people 
and institutions (trust relations), in this last situation the conflict is based on community social 
relations, which give rise to to ideological positions, social identities, etc.  Our case-studies will be 
based on this framework analysis. 
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2.4. Methodology and sample  
The social science methodolgy has been conditioned by the specifications of the original EU call 
(NFRP-12-2014), which mandatorily established a project in three phases: 
In the first phase, historians shall provide the core facts and figures, based on available 
documents and other sources of information, complemented as appropriate by field 
investigations, notably interviews of major players with regard to the selected developments and 
projects. This should result in a well-organised and documented database and historical record 
(the SCRs).  
The second phase shall bring-in social science specialists in order to analyse and interpret this 
information from the perspective of furthering the understanding of the mechanisms for effective 
interaction with civil society regarding nuclear applications and projects, including the factors 
underlying perception, participation and engagement. 
In the third and last phase, the results shall be presented and discussed with industry, 
associations, policy makers and representatives of the civil society. 
According to these very detailed specifications of the EU call, the possibility of social scientists 
obtaining information on their own was not contemplated, in principle. However, although these 
were the specifications of the call, in the HoNESt project we have tried to go further and 
implement a more integrative approach, by embedding the research process in an 
interdisciplinary framework combining historical accounts of nuclear developments with social 
science analyses of public perceptions and stakeholder engagement. To achieve this, we 
developed a methodology that enables social scientists to analyse the data and reports delivered 
by HoNESt historians – given the differences in disciplinary norms within their respective fields. In 
the first place, contents of the SCR will be compiled on the basis of historian’s research methods, 
and be framed by a chapter structure commonly decided upon by historians and social scientists 
in WP3. To further underline the interdisciplinary character of HoNESt, members of both 
disciplines developed a set of guiding questions historians should aim to take into account when 
compiling their country studies. In this sense, within WP3, a Guidance Framework (GF; cf. D3.1) 
has been designed to support historians in data collection and generating short country reports. 
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Historians will use the GF as a compass for gathering, prioritising, and consolidating the data they 
found in sources such as archives, documents, etc. 
We aim to identify and analyse the public perceptions and communication and engagement 
activities carried out by the different actors involved in nuclear developments. In order to enable 
clear distinctions between different originators and receptors of engagement processes, HoNESt 
researchers have developed the following scheme consisting of four actor types. 
 
Figure 3: Actor’s taxonomy (Source: Rubio-Varas et al., 2016) 
 
For the purpose of D4.3, we feel it useful to introduce a slighty changed terminology regarding the 
actor category ‘Regulator’. Because not all actors involved in regulation activities may actually be 
‘Regulators’, we instead decided to talk of  ‘Public Authorities’ referring to Regulators and others 
in charge of making regulations.We are aware that in nuclear decision processes ’Public 
authorities’ may belong to several actor types, especially in siting processes, where local and 
regional governments can be classified as ‘Receptors’. It is the specific context of each case 
which determines whether a public authority behaves as a regulator or receptor. 
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A synthesis of the findings of the analysis of ‘key events’ and the ‘historical narrative’1 of each 
selected country has been done in the following way: 
1. Filling in an analytical grid (composed of the analytical dimensions proposed above) for every 
key event, and for the country narrative. 
2. Interpreting the results by trying to understand the underlying patterns in the use of 
arguments and discourses related to the general analytical dimensions characterized above: 
o Health & Environment dimension 
o Economic dimension 
o Socio-cultural dimension 
o Political-institutional dimension 
As the events and narratives are the sources of the perception and engagement analyses, table 2 
presents a list summarizing all events.  
 
Table 2: List of analysed events  
Bulgaria 
General narrative  
Event 1 - Starting the experimental reactor IRT-2000 near Sofia in 1962 
Event 2 - Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-
1977 
Event 3 - Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident 
Event 4 - Initial negotiations and contract with the European Union for 
memberships, which included decommissioning reactor 1,2,3,4 at Kozloduy 
NPP – 1993- 2004 
Event 5 - Referendum for constructing new atomic power plant in Bulgaria- 
2013 
F.R. Germany 
General narrative 
Showcase - Wunderland Kalkar  
Event 1 - German Atomic Program – First Nuclear Research Centre 
Event 2 - Civil Society Interaction—The Wyhl Example  
Event 3 - Civil Society Interaction—The Wackersdorf Example 
Event 4 - Civil Society Interaction—The Gorleben Example  
Event 5 - Energy transition after Fukushima 
Finland General Narrative 
                                                     
1 All short country reports produced by HoNESt historians follow the same structure. Beyond a ‘Showcase’ and a 
‘Facts and Figures” section they provide about five ‘Events’ crucial for the country’s nuclear history, a ‘Showcase’ 
with a more in-depth depection, and a comprehensive overview of its ‘Historical context (narrative)’. Some reports 
added one or more appendix describing key themes or current issues (as the USA case). This deliverable is based 
on the descriptions and analyses of the reports’ “events” and “narrative” sections. 
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Showcase - Collective memory and the uneasy nuclear collaboration 
between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union 
Event 1 - From isolation into transnational networks 
Event 2 - Finnish nuclear power project 1955-1962 
Event 3 - Transnational organizations and the Cold War politics 
Event 4 - Surprise in Moscow 
Event 5 - Becoming the “Atom town” 
Event 6 - First nuclear debates 
Spain 
General Narrative 
Showcase – Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor)  
Event 1 – Vandellós I (nuclear incident in 1989) 
Event 2 – Ascó Nuclear Power Plant 
Event 3 – Basque antinuclear movement 
Event 4 – Nuclear moratorium 1983 
Event 5 – Nuclear Repository Waste (sitting process) 
Sweden 
General Narrative 
Event 1 - The atomic weapons controversy 
Event 2 - TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
Event 3 - Local protests against a repository 
Event 4 - Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
Event 5 - A competition for getting a repository 
UK 
General Narrative 
Event 1 - First nuclear weapons test 1952 
Event 2 - First nuclear power station opens 1956 
Event 3 - Windscale Fire 1957 
Event 4 - SGHWR chosen as AGR replacement 1974 
Event 5 - Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
Event 6 - Sizewell B public inquiry 1982-5 
Event 7 - Government repositioning on new build NPPs 2006 
Ukraine 
General Narrative 
Showcase – Dealing with Chernobyl disaster aftermath 
Event 1 - Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
Event 2 - Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium 
on the construction of new nuclear reactors (1989-1991) 
Event 3 - Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-
nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
Event 4 - Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP 
and public hearings on the completion of the Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear 
reactors in exchange (1994-2000) 
Event 5 - Start-up of the Kmelnytska 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors (2004) as 
part of strategy aiming at “nuclear revival” and new public information effort 
USA 
General narrative 
Showcase - Early Demonstration Projects 
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Event 1 - Licensing and Operation of Enrico Fermi (Detroit) Breeder 
Reactor 
Event 2 - Licensing and Protest over Diablo Canyon NPP and the Abalone 
Alliance Protests 
Event 3 - Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, 1979 
Event 4 - Seabrook Nuclear Power Station and Clamshell Alliance Protests 
Event 5 - Davis-Besse NPP Operation and Reactor Head Corrosion (2002) 
Appendix 1 - Current Status and Plans: Nuclear power in the US 
Appendix 3 - Reactor Safety Studies 
Appendix 4 - Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Source: own depiction 
The conditions in which nuclear energy has been developed in different countries vary greatly 
over time, since each historical phase is characterized by a specific political, social and economic 
context. Therefore, for the analysis of all the data available in the SCRs, it has been decided to 
distinguish three main historical phases:2 
 Phase 1: 1950 – 1970: Post-war developments and Atoms for Peace. First phase of 
nuclear energy development. 
 Phase 2: 1970 – 1990: Economic growth and public mobilisation. Three Mile Island (TMI) 
and Chernobyl accidents impacted the public opinion. 
 Phase 3: 1990 – 2015: Drop of the Iron Curtain. Globalization. Climate change, peak-oil, 
energy crises and the role of renewables. Fukushima accident. 
The following section shows the results (key findings) on public perceptions and engagement 
initiatives identified in the selected case studies, according to how they were described by the 
Historians team in the Short Country Reports (SCR).  
 
 
  
                                                     
2 These three phases were discussed and defined by the HoNESt Consortium at the Barcelona meeting (2016, 
October the 6-7th)   
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3. Public perception and engagement in the selected case studies 
Based on the texts (SCR) written by the team of Historians for each selected country, this section 
explains how each of the dimensions of analysis is discussed, highlighting its content in different 
historical periods. Concrete verbatim excerpts on which the explanations are summarized and the 
synthesis tables can be found in Annex 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
3.1. Perception of risks and benefits of nuclear power: Key findings 
According to our proposed analytical framework, the risks and benefits can be interpreted as 
those factors belonging to the health and environment and economic dimensions (see figure 2, 
above).   
The analysis carried out shows that the perceived risks are very similar in all the countries 
sampled. The most frequently mentioned risks (see table 3) are those related to the possibility of 
accidents and radiation contamination; in both cases these include damages or losses that may 
affect human health or the environment (especially aquatic, fluvial or marine environments). 
There are also concerns about the safety of nuclear facilities, as well as episodes of stress and 
anxiety in some people when confronted by the possibility of such risks materializing. 
It can be said that a large part of the references to health concerns related to nuclear power were 
reported in the period 1970-1990, although some fewer references can also be found in other 
periods. This tends to coincide with the period of higher social mobilization against nuclear 
projects around the world. This means that most of the protests used to be based on health and 
environmental arguments, although there could be other dimensions involved that were not 
obvious (not explicit). 
Regarding ‘actors’, mostly the ‘receptors’ (affected people) expressed concerns about health 
effects, but neither promoters nor public authorities (regulators, etc.) tended to focus on this 
dimension, and when this happened they tend to express the low probability of these potential 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
44 
harms (as such in the USA case, event 3, see annex I)3 or highlighting its potential healthy uses 
(as such in the Finnish case, event 1, see annex I). 
In similar terms, although roughly absent during the first period of the nuclear development, since 
the 70’s the environmental risks became a dominant argument among all the involved ‘actors’. 
Since then, perceptions of positive and/or negative effects related to environmental issues, such 
as water, soil and air pollution, and climate change impacts are reported in the SCRs (see the 
annex I). Affected people (receptors) highlighted in a broad sense the potential environmental 
impacts of nuclear facilities (actual in the cases like Chernobyl in Ukraine). On the contrary, we 
identified only a few references to these impacts on the promoters and regulators side, usually 
hinting at positive impacts such as mitigating climate change. We are aware that this could be 
seen as a kind of truism as the scientific community has stated that, despite the low probability of 
accidents with large radioactive releases, a technology requiring evacuation plans should not be 
further promoted. In fact, promoters tend to say that generation IV technology would aim at 
inherently safer systems, therefore avoiding the need of evacuation plans. 
Regarding local receptors, the SCRs show several cases of municipalities arguing about potential 
environmental dangers if hosting a repository (i.e. Sweden, event 3, see annex I), and some 
social movements opposed to it and advocate for other technological options (less risky). 
However, in some countries (i.e. UK, event 7, see annex I), receptors seemed to agree with a 
‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power because it could help in coping with the low-carbon 
energy and climate change challenges. 
The perception of risks related to the high economic costs that nuclear projects entail is also 
relevant, as is the concern related to the supposedly low sustainability of nuclear projects (in 
environmental, economic or social terms).  
                                                     
3 From here onwards we are putting the concrete references of the cited arguments indicating to which section or 
event of the respective SCR they belong,. For instance, in this case we are refering to the event 3 of the USA report, 
to be found in Annex I. All the concrete selected fragments to illustrate our argumentation can be found in the Annex 
I, classified by theme, historial period and country. The SCRs correspond to the February 2017 versions of the SCRs 
available in the project webpage (http://www.honest2020.eu/), most of which are under revision when writting this 
report. When we have the definitive final versions these references will have to be updated. 
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Interestingly, there are hardly any differences by country. The same concerns (the same 
perceived risks) appear more or less clearly in all the studied countries.  
However, there are some differences in relation to each historical period. While in the first period 
(1950-1970) the mention of risks is low, during the second period (1970-1990) the references to 
risks multiply, and in the third period (1990-2015), there is less mention of them in the SCRs 
(although always more than during the first period). However, we should approach these data 
with caution since our analysis is not based on a quantitative approach, but on a qualitative one, 
and for that reason quantities or frequencies are not relevant in this context. The focus of our 
analysis is placed on arguments, themes, actors and historical phases. 
Table 3: Perceived risks of nuclear energy identified in the selected case-studies SCRs, by periods. 
1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2015 
F pollution 
F safety culture 
G high cost 
SP high cost 
SW safety 
UK radiation 
U financial damage 
US Accident 
US high cost 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B Health and safety 
B emergency 
B stress, anxieties 
B safety 
B high cost 
G safety 
G pessimistic view 
G high costs (2) 
SP radiation (2) 
SP safety 
SP High costs (3) 
SP economic uncertainties 
SW Accidents, fears and anxieties 
SW environment dangers 
SW high costs (2) 
UK concerns about the environment 
U radiation (2) 
U damage for health (2) 
U Environmental concerns 
U economic compensations (2) 
US accidents 
B technical safety 
B safety conditions 
F accident 
F non-carbon-free 
F Low sustainablility (2) 
F high costs (3) 
SP High costs 
UK High costs 
UK environmental concerns 
U High costs 
U safety 
US environmental impacts 
US safety 
US High costs 
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US safety 
US high costs (2) 
Source: own depiction based in the in-depth analysis of the SCR. Each line means that this risk is mentioned in the respective 
SCR, (numbers in brackets when it appears more than once) (Code: B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = Spain; 
SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = Ukraine; US = United States). 
 
What about the perceived benefits? Although they are less mentioned than the risks, the SCR 
also mentions the benefits perceived in the promotion of nuclear energy. 
In the same way as the perceived risks, the perceived benefits are relatively similar among all the 
countries in the sample (table 4). In all the countries there are actors who argue that nuclear 
energy will bring benefits of different types, especially in economic terms (jobs, socioeconomic 
development, inexpensive electricity or a guarantee of energy supply), but also (to a lesser 
extent) environmental benefits, and even for human health.  
Environmental impacts were used in different ways along the different historical phases. 
References to positive environmental effects of nuclear energy appeared already in the first 
period as a response (from promoters and public authorities) to the early concerns of the public, 
whom at this time was not much worried about it (i.e., Finland, Event 5, see annex I). During the 
second period (1970-1990), after recognizing its potential negative impacts, promoters and public 
authorities tried to explain its relative importance and, in some cases, to highlight its potential 
positive environmental impacts (i.e. Sweden, General narrative; Spain, Showcase; see annex I). 
These arguments increased since the 90’s, when promoters and public authorities argued that 
without nuclear power stations the international climate agreement cannot be fulfilled (is the case 
of Finland, General narrative and Showcase; UK, General narrative and event 7; or USA, General 
narrative and event 1; see all the concrete excerpts in annex I). According to this interpretation, 
nuclear power would play the role of a preventative measure in mitigating environmental risks. 
Another argument mentioned is that some people (mainly promoters/regulators) have a high 
degree of confidence in the technical safety of the nuclear industry (which could be interpreted as 
a benefit or positive impact). (i. e. the cases of Finland, General Narrative; Spain, Showcase and 
event 2; UK, General narrative, event 4 and event 5; see annex I). 
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Unlike the perceived risks, which remain more or less stable throughout the three contemplated 
historical phases, regarding benefits, some small changes are observed through time, specifically 
with respect to environmental benefits. In the first two phases (1950-1970 and 1970-1990), some 
actors talk about positive environmental impacts of nuclear energy production,such as 
temperature increases that could favor certain ecosystems, economic activities, and less pollution 
than other industries (i.e. Sweden, General narrative; Spain, Showcase, see annex I). However, 
since 1990 there are no more references of this type, and instead, they speak more about the 
benefits of nuclear energy in the fight against climate change. Additionally, it is worth noting that 
there are hardly any differences between the perceived benefits in the different selected 
countries. 
Table 4: Perceived benefits of nuclear energy identified in the selected case-studies SCRs, by periods. 
1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2015 
F energy supply 
F inexpensive electricity 
F jobs 
F jobs (high quality) 
F socioeconomic development 
G socioeconomic development 
SW positive environmental impacts 
US investments (business) 
 
 
F safest 
F useful for medical healthy uses 
G clean and safe energy  
SP energy supply 
SP Jobs 
SP positive environmental effects 
SP Safest standards 
SP socioeconomic development (2) 
SW inexpensive electricity 
SW investments (business) 
SW safest 
SW suitability 
UK safest 
US healthy 
F climate change challenges 
F jobs 
F radiation is a natural phenomenon 
F safest 
SP radiation is a natural 
phenomenon 
SP socioeconomic development 
SW Jobs 
SW safest (2) 
U economic viability 
U safest 
UK climate change challenges (3) 
US investments (business) 
Source: own depiction based in the in-depth analysis of the SCR. Each line means that this benefit is mentioned in the respective 
SCR, (numbers in brackets when it appears more than once) (Code: B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = Spain; 
SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = Ukraine; US = United States). 
It is observed that perceived health and environmental issues are closely related to the 
perception of technological safety. Some reflections on safety concerns according to the 
analysed SCRs are needed: In general terms, most of the safety concerns regarding nuclear 
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energy arose after the 1970’s. Before this date few doubts about safety issues were found among 
the SCR (only the Finnish fears about Soviet designs, and reported criticisms in Sweden from 
technical experts and politicians regarding safety requirements of the reactors) (Finland, Event 4; 
Sweden, General narrative,  see annex I). However, since the 1970’s, safety concerns are 
frequently used to define arguments for or against nuclear developments. On the one hand, 
contradicting attitudes came from the public and specific experts on issues concerning the safety 
of the reactors, while receptors showed increased concerns about the location of the nuclear 
installations because of safety issues (F.R. Germany, Showcase, and event 3, see annex I). After 
international nuclear accidents, such as TMI and Chernobyl, their claim for safety was reinforced. 
On the other hand, promoters and regulators tend to focus on high technological expertise and 
innovations to argue for the guaranteed safety of the NPPs. For example, in Finland new reactors 
were considered by the nuclear Promoters and Regulators far safer than those of TMI or 
Chernobyl (Finland SCR, General narrative; see annex I). In Spain Promoters argued that the 
technology was safe and effective (Spain, Showcase; see annex I). While in the UK, the public 
authorities made decisions based on the assumption that British citizens required confidence that 
their government had chosen the safest available nuclear technology (UK, General narrative, and 
event 4, see annex I). However, not all the public authorities were able to maintain the image of 
nuclear power as a safe energy source. For instance, in the F.R. Germany it was not possible 
after the Chernobyl case (F.R. Germany, Event 3, see annex I), nor in the USA after the Three 
Mile Island (TMI) accident revealed weaknesses in the regulators’ and promoters’ actions (USA, 
Event 3, see annex I), which in turn led to increased regulatory powers and a renewed safety 
philosophy among regulators.  
Few changes have been detected since the 1990’s on these arguments, neither in the Receptors’ 
perceptions nor among the Promoters and Regulators’ side. The only remarkable differences are 
those in Bulgaria and Sweden. In Bulgaria, Promoters and Regulators continued to express their 
satisfaction with the technical safety issues, in contrast with the opinion of international agencies 
(Bulgaria, Event 4, see annex I). In Sweden, Regulators continued arguing they had the most 
appropriate technology, but later changed their strategy to a more engagement oriented strategy 
with local municipalities who were willing to host repositories (Sweden, Event 5, see annex I). 
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In general, different dynamics are observed among the actors’ behaviours. The promoters almost 
always argued for a high degree of safety measures and standards, although in the F.R. 
Germany case, public authorities tried to convince the promoters about nuclear power safety (in 
early times). The regulators and public authorities were traditionally linked to the promoters 
(probably because nuclear technology needs full support of the state, at least in early steps), but 
over time they tend to act in a more autonomous way (mainly after TMI the independence of 
Regulators was strengthened and they became autonomous bodies), sometimes publicly 
criticizing the promoters’ actions. The receptors were also concerned about safety issues, with 
respect to both the people living in the areas near NPPs and the environmental social movements 
operating in the territory. Additionally, the safety measures were known and positively considered 
by some local governments (of the municipalities hosting the NPPs), and specific social groups 
(workers of the plant, etc.). 
 
Regarding the economic dimension, we can detail some additional arguments found in the 
SCRs:  
Job creation seems to play a role in the negotiations between promoters, public authorities and 
receptors of nuclear energy infrastructures, but this does not seem to have motivated too much 
attention among the drafters of the SCRs. In  the first period is only mentioned in the Finnish SCR 
(event 5, see annex I); in the second period it appears in the Spanish SCR (Showcase, and event 
2, see annex I); and in the third period it is detected in the Finnish SCR (General narrative, see 
annex I) and in the Sweden SCR (event 5, see annex I). Besides, it seems that promoters and 
public authorities managed a risk-benefit model, taking for granted that with the appropriate 
economic compensation the people would accept their risk exposure. However, in several cases 
sooner or later public rejection appeared, proving that those assumptions were erroneous, maybe 
as indicative of other variables involved in the explanation of people’s behaviours. 
It is clear that in some countries (as such as F.R. Germany, Finland, Spain, USA) nuclear energy 
is presented by the Regulators and Promoters as a trigger for technological and industrial 
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modernization, and as a path to becoming part of high developed countries. In some cases (F.R. 
Germany) a shift in this idea has been observed since the 1970’s and the 1980’s.  
Few references have been detected in the SCRs related to the guarantee of energy supply, and 
they are predominantly in the early times (in the Finnish and in the Spanish SCRs). It seems that 
in the last considered period (1990 – 2015) this issue was not so relevant as the previous periods 
(perhaps because other sources capable of guaranteeing security have been maturing).  
The impact of nuclear energy on energy prices is a factor taken into account in some SCRs 
(Finland, Sweden, UK). Its relevance seems more present in the first and second considered 
periods than in the third one. Different attitudes regarding this topic can be detected among 
different actors, confronting the wishes of maintaining cheaper tariffs with the need of moving 
towards more sustainable energy systems and growth. Opinions on this topic have evolved over 
time, apparently being more frequent in the past than in recent times. 
The high cost of nuclear energy projects has been an argument used by many actors both to 
justify their reluctance in investing in these projects and cancel on-going projects, but also to 
justify continuing with a project once it had been initiated (in this case avoiding potentially larger 
economic losses from projects already invested in case they were stopped).  In cases such as 
those of FR Germany and Bulgaria, promoters and regulators were critical of nuclear power 
because of the high cost associated with them (Bulgaria, event 2; F.R. Germany, Showcase, see 
annex I). In other cases, such as in Spain, financial facilities were crucial for the business 
decision-makers in order to proceed with or cancel their nuclear projects (Spain, General 
narrative, and event 4, see annex I). This results in the need of an active and key role of the State 
in promoting nuclear development in all kind of countries (both democracies or dictatorships). In 
some cases, such as in Sweden, although receptors decided to stop the nuclear program 
(through the non-binding referendum in 1980), this did not happen because economic losses 
were argued by the public authorities (Sweden, event 2, see annex I). 
Arguments about the high costs of nuclear energy were mainly publicised by receptors and 
included not only the economic costs caused by the accidents, but also the costs resulting from 
further regulations derived from the accidents. In some ways, accidents are interpreted as a 
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driving factor of the increased resources needed to implement the nuclear sector (to cope with 
the efforts in design/procedures for accidents’ mitigation). 
 
3.2.  Political-institutional factors: Key findings regarding social trust 
In general, although the perceived risks (and perceived benefits) are very similar in all the 
countries studied, the social and institutional responses are very different. In some countries, 
public opinion is more receptive to nuclear development, while in others it is more hostile. Why? 
And what relationship does this fact have with the communication and engagement policies 
implemented in each country? In order to answer these questions, we first need to understand 
how people perceive their relationships with institutions (social trust, or what we have considered 
here as the political-institutional dimensions), as well as what kind of socio-cultural factors are 
part of the context in which the nuclear technology is perceived. 
The analysis carried out allows for the identification of a series of factors related to political-
institutional dimensions of nuclear energy, which strongly shape social trust in every country.  
According to the interpretative and contextual theories of risk it is not so easy to separate 
perceptions of nuclear issues from their social, economic or political context of production. We 
should consider that when people evaluate a technology or activity, they are also implicitly 
making an evaluation of the institutions that promote, manage, and regulate it, along with 
generating a judgement about the credibility or trustworthiness that these deserve. In this sense, 
distrust is related to the perception that these institutions have carried out some kind of incorrect 
or unethical behaviour, for example by favouring private interests above the public, by acting 
against the law or by keeping secrets (which at some point were revealed to the public). In fact, 
we have found several cases where the public raised concerns about the secrecy of the 
information provided by promoters and/or regulators. 
The main political-institutional factors identified in the SCRs are the following (table 5):  
- Low institutional trustworthiness, which draws attention to the fact that the behaviours of 
the institutions in charge of managing or regulating nuclear energy have been perceived 
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as not worthy of trust by certain social sectors. In the SCR there are many examples of 
these type of behaviours generating mistrust.  
- Political games (i.e. elections affected decision-making, political parties changed their 
opinion about nuclear developments when governing, disputes between pro and anti-
European parties, etc.)  
- Dependency on other countries conditioned decision-making, leading national 
governments to adopt certain behaviours in order to gain energy autonomy or to avoid 
dependency. 
It must be said that these factors are distributed differently among the different countries, which 
explains the different social responses in each place. For instance, concerns about the 
‘dependency on other countries’ appears more in the Eastern countries (Bulgaria and Ukraine), 
but also in Finland. Additionally, in some countries such as the UK and Finland, a higher 
perception of trust in institutions has been found than in the other countries; while political games 
appeared stronger in the German and the Spanish cases. Later we will try to classify the selected 
countries according to these criteria. 
 
Table 5: Political-institutional factors shaping social trust identified in the selected case-studies SCRs, by periods. 
1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2015 
B Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making 
 
F Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making 
 
SW Political games (coming 
elections conditioned decision 
making) 
 
UK Low institutional trustworthiness 
(due to the government’s handling of 
an incident, and the secrecy 
surrounding it) 
 
US Low institutional trustworthiness  
(Promoters made promises not 
fulfilled) 
B Low institutional trustworthiness  
(secrecy in case of Chernobyl 
accident) 
 
F Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making  (self-
sufficiency had dropped) 
 
F Political games (Opposing nuclear 
program due to anti-nuclear 
weapons treaties) 
 
G Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Lack of trust in government’s 
willingness to seriously consider 
people’s concerns) 
 
G Political games (proximity of 
B Political games (discrepancies 
between institutions) 
 
B Political games (fighting between 
pro and anti-European parties) 
 
F Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making 
(preferences for an energy source 
that could guarantee a high degree 
of energy independence) 
 
F Perception of good commitment 
with public interest (high levels of 
trust) 
 
SP Political games (policy makers 
changed opinion about nuclear 
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US Low institutional trustworthiness 
(regulators captured by the industry 
and by military interests) 
political elections conditioned 
making decisions) 
 
SP Low institutional trustworthiness 
(after illegal works, legislation was 
adapted to the nuclear industry 
interests) (2) 
 
SP Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Promoters did not tell the truth) 
 
SP Political games (political parties 
changed opinion about nuclear 
developments when governing) 
 
SW Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Promoters ignored results of a 
referendum) 
 
U Low institutional trustworthiness  
(secrecy in case of Chernobyl 
accident) (2) 
 
U Political games (public opinion 
accepted NPP once Ukraine was 
constituted) 
 
UK Perception of good commitment 
with public interest (high levels of 
trust in public authorities) 
(guaranteeing the safest technology) 
 
US Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Regulators did not act in favour of 
common public interest) 
 
US Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Regulators did not act in favour of 
common public interest) (3) 
developments due to political 
strategies of the electoral arena) 
 
U Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making 
(European West-East distrust 
situation) 
 
U Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making 
(nation’s economic survival lead to 
nuclear acceptation) 
 
UK Low institutional trustworthiness  
(secrecy in case of private reactor 
management) 
 
US Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making (energy 
independence aspiration) 
 
US Dependency of other countries 
conditioned decision making (losing 
energy autonomy) 
 
US Low institutional trustworthiness 
(Regulators did not act in favour of 
common public interest) 
 
Source: own depiction based in the in-depth analysis of the SCRs. Each line means that this factor is mentioned in the respective 
SCR, sometimes more than once (numbers in brackets) (Code: B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = Spain; SW = 
Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = Ukraine; US = United States). 
 
The Bulgarian SCR explains the country’s vast dependency on the Soviet Union’s technology and 
development model (Event 1, see annex I) during the first period (1950-1970), which conditioned 
the public (and institutional) perception of nuclear energy. During the second period (1970-1990), 
the secrecy of information provided by public authorities (event 2and 3, see annex I) framed the 
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public perception of the government itself. This generates a situation of distrust of the government 
as a communicative actor. In the third period (1990-2015), the political fight between pro and anti-
European parties conditioned the national nuclear agenda (Event 4). While pro-EU parties agreed 
with the shutdown and change of nuclear reactors, the anti-EU parties advocated keeping all of 
them. At political level, again the nuclear power discussion among regulators/promoters was used 
as an issue of how the country is positioning in the new membership for the EU (specifically, on 
the issue of changing technology to other reactors (whether to keep old reactor or adapt them to 
new technologies). Bulgarian socialists wanted to keep all of the reactors with the argument of 
their strength and profitability. While Bulgarian democrats and pro-EU parties and officials were 
willing to compromise arguing that such step would be better for the Bulgarian country. In fact, the 
building of a new NPP (Event 5, see annex I) reactivated the debate on energy (and political) 
dependency because it might help to diminish the energy imports from Romania and Turkey, 
while increasing dependency on Russian technology (Event 5, see annex I). 
In Finland, the history of nuclear energy is linked to strategic international political relationships of 
the country since the first period (1950-1970). So, it is suggested that Finland became member of 
the United Nations organization due to its participation in nuclear projects (General narrative, see 
annex I). The diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union conditioned some decisions on 
nuclear programs (event 1, 2 and 5: see annex I). The Finnish SCR is full of references to the 
debate about national energy dependence and/or self-sufficiency. The whole nuclear program is 
justified from the beginning and during several decades as a key factor to ensure energy 
independency. The particular geostrategic position of the country during the Cold War, in-
between East and West, facilitated the political preferences for an energy source that could 
guarantee a high degree of energy independence. The energy dependence from the Soviet Union 
is presented as a reiterate concern. During the second period (1970-1990), the Finnish SCR 
continues to give high importance to this argument. So, public authorities in Finland noted the 
country’s dependency on energy imports and that the level of self-sufficiency had dropped since 
the early 1960s while the demand of energy continued to grow. The conclusion was that if no new 
nuclear power stations were built, self-sufficiency would go progressively down. In the period 
1990-2015, the Finnish SCR says that the country has a governance system including authorities, 
nuclear companies and government agencies deciding together in closed cabinets, but having 
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high levels of trust among public opinion. However, during last times some projects are 
accumulating troubles and nobody is able to say when the power stations were ready and how 
much they would eventually cost (General narrative, see annex I).  Besides, in Finland there are 
some nuclear developments that would help to decrease energy imports (from Russia) and 
improve self-sufficiency, but due to unavoidable geopolitical decisions Finland becomes 
dependent on Russian nuclear technology. (Showcase, see annex I). 
In the F.R. Germany lack of trust in government and regulators seemed to be a popular point of 
criticism among the groups against nuclear energy, in particular during the second period (1970-
1990). The criminalization of antinuclear activists was interpreted as a source of mistrust among 
the receptors, leading to a lack of trust in government’s willingness to seriously consider people’s 
concerns (General narrative, and event 4; see annex I). Left-wing critics perceived this collusion 
between the state, the regulators and promoters in terms of left-wing ideas. Ideas of the high-
security ’nuclear state’ also played a role in this debate (Showcase, see annex I). Besides, in 
some cases, according to the German SCR, the proximity of political elections was the main 
factor that influenced the government to postpone the choice of the place where a NPP should be 
built (Event 4, see annex I). 
In Spain, in the early phases of nuclear development (period 1950-1970), the industry created its 
own rules by manoeuvring within the dictatorship and even ignoring the law in their dealings 
(General narrative, see annex I). The lack of checks and balances in the dictatorship shaped the 
public image of the nuclear sector among the public for long time. During the second period 
(1970-1990), in several cases the public authorities later legalized illegal works when building 
NPPs (Showcase, and event 3; see annex I). The legislation was adapted to the NPP interests 
generating great distrust among the public (receptors) (event 2, see annex I). There were also 
cases where the promoters did not tell all the truth about their intentions when acquiring land for 
siting the NPPs (according to the press, they said they want to promote chocolate factory in Event 
2, see annex I). Besides, in Spain, there are several examples of political games that created 
distrust among the public: sometimes a political party expressed its anti-nuclear principles but 
later, when governing, changed opinion and maintained or supported NPPs (Event 2, see annex 
I); and the opposite happened between different territorial levels, even governed by the same 
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political party, e.g. when the central government supported nuclear siting and the regional 
(autonomous) government stopped it (trying to increase its legitimacy by demonstrating sensitivity 
to social demands in the region) (Showcase, see annex I). During the period 1990-2015, the 
issue of vested interests was raised by several actors, mostly regarding supporters of a waste 
repository (Event 5, see annex I). The existence of contradictory external reports (about the siting 
features or nuclear impacts) was a source of distrust among the actors too. In Spain there are 
cases in which a political change in the local and regional government halted the nuclear plans 
(Event 5, see annex I). In these cases (such as those happened in the former period) the relevant 
issue is that policy makers changed their orientations and decisions towards concrete nuclear 
developments due to political strategies of the electoral arena, even contradicting themselves and 
their explicit political principles. 
In Sweden, the issue of nuclear weapons became a contested political issue for the receptors 
when the knowledge about the military aspects became more generally known (event 1, see 
annex I). But at the political level people that were in favour of research on nuclear weapons also 
argued that this would act as a deterrent by showing the world that the country was capable to 
build these. On the other hand, the public debate was somehow neutralized by the regulators and 
political parties due to the coming elections, reaffirming that this was a controversial issue for the 
political scene (event 1, see annex I). Besides, in Sweden national independence of energy 
supply was an aspect of nuclear development subordinate to the competitiveness or reliability of 
the nuclear energy sector (General narrative, see annex I). 
The UK is the country where the public authorities and regulators seemed to have been trying to 
achieve more trust from the public. Although in the first period (1950-1970) the Windscale fire 
(event 3, see annex I) had little impact on the nuclear power programme at the time, the 
combined impact of the incident itself, the government’s handling of it, and the secrecy 
surrounding it, led to a decrease in trust in the institutions involved. This generated notable 
criticism of the government and changes to the manner in which nuclear power was debated and 
perceived. Besides, one of the arguments mentioned in the UK report related to the reduction of 
dependency on foreign energy sources (considered also more expensive) (event 2, see annex I). 
Nuclear energy offered a chance to reduce British reliance on coal and expensive imported oil 
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amongst concerns of air pollution and a fuel crisis. During the second period (1970-1990) the 
public authorities emphasized the need of guaranteeing the choice of the safest available nuclear 
reactor technology (event 4, see annex I). In the third period (1990-2015), some receptors 
showed a lack of trust in the management performed by private companies following a culture of 
secrecy (Event 7, see annex I). The receptors demanded more public information about power 
stations, and this was especially the case in local communities affected. 
In Ukraine, during the second period (1970-1990), the affected population (receptors) perceived a 
lack of information flow regarding the Chernobyl accident (General narrative, see annex I) and 
even a falsified narrative about how the management was done (Event 1, see annex I). Public 
trust seemed severely damaged in Ukraine by the event and the associated secrecy surrounding 
its consequences and management, which played a key role in the resistance of Ukraine against 
Soviet rule. However, key changes in the political scene in Ukraine led also to changes of public 
attitudes towards nuclear power, in the sense that they reacted less once Ukraine was 
constituted. The antinuclear local mobilization from the receptors contributed to the moratorium 
on the construction and commissioning of new nuclear power units (Showcase, see annex I), with 
many experts proposing informational and educational work with receptors as a method to 
address such mistrust, reflecting the knowledge deficit model of gaining support through the 
provision of scientific facts to create a better informed public and therefore overcome societal 
concerns. Regarding how regulators managed information, the receptors perceived a lack of flow 
of information to act adequately in an emergence status. In general, there were great fears the 
nuclear plant may collapse or decay and trigger another nuclear incident. This lack of 
management and/or coordination from the authorities in dealing with the accident could be 
noticed among the receptors (event 2, see annex I). In the third period (1990-2015), at regulators 
level, the debate in Ukraine was on the European West-East distrust situation, as western 
partners should assist Ukraine on exchange of closing Chernobyl remaining reactors (at the time 
of the accident six RBMK reactors were in operation or under construction at the Chernobyl site –
to be noted that this technology is no more used in Ukraine where nuclear power supplies about 
50% of electricity production). Ukraine officials were disappointed by the Western partners who, 
according to the Ukrainian side, failed to fulfill their 1995 commitment to assist the country in 
exchange for closing the Chernobyl plant. For instance, the Western side didn’t provide the funds 
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necessary to complete K2-R4 (Event 4, see annex I). Besides, after Ukraine gained political 
independence, the perception of the Chernobyl NPP turned from being a sign of colonial 
domination by Russia into an important source of the electricity production that crucially 
contributed to the nation’s economic survival and independence (Event 3, see annex I). The 
public authorities hoped that nuclear power would ensure high degrees of independence from 
Russian oil and gas, but they had not been able to break free of this relationship because of 
heavy dependence on Russian nuclear services (as their nuclear development was linked to the 
former soviet technology) (General narrative) (although the fuel for Ukraine NPPs was designed 
and produced by Russia, but Euratom has recently funded projects aiming at the production of 
fuel by Western companies). 
. In order to achieve a better public image, the Promoters of NPP tried to introduce rules of 
transparency and accessibility to the nuclear sites (Event 5, see annex I). 
According to the USA SCR, the regulators (the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC) yet from the 
start (by the late 1940s and 1950s) suffered from two weaknesses in the effort to promote nuclear 
power: first, in early times the AEC commissioners were fully beholden to military interests; 
second, the agency appeared  to be “captured” by the industry it was meant to regulate (General 
narrative, p. 6-7). Other sources of distrust were found in the promises made by Promoters and 
Regulators that later were not fulfilled or turned out to be false. For instance, yet in spite of the 
precautions in the design and construction of the Fermi reactor, and in spite of the reassurances 
by the scientists that a serious accident could not happen, one did occur (Event 1, see annex I). 
In sum, since early times (period 1950-1970), and according to its critics, the regulator too often 
assumed a promotional, not sufficiently regulatory role, which could lead to the public distrust. In 
the second period (1970-1990), according to the USA SCR, the regulator (AEC-NCR) (AEC 
dissolved in 1975 and since then the NRC became the independent regulator). was seen as low 
trustworthy due to several non-congruent behaviours. First, for its supposedly inefficient 
functioning (“the NRC routinely licenses plants on extremely thin financial, safety, and 
environmental evidence”) (General narrative, see annex I). Second, in the aftermath of the TMI 
accident, the Kemmeny Report indicated the poor regulatory operations of the NRC (Event 3, see 
annex I). Finally, the Regulator (NRC) lost a great deal of trust among people when it accepted 
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an industry-sponsored emergency evacuation plan, in a place where geographic and 
demographic characteristics of the seacoast area make it difficult to evacuate safely under any 
conditions (Event 4, see annex I). In the third period, in the USA some critical groups (such as the 
Union of Concerned Scientists) considered that the license-renewal process “was designed to 
limit the scope that could be considered, specifically the ability of the public to intervene” 
(Showcase, see annex I), fostering distrust among some social groups. At the same time, 
supporters of nuclear energy emphasize the facts that nuclear power will help secure US energy 
independence (General narrative, see annex I). However, in the early 1990s the United States 
and Russia reached a landmark agreement that would turn former Soviet nuclear weapons 
material into fuel to power America’s civilian nuclear reactors. The “Megatons to Megawatts” 
partnership provided enough fuel to generate 10% of America’s electricity needs (Appendix 4, 
see annex I), and it could be interpreted as a way of losing a bit energy autonomy (a very small 
proportion but that moves the country away from utopian ideal of self-sufficiency in times of peak-
oil and potential energy crises). 
In general, the diachronic analysis of all the case-studies countries shows that the political-
institutional factors were more present in the second period (1970-1990), when the popular 
mobilization against nuclear energy increased. In any case, the content of these factors are more 
or less similar in all three of the temporal phases considered. 
 
3.3. Socio-cultural factors underlying nuclear energy: key findings 
The socio-cultural dimension refers to several factors identified by two different theoretical 
approaches: the Psychometric paradigm and the Cultural Theory of risk. It is well known that 
some factors can influence individual risk responses, such as unwillingness to be exposed, 
familiarity with the risk, the controllability of the consequences, the deferred appearance or not of 
damage in time or space, etc. As well, risk could play a role in the maintenance of a certain social 
order, therefore, certain groups emphasise the perception of certain risks over others generating 
different social identities. 
The main socio-cultural factors found in the analysis are (table 6): 
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- Conflicts of values: social conflicts related to preferences for different lifestyles, different 
economic and social development models, different attitudes towards pacifism / 
warmongering that nuclear development may entail, even concerns about how future 
generations will judge current ones because of their management of nuclear energy, etc. 
These are elements that respond to different ideologies or ways of understanding how 
society and its evolution should ideally be. 
- National scientific pride (and national military pride too) 
- Territorial identity conflicts (territorial comparative grievances; conflicts between 
economic activities and land uses, etc.) 
- Subjective attributes of risk: perception of difficulty of calculating risks, perception of low 
controllability of risk, unwillingness of being exposed, familiarity with the technology (and 
coping with similar risks in the past). 
The concrete content of these factors for each country can be seen in the Annex I. 
These factors are also unevenly distributed among the different countries, and therefore would 
help to explain the different social responses to nuclear energy. For instance, national pride was 
a very predominant factor in Finland, whereas territorial identity conflicts were very present in 
Spain. 
Table 6: Socio-cultural factors shaping public perceptions identified in the selected case-studies SCRs, by periods. 
1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2015 
B Conflict of values (life styles / 
development models) (fear of being 
accused by future generations) 
 
B national scientific pride 
 
F Adherence to values 
(development models) 
 
F Conflict of values (life styles / 
development models) 
 
F Low calculability of risk 
 
F national scientific pride (2) 
 
B Adherence to values 
(development models / ideology) 
 
F Conflict of values (life styles / 
development models / ideology) 
 
G Conflict of values (life styles / how 
to be seen by future generations) 
 
G Conflict of values (perceived 
increasing risk of war) 
 
G Low calculability of risk 
 
G Low controllability of risk 
 
SP Familiarity with the risk (coping 
with similar risks in the past) (2) 
 
SP National scientific pride (2) 
 
SP Territorial identities conflicts 
(territorial comparative grievance) 
 
SP unwillingness to be exposed 
 
SW Familiarity with the risk 
 
U Conflict of values (political 
identities) 
 
U Conflict of values (political 
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F Threats to local identities 
 
F unwillingness to be exposed 
 
SW Conflict of values (perceived 
increasing risk of war) 
 
SW national scientific pride 
 
UK Conflict between economic 
activities and land uses 
 
UK Conflict of values (perceived 
increasing risk of war) (2) 
 
UK Low controllability of risk 
 
UK national scientific pride (and 
military) 
 
US Conflict between economic 
activities and land uses 
 
US Conflict of values (life styles / 
development models / ideology) 
 
US national scientific pride (and 
military) 
G territorial comparative grievance 
 
G Territorial identities conflicts 
(political territorial borders) 
 
SP Conflict of values (ideology) 
 
SP Conflict of values (political 
identities) 
 
SP Territorial identities conflicts 
(conflict between economic activities 
and land uses) 
 
SP Territorial identities conflicts 
(territorial comparative grievance) 
(2) 
 
SW Conflict of values (life styles / 
development models / ideology) 
 
SW national scientific pride 
 
SW Territorial identities conflicts 
(conflict between economic activities 
and land uses) 
 
U Conflict of values (political 
identities) (2) 
 
US Conflict of values (political 
identities) (risk of war) 
identities) 
 
 
 
 
Source: own depiction based in the in-depth analysis of the SCRs. Each line means that this factor is mentioned in the respective 
SCR, sometimes more than once (numbers in brackets) (Code: B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = Spain; SW = 
Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = Ukraine; US = United States). 
 
Among the SCRs there are also several clues of classical ‘attributes of risk’ (in terms of the 
psychometric approach), such as ‘unwillingness’ to be exposed to a potential risk (cases in 
Finland and Spain), the ‘perception of low controllability of the risks of the technology’ (cases in 
Finland, F.R Germany and UK), and the ‘familiarity with the technology’ (cases in Spain and 
Sweden). While the first two attributes are expressed overall by different sectors of receptors, the 
last one (‘familiarity’) is used by promoters and regulators to explain the absence of social 
mobilization in certain cases, or sometimes to convince the public of the inadequacy of their 
opposing attitudes towards a certain nuclear project (as the case of Sweden, event 5: “the 
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population were already accustomed to nuclear facilities and did trust the nuclear industry”) (see 
annex I). In general, it reflects a certain distance between ‘experts’ and lay people’s perceptions. 
The few available data in the SCR does not allow to evaluate the time evolution of these 
analytical dimensions. 
In several countries nuclear energy became a symbol of scientific progress and, therefore, of 
‘national pride’, especially in Cold War times, but also later. In this context, national scientific 
pride became an argument to be for or against nuclear developments. Nevertheless, there is still 
another side of that ‘national pride’: some social groups holding positions contrary to nuclear 
energy are concerned about the image that future generations will have about their countries for 
having supported nuclear developments in the past (the SCR of Bulgaria and Germany 
expressed these concerns). Being in support or against nuclear power would imply to be treated 
as a traitor or as a hero, which is another way of thinking of nuclear developments from an 
identity frame. 
Local communities can sometimes be reluctant to nuclear siting decisions for a variety of 
reasons; 1) the project did not fit into its development plans, 2) it increased conflicts related to 
land uses, 3) the local economic activities felt threatened by the nuclear project, 4) the local social 
fabric (social networks and local identities) could potentially be modified due to the impact of the 
nuclear project, 5) or regional identities fight against central government decisions in the territory. 
These negative attitudes can in some cases be described as NIMBY protests, but not always. 
Nuclear programs have played a political role in different countries at different times. During the 
Cold War times by positioning the country in the international sphere (Finland case), or framing 
the internal national images (USA case). In times of democratic transitions as a way of positioning 
internal parties in the impending elections to come: in the Spanish case, nuclear developments 
were symbolically linked to the dictatorship regime; in the Ukrainian case, Chernobyl became a 
symbol of colonial power and fuelled the independence movement. 
Going through the selected case-study contents would help to better understand the countries’ 
differences: 
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In the Bulgaria SCR, sometimes the actors’ discourses have to do with the collective identities 
they seek to promote. For instance, in the first period (1950-1970) some actors justify their 
support for nuclear energy because it was a symbol of scientific progress and, therefore, of 
national pride (Event 1, see annex I). This can be understood as a collective identity that some 
actors would like to be shared by all national actors (mainly Promoters and Regulators). Instead, 
Receptors fear to be accused by future generations for their support of nuclear developments. 
During the second period (1970-1990), the dependency on the Soviet Union’s nuclear technology 
was presented as a symbol of brotherhood between Communist countries (Event 2, see annex I). 
And during the third period (1990-2015) the public perceptions in Bulgaria seem to have been 
affected by the change of political and social model due to the fall of the communist regime 
(Event 3, see annex I), in a time when the Green organization Ekoglasnot acted as catalyser of 
people concerns on nuclear power, becoming a stake in times of political and social changes. 
In the Finnish SCR, during the first period (1950-1970) some word about the difficulty of 
calculating nuclear risk, and the correlative distance between experts and lay people, can be 
found (“engineers and scientists tend to be overly optimistic. (…) Anti-nuclear groups spread 
alternative truths about the nuclear risks”) (Event 5, see annex I). Also the concept of 
‘unwillingness’ to be exposed to risk explains some of the public attitudes against nuclear 
infrastructures (from the receptors’ side) (as such the case of the residents of the town of Loviisa, 
where a NPP was built) (Event 5, see annex I). At the same time, the Finnish SCR insists several 
times in the key role played by the ‘national scientific pride’ in justifying the nuclear projects 
decisions. Nuclear program helped in establishing high quality scientific and technological 
research and education institutions, and allowed Finnish experts and politicians to participate in 
key international conferences during the Cold War (General narrative,; events 1 and 2;  see 
annex I). Additionally, in the process of finding a place for the first nuclear power plant in Finland 
(1966), land owners and community politicians were suspicious about the search for siting a 
nuclear energy installation, and several municipalities were reluctant to the siting decision 
because the project did not fit in their future development plans (Event 5, see annex I). In any 
case, the Finnish SCR shows that the nuclear program played a political role in the international 
position of the country, located in between West and East, helping in building a Finnish identity 
adapted to the geopolitics of the Cold War (General narrative,and event 1; see annex I). The 
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report also shows how (in the early 60’s) it was not easy to separate the civilian and military 
applications in nuclear technologies (event 3,and event 6; see annex I). This lead to the 
opposition movements to be critics with the nuclear program appealing to anti-nuclear weapons 
treaties and laws. Later, during the period 1970-1990, some concerns about the siting of nuclear 
power plant right next to large urban areas were reported (event 6, see annex I). In the case of 
Kopparnäs community (40 Km away from Helsinki) it was argued that six large scale reactors 
would need massive amounts of cooling water and fresh water and also an industrial size 
infrastructure, which was a great impact for a small community. Besides, it was said that “nuclear 
power stations would also destroy the image and identity of Kopparnäs” (event 6; see annex I). 
Threats to local identities were a source of public reactions against installations with potential 
large impact, as those of nuclear developments. However, according to the Finnish SCR, 
modernization of Finland received very few critical comments (General narrative, see annex I). 
Later, environmental movements promoted energy saving, environment protection and new life-
styles grounded in the idea that less consumption required less energy (General narrative, see 
annex I). Additionally, in the SCR is said that there is collective memory that shapes the ‘uneasy’ 
interaction between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union regarding nuclear energy issues 
(Showcase, see annex I). 
In the F.R. Germany report it is said that in early times (1950-1970), military strategic 
considerations influenced siting decision; and this pointed out to military aspects of the peaceful 
use of nuclear power in early West Germany. “Although the scientific community tried hard to 
present nuclear science as a strictly civilian endeavour, not least to strip it of its historical origins 
in the so-called “Uranverein” (a project to develop nuclear weapons) under National Socialism, 
military rationales did play a substantial role in West Germany’s early nuclear history” (Event 1, 
see annex I). During the second period (1970-1990), public authorities and receptors in the F.R. 
Germany perceived low controllability of the risks of the technology in the case of the proposed 
fast breeder sodium cooled nuclear reactor (SNR-300) construction in Kalkar (Showcase, see 
annex I). The critique to the project was even greater after TMI because a reactor of this type was 
seen not easily to be taken under control and therefore involved more risks. Concerning public 
authorities, some of them considered the commissioning as irresponsible, because the risks were 
ultimately not calculable. Additionally, in the SCR it is said that being in support or against nuclear 
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power is a matter of how to be seen by future generations: “Those who did not wish to be seen as 
traitors and followers had a duty to oppose nuclear power” (General narrative, see annex I), 
which implies the generation of an identity shaped by the pro or anti attitude. During this same 
period, the pilot-scale project SNR 300 motivated promoters due to the limited uranium reserves 
and regulators hoped for an efficient utilization of the minerals by building this reactor. However 
very soon, the search for a site raised concerns among receptors who demonstrated against the 
project, and many of the demonstrators even came from the Netherlands as the chosen site was 
close to the country’s borders (Showcase, see annex I). In this case land conflicts were related to 
political territorial borders. Also in the F.R. Germany, by locating the planned repository site in the 
economically underdeveloped hinterland the government tried to avoid opposition against the 
project, which failed because the level of protest increased (Event 4, see annex I). 
In Spain, several dimensions of technological colonialism (at international level) and imposition 
over local society (at national level) were discussed during the second period (1970-1990) 
(Showcase,and Event 1; see annex I). In both cases we find the notion of “unwillingness” to be 
exposed to a risk, one of the key factors underlying public responses. Additionally, promoters and 
public authorities expressed their views that people living near a NPP were coping with similar 
risks in their everyday life (such as road accidents) in order to minimize its importance (event 1, 
see annex I). Perception of catastrophic risk, very different from that expected by the experts, can 
also be detected (event 3, see annex I). During this same temporal period, territorial/regional 
identities played a crucial role in accepting or rejecting nuclear projects in Spain. In some 
instances, when the central government or other centralised authority took the location decision, 
the opposition to nuclear power became a fight for regional identity vs. the central government 
and the economic power imposition in the territory. This happened, for instance, with the early 
attempts to locate the first NPPs in Spain (General narrative, see annex I), or with the 
Valdecaballeros case (Showcase, see annex I). In many cases Spanish environmental 
movements (receptors) denounced the unequal distribution of risk among territories, with the area 
treated as a landfill of dangerous and/or with large impact infrastructures (Showcase, Event 2). In 
some way there is also a conflict between a rural world which feels forgotten and an urban world 
that holds the main benefits. From the Receptors opposing the NPP (as the case of Ascó, in 
Spain), it is argued that that territory concentrates already too many industrial risk facilities 
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(petrochemical, nuclear, etc.). Other argument is that it is a rural area disadvantaged, in crisis and 
losing population, which instead of giving a positive development reserve a role of landfill of what 
favored areas do not want (perception of inequality, comparative grievance). Behind the conflict 
of Ascó there is a tension between a rural world which feels being forgotten and the urban world 
that holds the main benefits. Additionally, in the case of Spain many of the anti-nuclear 
movements are difficult to distinguish from the anti-dictatorship movements (General narrative, 
and event 2, see annex I). The fact that the nuclear developments took place during the 
dictatorship linked symbolically this technology to this political regime. Additionally, the nuclear 
debate polarized the interrelationships between the actors in the Basque region, where a terrorist 
group (ETA) made anti-nuclear speech one of their hallmarks (even having been pronuclear in 
the past, as a way of instrumentalizing the growing public opposition to the NPP sitting 
processes) (event 3, see annex I). Finally, in Spain there are some perceptions linked to the 
desire to maintain certain forms of life (such as a rural or fishermen's life) (event 1, see annex I). 
Another issue is the moral dilemma the anti-nuclear movements in the Basque Country had to 
deal with, i.e. how much to accept that terrorist violence can be useful for its presumably peaceful 
purposes (event 3, see annex I). This leads to a strong conflict of values between several actors 
shaping public perceptions. In the third period (1990-2015), regarding the siting process of a 
nuclear waste repository, some receptors expressed beliefs about the familiarity of the local 
communities with the NPP because its presence became already part of their daily life (other 
nuclear facilities had been in the area), or it is considered as similar risk as any industrial facility 
(event 5, see annex I). On the other hand, promoters showed themselves proud of their 
knowledge and experience in decommissioning nuclear installations, as the case of Vandellós I 
(Event 1, see annex I). Although in this case the Promoters failed in managing the NPP (a serious 
incident happened in 1989 leading to the closure of the Vandellós I NPP), they try to present 
themselves as reliable managers, and the failure is presented as a learning opportunity to 
become better specialists. In this sense, they are proud of their good knowledge and experience 
in decommissioning the NPP. This argument can be considered as a matter of professional 
status, as a way of maintaining their place in their social networks. Besides, according to the 
Spanish SCR, Promoters (and some Receptors) of a nuclear waste repository (Event 5, see 
annex I) considered that nuclear developments would lead the country to scientific excellence, 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
67 
allowing high level scientific jobs in the area. During this third period new warnings on unequal 
distribution of risk among territories have been detected in Spain, with some areas feeling being 
treated as a landfill of dangerous and/or annoying infrastructures. For instance, the siting process 
for a nuclear waste repository has unleashed a sharp political contest between several social 
movements and public administrations, with a large dose of territorial and social identities in 
between (event 5, see annex I). 
In Sweden, protective defence purposes were mentioned in the first period (1950-1970) (event 1, 
see annex I). Among regulators the controversy was based on the purpose for the atomic 
weapons research (how research could be conducted). Concerning receptors there was less 
controversy on this matter; they understood research on how to protect Sweden for the risk of 
nuclear weapons from other countries (Sweden SCR, event 1; see annex I). The receptors 
directly related the development of atomic weapons with their security and also with a perceived 
increasing risk of war. In this sense, opponents of nuclear weapons were concerned by an 
increase in the risk of atomic warfare affecting Sweden (event 1, see annex I). During the second 
period (1970-1990), according to the Swedish SCR, one of the arguments to support nuclear 
developments in Sweden was the importance for the country in terms of its good position in the 
international community. Thus in 1972 when the Swedish king inaugurated the Oskarshamn 
plant, he remarked on the importance of this milestone for the country in terms of technological 
development and the beginning of a new epoch (General narrative, see annex I). Additionally, 
exploration activities looking for repository sites involved, at local level, specific protests with a 
NIMBY (‘Not In My Backyard’) emphasis from the Receptors (event 3, see annex I). This was, 
however, a first step towards a more general critique of nuclear developments, which included the 
defence of local territories. One of the objections expressed by some receptors was the need to 
advance towards other energy models based on renewable sources and efficiency measures 
(event 2, see annex I), equating to a request for a more sustainable development model, which 
refers to alternative worldviews. In the third period (1990-2015) the technology’, according to the 
promoters, seems to play a role in the absence of strong opposition (“the population were already 
accustomed to nuclear facilities and did trust the nuclear industry”) (event 5, see annex I). 
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According to the Ukrainian SCR, sometimes public authorities’ responses facing nuclear incidents 
were framed in a ‘war’ context against external enemies. This can be seen in the Chernobyl case, 
treated by the Public authorities as “an external enemy that Soviet people must fight” (Event 1, 
see annex I). More generally, the use of military rhetoric and images was pervasive in the Soviet 
media at the time. Soviet troops and military equipment were heavily involved in the Chernobyl 
clean-up and evacuation operations. In the third period (1990-2015), the anti-Chernobyl protest 
became part of a broad independence movement that was centred to a large degree on 
environmental concerns (Showcase, and Event 2, see annex I). Chernobyl became a symbol of 
colonial power and fuelled the independence movement. However, later public opinion seems to 
realize that nuclear energy was a condition for national independence, leading to a kind of 
“reluctant acceptance” (in terms of Bickerstaff et al. 2008) of it. The issue of “reluctant 
acceptance” for nuclear power like a condition for national survival was raised among receptors 
(Event 5, see annex I), even if the negative consequences of Chernobyl continue to haunt 
Ukraine, some of the public opinion still think that nuclear energy is the condition for the national 
survival. 
In the UK, since the first period (1950-1970), the public perception of the controllability of the 
technology became a key factor in social acceptance, according to the Promoters and 
Regulators. In the case of Windscale fire a governmental report claimed that the cause of the 
incident was a “human error by well-trained but unfortunate plant staff”, which informs of a weak 
point on the confidence granted to the controllability of the plant (Event 3, see annex I). During 
this time, in the UK the nuclear developments (even for military purposes) were justified by 
Promoters and Regulators as a matter of prestige and British supremacy in the international 
community (event 1, see annex I). For the government, the major reasons for going ahead were 
prestige, and to maintain Britain’s place at the ‘top table’ of international politics. However, the 
Windscale event raised some concerns about potential pollution of local food products among the 
Receptors (Event 3, see annex I). This recalls to a conflict between social and economic activities 
and land uses in the area where the NPP was located. But in the UK maintaining the country’s 
place at the ‘top table’ of international politics in Cold War times seems to have been the motive 
for appealing to nuclear weapons (Event 1, see annex I). Although the issue of Britain’s nuclear 
weapons became controversial, publicly and politically, opinion on the topic varied from 
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supporting unilateral disarmament to supporting continued development of nuclear weapons. On 
the receptors’ point of view, public reactions were towards the use of nuclear weapons but not on 
the nuclear power, in a period of public trust on political institutions. However, some early 
movements started with a growing concern about nuclear weapons throughout the 1950s. Later 
periods seemed to follow the same patterns. 
In the USA, since the first period (1950-1970), some words were devoted to the special prestige 
of scientists owing to their success in the Manhattan Project and in role in the unfolding Cold War 
military-industrial struggle with the USSR (General narrative, see annex I). Besides, according to 
the USA report, the Enrico Fermi NPP licensing process may be the first time in US history that 
public individuals began to oppose nuclear power. It is said that the head of the United Auto 
Workers became convinced that the NPP would endanger Detroit, the auto industry and auto 
workers themselves, and litigated against the station (Event 1, see annex I). It describes a conflict 
between different economic activities in the same territory, by defending concrete ways of living. 
Additionally, in Cold War times being pro or against nuclear energy was sometimes interpreted as 
being pro or against the national sentiments. For this reason, some cases of early protesters 
were qualified (and pursued) as communists. The East-West competition at that time seemed to 
frame the whole nuclear debate in the USA (General narrative, and Showcase, see annex I). In 
the USA report it is said that some environmental movements (as such Abalone Alliance) were 
critical to the direct relationship between civilian and military nuclear power (Event 2, see annex 
I). 
 
3.4. Engagement activities in the selected case-studies 
Based on the flow of information between participants and promoters, (i.e. those who have 
commissioned a particular engagement initiative), we have differentiated between three 
engagement types: public communication, public consultation, and public participation. In 
addition, we suggest designating engagement actions initiated by the public and directed towards 
the regulators or nuclear companies as ‘public-initiated engagement.’  
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The analysis of the SCRs shows a great variety of engagement mechanisms used by the 
selected countries over time (table 7). During the early phases of nuclear developments, 
communicative activities predominated, while after the ‘90s, more participative approaches and 
mechanisms arose.  
 
Table 7: Engagement activities identified in the selected case-studies SCRs, by periods. 
1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-2015 
B Secrecy 
 
F Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
F Participation: small group of 
decision makers) (low democracy 
mechanism) 
 
G Communication: promotion of 
“research centres” 
 
SP Public-initiated: administrative 
and legal litigation 
 
SW Participation: study group 
representing both opponents and 
proponents 
 
SW Public-Initiated: collecting 
signatures 
 
SW Public-Initiated: scientists 
writing articles in newspapers and 
contacting politicians 
 
UK Communication: films presenting 
nuclear energy 
 
UK Participation: public meetings 
 
US Communication : films about 
nuclear energy 
 
US Consultation: surveys on public 
opinion 
 
US Public-initiated: administrative 
and legal litigation 
 
B Communication: disinformation (2) 
 
B Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (protests) 
 
B Secrecy (or restricted 
communication) 
 
G Public-initiated: administrative and 
legal litigation 
 
G Public-initiated: collecting 
signatures 
 
G Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (protests) 
 
SP Communication: classic mass 
media (national / local) 
 
SP Communication: news for the 
media, press conferences 
 
SP Consultation: public opinion polls 
 
SP Public-initiated: collecting 
signatures 
 
SP Public-initiated: press 
interventions, books, support of 
celebrities 
 
SP Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (mass protests) 
(violence) 
 
SP Secrecy (or restricted 
communication) 
 
SW Communication: classic mass 
B Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
B Consultation: referendum 
 
SP Communication: informational 
visitors’ centres (educating the 
public) 
 
SP Communication: Internet media 
(website and social networks) 
 
SP Communication: Internet media 
(website) 
 
SP Participation: local informative 
committees (official) 
 
SP Participation: local Joint 
Commissions 
 
SP Participation: voluntary 
candidature process (for siting a 
repository) 
 
SP Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (local protests) 
 
SW Consultation: public hearings 
 
SW Consultation: referendum 
 
SW Participation: Public hearings, 
informative meetings and debates 
 
SW Participation: voluntary 
candidature process (for siting a 
repository) 
 
U (Public-Initiated: alternative 
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US Public-Initiated: public opposition 
groups 
 
US Public-Initiated: public protests 
US secrecy 
media 
 
SW Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
SW Consultation: referendum 
 
SW Participation: information 
meetings with experts of pro and 
anti-nuclear 
 
SW Public-initiated: collecting 
signatures 
 
SW Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (mass protests) (3) 
 
U Communication: educational work 
 
U Communication: informational 
visitors’ centres (educating the 
public) 
 
U Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
U Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (local protests) 
 
U Secrecy (or restricted and/or 
biased communication) (2) 
 
UK Communication: classic mass 
media (advertising campaign in 
newspapers) 
 
UK Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
UK Participation: public inquiries 
 
UK Public-initiated: Public 
mobilization (protests) 
 
US Communication: classic mass 
media 
 
US Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
US Consultation: referendum 
(proposed) 
 
US Public-initiated: Public 
hearings) 
 
U Communication: classic mass 
media (press-releases) 
 
U Communication: information 
centres (educational activities) (2) 
 
U Communication: rules of 
transparency and accessibility to the 
nuclear sites 
 
U Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
U Consultation: referendum (local) 
 
U Participation: Public hearings, 
informative meetings and debates 
 
U Public-initiated: collecting 
signatures 
 
U Public-initiated: public hearings 
and roundtables 
 
UK Consultation: citizen’s panels 
and focus groups 
 
US Consultation: public opinion 
surveys 
 
US Public-Initiated: activists sending 
letters, making protest skits 
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mobilization (mass protests) 
Source: own depiction based in the in-depth analysis of the SCRs. Each line means that that activity has been mentioned in the 
respective SCR, sometimes more than once (numbers in brackets) (Code: B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = 
Spain; SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = Ukraine; US = United States). 
 
The analysis shows a long list of engagement practices and mechanisms, evolving through the 
different temporal phases. 
During the first period (1950-1970), the communicative practices related to the expression of 
nuclear promises (popular films, etc.) predominated, but some countries also activated 
consultation processes (public opinion surveys in UK, USA, Finland) or participative mechanisms  
(public meetings in the UK, a study group in Sweden). These countries were facing public opinion 
pressures due to earlier incidents (Windscale in the UK, Fermi in the USA) and/or nuclear 
weapons debates.  
 In the second period (1970-1990) communicative strategies continued but also cases of secrecy 
and misinformation related to nuclear incidents and accidents appeared (i.e. the case of 
Chernobyl was poorly handled in communicative terms by public authorities in Bulgaria and 
Ukraine, with restricted and biased information). But the most relevant engagement activity during 
this phase is the increase of consultation activities, especially through public opinion surveys (that 
became periodic in most of the countries), information centres and meetings (as in Ukraine or 
Sweden) or even referenda (done in Sweden, and proposed in some states of the USA). In the 
UK, the public inquiries mechanism played an interesting participative approach. Public-initiated 
engagement rose dramatically during this period in all of the countries (the SCRs refer to mass 
mobilization protests, collected signatures, press interventions, etc. from local communities and 
national social movements). 
The third period (1990-2015) is characterised by an intensification of the consultation 
mechanisms: public opinion surveys, referenda (mainly at the local level, in Bulgaria, Sweden, 
and Ukraine), participative processes as public hearings (in Ukraine, Sweden), local informative 
committees, local joint commissions (Spain), voluntary candidature processes to siting nuclear 
installations (as in Sweden, Spain), citizen’s panels (UK), etc. Regarding communicative 
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mechanisms, during this phase Internet began to play a key role in transmitting information to the 
public, allowing more transparency and accountability of the nuclear sector, and also being used 
for consultative purposes. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
According to our theoretical proposal, the perception of nuclear energy is composed of several 
dimensions that, in each specific case, may have different weights in their influence on the 
opinions, attitudes or behaviors of the population. From this perspective, it would not be correct to 
consider that there is one population in favor of nuclear energy and another against it. Rather, 
situations can occur of people who are in favor in one dimension and against in another at the 
same time. That is, we can find people or social groups considering that nuclear energy is a 
benefit because it guarantees an energy flow and facilitates national independence, while, at the 
same time, considering that it is not easily acceptable because it involves certain environmental 
risks, or because it grants economic benefits to a company with a bad image because suspected 
of being corrupted. In each empirical case, the balance between these weights is moderated by 
the political-institutional factors producing social trust, and by the socio-cultural factors shared by 
large social groups. 
Nuclear energy is a technology with different degrees of public acceptance in different countries. 
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the different public acceptance  depends on the 
perceived risks and benefits (which revealed to be very similar among the case-studied 
countries), and that these perceived risks and benefits depended on social trust of institutions in 
charge of managing and/or regulating it (political-institutional dimensions), all of which are a 
function of a series of socio-cultural factors generated by the social climate over time. Further, the 
concrete articulation of this set of factors in each case is related to different engagement activities 
deployed in each country. 
Regarding the common features about perceived risks and benefits, large part of the references 
to health concerns related to nuclear power were reported in the period 1970-1990, although 
some fewer references can also be found in other periods. This tends to coincide with the period 
of higher social mobilization against nuclear projects around the world. This means that most of 
the protests used to be based on health and environmental arguments, although there could be 
other dimensions involved that were not obvious (not explicit).In similar terms, although roughly 
absent during the first period of the nuclear development, since the 70’s the environmental risks 
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became a dominant argument among all the involved ‘actors’. Affected people (receptors) 
highlighted in a broad sense the potential environmental impacts of nuclear facilities. On the 
contrary, we identified only a few references to these impacts on the promoters and regulators 
side, usually hinting at positive impacts such as mitigating climate change. These arguments 
increased since the 90’s, and according to this interpretation, nuclear power would play the role of 
a preventative measure in mitigating environmental risks associated to climate changes. 
Economic benefits and risks seem to be more present during the first and the second periods, 
while losing some importance during the third. The high cost of nuclear energy projects has been 
an argument used by many actors both to justify their reluctance in investing in these projects and 
cancel on-going projects, but also to justify continuing with a project once it had been initiated. 
Arguments about the high costs of nuclear energy were mainly publicised by receptors, and the 
increasing regulations and safety requirements became a driving factor of the increased 
resources needed by the nuclear sector. Additionally, the technological development alongside 
the trend towards privatisation, concentration and internationalisation of the nuclear energy 
industry eventually could undermine the effectiveness of national regulatory structures (as 
hypotetized by Strandberg & Andrén, 2009), which leads to highlight the importance of the 
political-institutional factors and the socio-cultural factors in influencing the public acceptance of 
nuclear energy developments. 
The work of Strandberg and Andren (2009) explains how privatisation and concentration of the 
nuclear power industry has put an end to national ownership in many countries, thereby 
complicating institutional regulation of radioactive waste management. According to them 
(Strandberg and Andren 2009: 892): “The technological configurations required by leading-edge 
research can be expensive and are often the product of regional cooperation. Thus, one must 
also take into consideration the dynamic interaction between national and international contexts 
that affects technologies, principles and organisations. The value of responsibility is embodied in 
the internationally accepted principle that each country must manage its own HLW. National 
responsibility as a principle is currently being challenged by the abovementioned global 
developments, while the question of how to uphold it on a long-term basis remains unanswered.” 
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The articulation of this complex set of factors in our analysis leads to the emergence of several 
groups of countries (table 8).  
The overview allows to see how are distributed the political-institutional factors: First, the 
‘institutional trustworthiness’ is a factor widely distributed among all the countries (low in all the 
countries, except in the UK and Finland). The ‘political games’ are relevant in all the countries 
except in UK and the USA. And the ‘dependency’ factor is present overall in the nuclear debates 
of Bulgaria, Ukraine and Finland.   
Regarding the socio-cultural factors: ‘Conflict of values’ are seen in all the countries. ‘National 
pride’ is relevant in all the countries execpt in Spain and Germany. And the ‘territorial-identity 
conflicts’ are present overall in Germany, Spain and Sweden.  
 
Table 8: Distribution of the main political-institutional and socio-cultural factors, and engagement strategies. 
Factors underlying public perceptions of 
risks and benefits of nuclear energy B U F G SP SW UK US 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
 
Low institutional 
trustworthiness 
 
II (2) 
 
II 
 
 
III(+) 
 
II 
 
II (3) 
 
II 
I 
II (+) 
III 
I (2) 
II (4) 
III 
Political games  
 
II 
 
 
III(2) 
 
II 
III 
 
II 
 
II 
III 
I   
Dependency of/on other 
countries 
 
 
III (2) 
I 
 
III 
I 
II 
     
 
III(2) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
 
Conflicts of values 
(ideology, etc.)  
 
 
III (2) 
I 
II 
I (2) 
II 
 
II (2) 
 
II (2) 
I 
II 
I (2) I 
National scientific pride 
 
II (2) 
I I (2)   
 
III 
I 
II 
I (2) I 
II 
Territorial identity conflicts 
  I I (2)  
II (3) 
III 
 
II 
 I 
Subjective attributes of risk 
  I (2) I (2)  
 
III(3) 
 
 
III 
I  
5. Engagement 
strategies 
Secrecy / selective 
communication 
I 
II (3) 
 
II (2) 
 
I   
II 
   
Public communication 
  
II (2) 
III(4) 
 I  
II (2) 
III(3) 
 
II 
I 
II 
I 
II 
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Public consultation 
 
 
III (2) 
 
II 
III(2) 
I  
II 
 
II 
 
II (2) 
III (2) 
 
II 
III 
I 
II (2) 
III 
Public participation 
  
 
III 
I   
 
III(2) 
I 
II 
III(2) 
I 
II 
 
Public-initiated engagement 
 
II 
 
II 
III(3) 
 
II 
 
II (3) 
I 
II (3) 
III 
I (2) 
II (4) 
 
II 
I (3) 
II 
III 
Source: authors, based in the in-depth analysis of the SCRs. Each line means that that factor or activity has been mentioned in 
the respective SCR, sometimes more than once (numbers in brackets) over the different historical periods (I= 1950-1970; II= 
1970-1990; III= 1990-2015) (B = Bulgaria; F = Finland; G = F.R.Germany; SP = Spain; SW = Sweden; UK = United Kingdom; U = 
Ukraine; US = United States). 
 
According to table 8, we are clustering the case-study countries in the following classification. 
 
1) Countries where the geo-strategic dependencies predominate 
First, one of the proposed groups is made up of the Eastern countries (Bulgaria, Ukraine) and, to 
some extent, Finland. These countries are characterized by high and medium public acceptance 
of nuclear energy over time, sharing a particular position between historical Eastern and Western 
worldviews and geo-strategic tensions, which appears to have influenced public perceptions on 
nuclear energy.  
As it has already been said above, the main arguments on perceived risks and benefits in these 
countries are the same as the rest of the analysed countries (concerns about safety and 
accidents, radiation pollution, economic costs, etc.). However, these public perceptions are 
conditioned by a set of key facts shaping the loss of trust in institutions (regulators / promoters), 
such as the following political-institutional factors.  
The dependence on other countries conditioned the decisions on nuclear projects (not only in 
early times, but also in recent times). The particular historical relationship of these countries with 
the USSR/Russia has framed the public perceptions of nuclear energy (in the sense that they 
were energetically and technologically dependent countries, and in their independence processes 
the nuclear energy played a key role), a technology that in the past and over time has generated 
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a high degree of dependency (from Russia) and, at the same time, is necessary to ensure the 
essential energy supply for the modern countries’ development. (It should be said that nowadays 
there are Western companies able to provide assistance/maintanance/services for Russian-
designed reactors, but regarding its costs Russia is still very competitive). 
The secrecy maintained (by the public authorities) during the Chernobyl accident gave rise to 
distrust among large sectors of the public. This factor had a great influence at the end of the 
second period (1970-1990), with long-range political consequences. 
Following the fall of the USSR, the visible discrepancies in the public sphere between national 
and international institutions maintained very different opinions with respect to nuclear projects. 
For example, the minimum criteria required for nuclear safety in Bulgaria, the role of nuclear 
energy in the nation’s economic survival in Ukraine, and in a more general discussion between 
pro and anti-European parties in Finland. An instrumental use of nuclear energy by the political 
system is observed in all these countries, especially during the third period (1990-2015). 
Finland, though showing a lot of similarities with Bulgaria and Ukraine regarding the mentioned 
factors, presented some key differences. These include a strong internal public opposition to 
nuclear energy due to commitments with anti-nuclear weapons treaties, and also a widespread 
public perception of public authorities as institutions fully committed to public interest (which leads 
to high levels of trust in regulators / promoters of nuclear projects). 
Regarding the socio-cultural factors, the key role played by the ‘national scientific pride’ in 
justifying nuclear projects should be highlighted (especially in Bulgaria and in Finland). 
Adherence to certain political identities values are also present in the socio-cultural arena. For 
example, in early times nuclear technology was presented as a symbol of brotherhood between 
Communist countries; and with regards to the Chernobyl case, the Public Authorities treated it as 
“an external enemy that Soviet people must fight.” In fact, the use of military rhetoric was 
pervasive in the Soviet media at that time, when soviet troops and military equipment were 
heavily involved in the Chernobyl clean-up and evacuation operations.  
In recent years, some socio-cultural factors related with ideal social models appear to be 
conditioning a less positive view of nuclear energy. For instance, in Bulgaria some social sectors 
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were afraid of being accused by future generations of supporting nuclear developments, which 
can put pressure on a certain population to position itself negatively against nuclear energy. In 
Finland ecological modernization ideas such as the promotion of energy saving strategies, or new 
lifestyles grounded on the idea that less consumption would require less energy, are also 
affecting public attitudes against nuclear power among some people. 
However, some differences also arise when comparing the three eastern European countries. In 
Ukraine, the anti-Chernobyl protest became part of a broad independence movement, although 
the issue of “reluctant acceptance” for nuclear power as a condition for national survival was 
raised among receptors (even if the negative consequences of Chernobyl continue to haunt 
Ukraine). In Finland, some local municipalities were reluctant to the siting decision because the 
nuclear project did not fit into their future development plans, and was perceived as a threat to 
local identities. 
In these countries the decision of using nuclear energy was the result of historical and geo-
strategic decisions, leading to a situation where the perceived benefits (in terms of national 
independence, pride, etc.) are higher than the perceived risks. Nuclear energy was de facto 
imposed in the past, but this choice was done for reasons of security of supply and technological 
development, in an international context where achievements in modern nuclear technologies 
were part of the (Cold War) race with US. 
2) Countries where the instrumental use of nuclear issues in the political arena predominate 
A second group of countries would include F.R. Germany, Spain and Sweden. In all three 
countries public perception of the nuclear issue was used for political and electoral purposes. For 
instance, in the F.R. Germany and in Sweden, the proximity of political elections affected the 
decision making in some of their nuclear developments. While in Spain, the political parties 
changed their opinion about nuclear developments due to political strategies of the electoral 
arena. 
A further source of distrust is the perceived low coherent behaviour of some institutions. The 
government’s unwillingness to seriously consider people’s concerns has been detected in some 
cases, especially in Germany and in Spain as reported by Kirchhof and Trischler (2017, general 
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narrative, showcase and event 4; see the concrete excerpts in annex I) and Rubio-Varas et al 
(2017, Showcase, and events 2 and 3; see the excerpts in annex I) respectively. Both promoters 
and regulators did not tell the complete truth to the public when promoting nuclear development. 
For example, in Spain (Rubio-Varas et al, 2017) in early times promoters violated certain basic 
urbanistic rules to build a nuclear power plant, with the governments legalizing it a posteriori.4 
They even went so far as to change laws and regulations ad hoc making the local population feel 
cheated. In Sweden the loss of confidence in the public authorities could be in some way related 
to their government's lack of commitment to the results of the 1980 referendum, which has 
generated some distrust among certain sectors of the population (although there are other 
sectors more confortable with the government decision). 
Although these three countries share some political-institutional factors, they have a base of 
socio-cultural factors which are quite different from each other. For instance, in the F.R. Germany 
conflict values revolved around preferred development models and how these could be judged by 
future generations (for supporting nuclear developments instead of more sustainable energy 
models), along with ideological debates (concerning the role of nuclear energy in military affairs 
and potential risk of war). In Spain the main socio-cultural conflicts were centered on the degree 
of compatibility of land uses and economic activities in some territories, coupled with feelings of 
territorial grievances (by unequal distribution of risks and benefits among territories). In Sweden, 
national scientific pride seemed to be one of the main factors influencing nuclear public 
perceptions (positively, in this case), although at the local level some conflicts were detected in 
terms of land uses and development models of local communities. 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 According to Rubio-Varas et al. (2017: 25), “The (nuclear) companies had also hired personnel and began building 
on site in June 1975 despite the lack of the preliminary reports from the water authorities, the environmental 
evaluation by the national and regional governments, the proper expropriation of the affected lands, and the required 
construction permits. Some of these issues were legalized by government decree in 1979, when the government –
now democratically elected – gave the definitive authorization for the construction of the plant, which was well 
advanced already.” Other examples of the same strategy is found in event 2 (p. 42 and 45) and event 3 (p. 49). The 
concrete excerpts can also be found in annex I. 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
81 
3) Countries where the institutional confidence predominate 
A third group of countries is composed mainly of the UK, but due to its common historical steps 
the USA could be added here. These countries each had very early nuclear development, and in 
both cases they suffered incidents/accidents which created an impact on public opinion 
(Windscale in the UK, Fermi or TMI in the USA). In the case of the UK it seems that the measures 
and the approach that the institutions gave to nuclear management favoured an increased 
confidence of part of the population. This confidence resulted in a wide perception of good 
commitment to public interest (high levels of trust in public authorities, appearing to guarantee the 
safest technology). In recent times, although confidence in public institutions seems to be 
maintained (regulators, etc.), it is observed that among certain sectors of the population there is 
growing distrust of the private management of nuclear facilities following a culture of secrecy 
(according to Butler & Bud, 2017, based on the 2008 Energy White Paper on Nuclear Power, 
Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform). In the USA the relationship 
between public opinion and promoters and regulators is a bit more complicated since the 
regulators often seem to act not in accordance with the common interest, but rather in line with 
the interests of the nuclear industry (according to Josephson 2017, in general narrative, events 1 
and 2, and appendix 3; see annex I). Additionally, in the USA the potential energy dependence on 
other countries has conditioned the decisions of nuclear projects in such a way that the promoters 
present this energy as the only one that can guarantee national energy autonomy.  
Regarding the socio-cultural factors, both countries shared the public perception of conflicts 
between economic activities and land uses, and conflicts about values related to the use of 
nuclear weapons and the risk of war. Interestingly, both countries share a strong national 
scientific (and military) pride, which inevitably influenced the public perception of risks and 
benefits, as well as the trust in institutions. 
 
In light of this typology, some tentative reflections about engagement processes can be made.  
The ‘institutional confidence’ countries (UK and USA) seemed to be the first in promoting 
communicative strategies to cope with early nuclear incidents, and to spread (broadcast) the 
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benefits of nuclear developments among the public opinion. Progressively they developed also 
consultative strategies to measure the public opinion over time and in concrete cases, and were 
introducing participative mechanisms to deliberate and collect the diversity of voices and points of 
view on nuclear issues at a local level and at a general level. In general, most of these strategies 
seemed to be applied in a pro-active way (most in the UK than in the USA). 
The ‘political instrumental’ countries (F.R. Germany, Spain, Sweden) started later following the 
same path, introducing progressively communicative, consultative and participative processes 
and mechanisms, but mainly in a re-active way, trying to cope with the massive prostest against 
nuclear siting of developments. Perhaps Sweden was somewhat different because the idea of 
national scientific pride and modernization was much present in the public debate on nuclear 
issues. 
The ‘national dependence’ countries (Bulgaria, Finland, Ukraine) also followed the same path, but 
especially since they need to manage the information and the public opinion protests after the 
Chernobyl accident. Distrust in how the public authorities and nuclear promoters managed this 
serious situation was later balanced by the consideration of nuclear energy as something 
necessary for the national sovereignty, leading to a kind of resigned acceptance mixed with 
national pride. The case of Finland is perhaps slighty different because there the trust in 
institutions has remained quite high throughout all the nuclear period, making the difference with 
the others. 
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Annex I: Data analysis 
A.Public perception in the selected case studies  
A..1. Health and Environment dimension  
A.1.1. Human health concerns  
A.1.2. Environmental issues  
A.1.3. Safety concerns  
A..2.  Economic dimension  
A.2.1. Job creation  
A.2.2. Industrial progress and new business  
A.2.3. Security of energy supply  
A.2.4. Consumer economics  
A.2.5. Resource requirements  
A.2.6. Economic losses due to nuclear incidents  
A.3. Socio-cultural dimension  
A.3.1. Subjective attributes of risk  
A.3.2 Social networks and identities  
a) Scientific national pride  
b) Land use / territorial identities  
c) Socio-political identities  
Cultural values, traditions and lifestyles (military imagery included)  
A.4. Political-institutional dimension  
A.4.1. Trust and confidence in institutions  
A.4.2. Governance issues  
a) Political games  
b) Energy dependency  
B. Public engagement in the selected case studies  
B.1. Public communication  
B.1.1. Restricted communication / secrecy  
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B.1.2. Direct actors’ communication through the media and other 
channels 
 
B.1.3. Visitors’ information centres  
B.2 Public consultation  
B.2.1. Surveys and opinion polls  
B.2.2. Referenda  
B.3. Public participation  
B.3.1. Public hearings, informative meetings and debates  
B.4. Public-initiated engagement  
B.4.1. Signature collection  
B.4.2. Demonstrations and social mobilizations in the street  
B.4.3. Media, press and written mechanisms  
B.5. Other ways of influence on nuclear decision making: Legal, administrative and 
political routes 
 
 
Under each subsection all the fragments found about these categories are commented and 
described, identifying of which SCRs’ country and key event they come. 
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A.1. Health & Environment dimension 
According to our theoretical framework, and after the first exploratory analysis made through the 
early drafts of the selected SCRs, the Health & Environment dimension includes: 
 Human health: Perceptions of positive and/or negative effects related to human health 
(acute or chronic effects), including also perceptions of higher or lower magnitude of 
consequences (catastrophic potential, etc.). 
 Environmental issues: Perceptions of positive and/or negative effects related to 
environmental issues (water, soil and atmosphere pollution, loss of biodiversity, climate 
change effects, etc.), including also perceptions of higher or lower magnitude of 
consequences (catastrophic potential, etc.). 
 Safety concerns: Perceptions related to safety concerns and other control-management 
related factors. 
 
A.1.1. Human health  
Health concerns are mentioned in most of the Short Country Reports (SCR), although references 
to them are not equally distributed among historical phases.  
 Period 1950-1970 
In the period 1950-1970 references to health concerns are very scarce. The only detected 
mention is in the UK report (Butler & Bud 2017)), where the population seemed to be concerned 
about potential chronic health effects from a specific incident releasing radiation (the Windsdale 
fire, 1957). (Event 3, p. 35, 37) 
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
“Some long term health impacts coming from a punctual accident raised concerns about nuclear energy among 
receptors (the release of some information in the 1980s, and academic articles suggesting an increase in leukaemia 
published in the 1990s had a longer term impact on concerns about civil nuclear energy)” (page 35). 
“As little was known about safe dosage Hinton encouraged workers at Windscale to conduct tests to determine whether 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
100 
foodstuffs, and milk in particular were safe for the local populace to consume, leading to a ban on the consumption and 
sale of milk from the area for a month” (page 37). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
Instead, during the period 1970-1990 the references to health effects increase a lot and can be 
found in almost all the SCRs.  
The Bulgarian SCR (Hristov & Tchalakov 2017) shows nuclear power plant workers’ concerns in 
an emergency situation (an earthquake, Event 2), which eventually caused them psychological 
stress, and also feelings of insecurity and helplessness (Event 3).  
Event 2: Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
(…) the Bulgarian delegation presented a report on the psychological stress on workers during an earthquake. This 
report provided suggestions on how to prepare workers, and how authorities should react in the event of an 
earthquake. (page 36) 
Event 3: Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident 
“Over the next 2-3 years a fear was accumulated among the Bulgarian, which accelerates the degradation of the 
communist political system: “The lack of official announcements and explanations about the necessary radiation-
prevention measures, with the circumstance, that information was irregularly provided, not sufficient, unclear, often 
incorrect, and manipulated in relation to the radioecology status and the radiation danger, led to oppressing 
uncertainty, felling of insecurity, depression, and helplessness.” In this way the Bulgarian state and the communist 
party as its main representative, created an atmosphere of radio-phobia. In 1993 more than 38% of Bulgarian 
population considers radiation pollution as the most dangerous threat.” (page 17). 
 
The Finnish SCR (Michelsen & Harjula, 2017) shows how at the beginning the promoters of the 
nuclear program argued that radiation could be useful for medical healthy uses (Event 1).  
Event 1: From isolation into transnational networks 
“In addition, isotopes and medical use of radiation were going to cure cancer and other sicknesses and help to cultivate 
more productive plants for agriculture.” (p.35) 
 
In the case of the Spanish SCR (Rubio-Varas et al. 2017) several arguments related to health are 
found, both by citizens and by workers (firefighters, in Event 1), predominantly reflecting concerns 
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about potential radiation released by the NPPs. For instance, in the Showcase section the 
Receptors expressed their concerns about health issues saying that “our child health issues are 
not a game…”. (Showcase, p. 25) 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros: 
“Regarding health issues, our child health issues are not a game” (p. 25) 
Event 2: Ascó  
“The new town hall asked the university of Bremen, Germany, for a new report in 1982 that in conclusion disapproved 
of the presence of the nuclear plant taking into account the radiation and health risks.” (page 37) 
 
In the SCR of Sweden (Kaijser 2017), after learning (from the media) what happened in 
international incidents like TMI or Chernobyl, the population seemed to be worried about the 
possibility of accidents, and influenced on receptor’s argument on the use of nuclear power as 
well as other aspects like how to deal with the spent fuel. This seemed to increase fears and 
anxieties among public perceptions.  
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
“The first commission produced a report entitled Safe nuclear power? (SOU 1979:86) with an analysis of the TMI 
disaster, suggestions for a number of measures to increase security in Swedish reactors (for example installation of 
filter chambers to reduce emission of radioactive isotopes in case of a reactor melt-down) and the conclusion that a 
reassessment of the risks was not motivated” (page 44). 
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
“Mass-media gave generous coverage to the increased radiation levels, and this caused much anxiety. Many families 
were afraid to let their children play outside (…)” (page 49). 
 
The Ukrainian SCR (Kasperski 2017) includes several public concerns with respect to human 
health, together with public demands for compensation for families exposed to radiation. Besides, 
despite the serious danger, the Ukranian Public Authorities hoped that, in order to avoid more 
risks, the workers in charge of dealing with the Chernobyl accident could carry out their work. In 
this sense they recognized the damage for workers in order to achieve future safety (Showcase, 
Event 1).  
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Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
Among the citizens rumours circulated and they complained to the government and party officials expressing the fears 
for their own and the family’s health and asking for adequate protection measures and compensation (page 36).  
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
“Ukrainian public intellectuals and scientists involved in the protests denounced the secrecy surrounding the 
consequences of Chernobyl during first years of the disaster and the mismanagement of radioactive fallout that they 
claimed criminally jeopardized the health and life of the Chernobyl victims, and they demanded extensive emergency 
protection measures, along with relocation and compensation payments”. (page 42) 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“Such anti-nuclear activist groups as Greenpeace Ukraine, Zelenyi Svit and Green Party strived to give as much 
publicity as possible to what they saw as unacceptable return of the Ukrainian officials to pro-nuclear positions. They 
considered information and outreach activities involving the general public, elected officials and expert community as 
one of instruments of resistance to the looming “nuclear renaissance”. They reminded the public that the Chernobyl 
disaster and its continuing public health and environmental impacts were the tragic proofs of the inherent danger of the 
nuclear enterprise” (page 47) 
“The local protesters in Zaporizhzhya region were primarily preoccupied by the fact that the further expansion of 
already vast nuclear facilities would have significant negative impacts on the local environment and people. For 
instance, they feared that the NPP cooling waters when allowed to flow to the Kakhovka reservoir on the Dnipro River 
would contaminate them with tritium and other dangerous elements. Local activists also insisted that the inhabitants of 
the areas surrounding the plant were poorly, if at all, compensated for the ever-growing risk from the nuclear site 
(Soiuz “Grazhdanskii dozor” 2012).” (page 48) 
 
In the case of the USA (Josephson 2017), references to health effects are focused on the 
potential catastrophic impact of nuclear accidents in large populated areas (General narrative), 
but there are also references aimed at diminishing the importance of radiation impacts on human 
health (In Event 3). 
General narrative: 
Opponents note that nuclear power (…); may be risky, certainly more risky than supporters admit; they note that in the 
case of a catastrophic accident, people and property may be damaged, and timely evacuation will be nearly impossible 
(…). They also note the practice of siting stations near population centers may save costs for infrastructure and 
transmission of electricity, but opens millions of consumers precisely to the risk of accidents. (General narrative, p. 17) 
Event 3 - Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, 1979 
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According to several studies, the radiation doses of the approximately 2 million people in the affected region were very 
small and there would be no long term health impacts. (Event 3, p. 42) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
During this period the references to health effects in the SCRs tend to be lowest than before. 
Only the Finnish report includes a reference showing how the anti-nuclear movement put on the 
table the risk of a nuclear accident in a populated area as that of the capital (Event 6), and that 
workers and people who lived close to the nuclear power plants were in danger (Event 6), 
arguments that were discussed arguing that radiation is a natural phenomenon and that most of 
the people are exposed to natural radiation everywhere (Event 6). 
Event 6: First nuclear debates 
“That is when Heikki von Herzen stepped in. He wrote a long article in which he reflected the anti-nuclear ideas of 
Hannes Alfvén. IVO was making a huge mistake by investing in the fission reactors. They were old-fashioned, risky and 
economically infeasible. IVO’s plan was especially dangerous because a 6000 MW nuclear power complex right next to 
Helsinki threatened the very existence of the capital. If something went wrong either in Loviisa (east of Helsinki) or in 
Kopparnäs, Helsinki must be evacuated. How and by whom this kind of a massive operation could be done in a hurry 
(Alfvén 30.8.1973).” (p.55)  
“Kirsti Erä-Esko challenged previous articles by taking up the moral aspects of nuclear energy and nuclear waste. She 
argued that small amounts of radioactivity escaped every day from the nuclear power plants and accumulated in the 
environment. Therefore, both workers and people who lived close to the nuclear power plants were in danger.” (p. 56) 
“Professor Erik Spring criticized Erä-Esko’s emotional interpretations. Radioactivity is a natural phenomenon and 
people are exposed all the time to radiation from nature. Medical profession was also continuously exposed to the 
radiation and x-rays were common practice in every hospital.” (p. 57) 
 
This argument is also found in the Spanish SCR, in a case of a waste repository siting (Event 5), 
where the Promoter (a state company) explained that the potential radiation emissions would be 
low and without any health risks since the radiation emitted by nature would be higher than that 
from the Waste Repository.  
Event 5: Waste repository site 
“A study was carried out and published with the following results: radiation emissions are low; no risk for health, 
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radiation emitted by nature is higher than the ones from NPP” (page 57). 
 
A.1.2. Environmental issues  
This sub-section includes perceptions of positive and/or negative effects from each country 
related to environmental issues, such as water, soil and atmosphere pollution, loss of biodiversity 
or climate change effects.  
 Period 1950-1970 
Few SCR reported environment concerns at this stage, and mostly in an ambivalent way. In the 
Finnish SCR environmental impacts are perceived by a fishermen community fearing that thermal 
pollution would damage the fragile marine ecology (Event 5, p. 48-51).  
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
“Fishermen were worried about thermal pollution and also possible leaks of radioactive waters into the sea.” (p. 48) 
“Fishermen community in near Hästholmen feared that thermal pollution would damage the fragile marine ecology of 
the Gulf of Finland. (p.51) 
 
Nevertheless, in Sweden during the early years of nuclear development some social movements 
considered that NPPs could have positive environmental impacts (e.g. it would avoid other 
evident sources of river pollution) (General narrative, p. 14). No data of Promoters or Public 
Authorities were expressed in the SCR during this period.  
General narrative 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the largest and oldest environmental organization Svenska Naturskyddsförening had even 
demanded a faster introduction of nuclear power to save the remaining wild rivers (page 14). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
Environmental concerns had a great expansion during the period 1970-1990. For instance, in 
Spain some Receptors (farmers and fishers) were worried about potential water contamination 
related to a NPP, which would negatively impact agricultural and marine activities (Event 2). 
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However, as a way of counter-acting these concerns, Promoters and Regulators of NPP talk 
about the environmental effects in a positive sense (by arguing that the NPP would increase 
surrounding temperature with positive effects for farming and touristic activities (Showcase). 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor) 
“Even the environmental impact of the NPP was suggested as an unquestionable advantage, as “heat emitted by the 
NPP – around 30 degrees in winter – will bring a tropical climate to the touristic destination of the Guadiana reservoirs`. 
This change in the climate will be to the advantage of the farmers.” (Diario Ya - 25-10-1974). A report from the Ministry 
of Agriculture to substantiate this argument was commissioned.” (page 25) 
“But the real opposition to the nuclear plant arose and got organized some 80km downstream, in the city of Villanueva 
de la Serena, which agglutinated the landowners of the irrigated lands. Irrigators have had a precedent with an attempt 
to build a cellulose factory upstream, and they feared the contamination and the competition for water, “here the future 
of was irrigation, it was agriculture”.  With frequent draughts, they argued, the Guadiana river would be insufficient to 
meet the needs of both the nuclear power plant and the irrigated lands.”  (page 25) 
Event 2: Ascó  
“Later the Comitè Antinuclear d’Ascó and the CARE drew up a new document in which they expounded their opposition 
to use water from the Ebro river to cool the NPP reactors. It called attention to the negative consequences for the 
environment and the agricultural economy of the area.” (page 39). 
 
In Sweden from 1972 onwards a dramatic shift took place and nuclear power was criticized from 
groups of scientists, politicians and environmental activists. Potential environment dangers were 
among the factors leading to this growing opposition (which resulted in a referendum in 1980) 
(General narrative, p. 13). 
General narrative, p. 13 
Thus, very little questioning of nuclear power occurred in Sweden until the early 1970s, but from 1972 and onwards a 
dramatic shift took place and nuclear power became heavily criticized by many different kinds of actors. Three of these 
were particularly important: scientists, politicians and environmental activists. The single person that most strongly 
contributed to this shift was a scientist, Hannes Alfvén. He had been awarded the Nobel Prize in physics in 1970 and 
thus had very high respect as researcher. 
 
The UK report states that although Public Authorities and regulators tried to remain neutral 
towards nuclear power with regards to use it or not to generate electricity, there were a pressure 
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on the decision by the growing concerns about the environment from the Receptors side (Event 
5, p. 41). 
Event 5: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
“Chairman of the Commission. Although a former member of UKAEA, Flowers remained neutral on whether nuclear 
power should be used to generate electricity. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) was in part 
instigated by growing concerns about the environment which had been developing in the UK throughout the mid/late 
1960s” (page 41). 
 
Environmental concerns also appeared during this period in the SCR of Ukraine, allowing a social 
mobilization with nationalist aims to develop following the Chernobyl accident. (Event 2, p. 39). 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
“The anti-Chernobyl protest became part of a broad independence movement grounded to a large degree on 
environmental concerns” (page 39). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
According to the Finnish SCR, Promoters of nuclear energy claim that new reactors are 
necessary if Finland is going to fulfill its commitments in the global fight against climate change. 
Although environmentalists defined nuclear power as a non-carbon-free source of energy, the 
Finnish authorities reserved to nuclear energy a key role in the battle against climate change by 
arguing that without nuclear power stations the international climate agreement cannot be 
fulfilled. (General narrative, p. 25-26; Showcase, p. 30). 
General Narrative 
“Proponents of nuclear energy claim that new reactors are necessary if Finland is going to fulfill its commitments in the 
global fight against climate change.” (page16) 
“Without nuclear energy Finland was forced to invest in conventional energy, and this decision defied the international 
agreements against the climate change.” (page 25) 
“Only years after the Parliament handed down the negative decision. The Ministry of Trade and Industry started to 
prepare a new energy strategy. The guiding principle was written in the following way: “All environmentally friendly and 
sustainable energy production technologies should be included in the strategy”. This sentence signaled to nuclear 
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energy companies that the Finnish government was supporting nuclear energy. Although environmentalists had 
previously defined nuclear power as a non-carbon-free source of energy, the Finnish authorities believed that it could 
be used in the battle against climate change (Litmanen 2004).” (p.25-26) 
Showcase - Collective memory and the uneasy nuclear collaboration between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union 
“Nuclear energy is almost emission-free, but it is not considered to be one of the renewable energy sources because it 
is burning uranium and other radioactive materials. They are currently not recyclable. However, nuclear energy has 
been regarded as one of the most important source of energy in the battle against climate change. It is argued that 
without nuclear power stations the international climate agreement cannot be fulfilled.” (p.30) 
 
In the Swedish report, when talking about a competition between several cities for getting a 
repository (Event 5), environmental risks became the dominant argument among Promoters and 
Receptors. Promoters explicitly focused on geology as key criteria for minimising environmental 
risks, but considered also other factors like the attitude of the local population and the availability 
of suitable transport to the area. 
Event 5: A competition for getting a repository 
“(…) but in Storuman and Malå the environmental dangers with a repository became the dominant argument (page 54). 
“Other factors, like the attitude of the local population and the availability of suitable transport and other infrastructural 
facilities, were as important as geology” (page 53).  
 
The UK SCR includes several statements explaining how the political system in the UK had been 
mainly supportive of NPP, and in recent years one of the arguments in justifying its favourable 
position was the growing importance of tackling climate change (General narrative, p. 30). In this 
sense, the Public Authorities (regulators, etc.) stressed the potentially positive environmental 
impact of the NPP. Promoters and some prominent persons in the public debate expressed the 
same positive views. Governments of all parties have remained supporters of nuclear power 
throughout the period, among the regulators’ and promoters side. However, environmental 
concerns were detected among some Receptors who saw little progress in the solution of nuclear 
waste management, while other Receptors seemed to agree with a ‘reluctant acceptance’ (in 
terms of Bickerstaff et al. 2008)  of nuclear power because it could help in advancing towards a 
low-carbon energy system and coping with the climate change challenges. (Event 7, p. 49, 51). 
General narrative 
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“At first the Labour governments of 1997-2010 avoided taking any decision on nuclear power (or nuclear 
weapons).(Adams and Eaglesham, 2005) The early 2000s, however witnessed a conjunction of the depletion of North 
Sea gas reserves from 2005 (changing Britain from a net energy exporter to an energy importer), a capacity crisis 
(caused by ageing plant) and the growing importance of climate change mitigation” (page 30) 
Event 7: Government repositioning on new build NPPs 2006 
“The 2006 Energy Review announced that ‘nuclear has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside other 
low carbon generation options’, but did not cite any details of the public consultations undertaken” (page 49).  
“Overall, public responses highlighted the impact of climate change on their willingness to accept the need for nuclear 
power. The privatised industry’s efforts to portray nuclear as a low carbon technology seem to have worked, and most 
UK citizens believe that nuclear will have a significant part to play in the generation of electricity in the future.(European 
Commission, 2007) A number of high profile environmental writers and campaigners have changed their minds and 
now support nuclear power as part of the answer to the challenges posed by climate change.(Monbiot, 2011) As 
climate change continues to rate as a matter of concern for the public, nuclear power is perhaps seen as a ‘necessary 
evil’.(European Commission, 2007)  Although this is defined as ‘resigned acceptance’ by the report’s authors ‘reluctant 
acceptance’ would be the more usual term.” (page 51). 
 
According to the USA SCR, supporters of nuclear energy emphasize the facts that nuclear power 
does not produce greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming. In this sense, the will of 
extending NPP licenses is presented as a way to slow global warming (Event 1). As a result, 
Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which is offered extensive subsidies for nuclear 
power and other alternatives to fossil fuels. However, a sector of the Receptors finds that nuclear 
technology leads to the disruption of nature, and data about environmental impacts are 
mentioned (i.e. the heated effluent water damage fishes and other aquatic organisms). (General 
narrative, p. 17). 
General narrative: 
“ (…) supporters of nuclear energy emphasize the facts that nuclear power (…) does not produce greenhouse gases 
that contribute to global warming; is a proven technology whose next generation of reactors are, or will be almost 
inherently safe”. (General narrative, p. 17) 
“An opposing position finds that nuclear technology leads to the destruction or disruption of nature.” (General narrative, 
p. 17) 
Showcase - Early Demonstration Projects  
“Finally, the heated effluent water – up to 2.5 billion gallons a day – kills about 1 billion fish and other aquatic 
organisms a year.” (Showcase, p. 25)  
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Event 1 - Licensing and Operation of Enrico Fermi (Detroit) Breeder Reactor 
“Indeed, in December 2016 two US Senators called for consideration of ways to extend licenses within safety 
parameters to permit operation to 60 and up to 80 years as a way to slow global warming. (Lamar Alexander, Sheldon 
Whitehouse, 2016).” (Event 1, p. 28) 
Appendix 1 – Current Status and Plans: Nuclear power in the US 
“In the mid-2000s, as worries about global warming and greenhouse gases associated with fossil fuels grew, 
representatives of the nuclear industry began to push again to create broad government, utility, and public support for 
the bringing on line of a new generation of nuclear power stations.  As a result, Congress passed the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, which is offered extensive subsidies for nuclear power and other alternatives to fossil fuels. It offered 
billions of dollars in tax credits, loan guarantees for advanced nuclear reactors or other emission-free technologies up 
to 80% of the project cost, $2 billion in insurance to cover licensing delays to the industry, extension for 20 years of the 
Price Anderson Act for nuclear liability protection, and support for advanced nuclear technology.” (Appendix 1, p. 69) 
“Beyond costs and delays, many people oppose nuclear technology, not only because of the Fukushima disaster in 
March 2011, but because of fear of terrorism, on top of which gas and oil processes have dropped precipitously.  
Perhaps the major argument for nuclear power in 2016, then, is the argument that nuclear power does not produce 
greenhouse gases.” (Appendix 1, p. 71) 
 
A.1.3. Safety concerns 
Perceptions related to safety concerns and other (technical) control management factors are 
analysed in this sub-section. These factors are also related to health and environmental issues 
(described above), but here we will mainly focus on its safety design and management 
dimensions. 
 Period 1950-1970 
Although few excerpts are found in the SCR in this period, the Finnish SCR includes several 
safety concerns related statements. For example, when trying to build a NPP in Finland they 
realize that the safety culture of the Soviet Union was considered as less exigent than the 
Western one (Event 4). But as the Soviet Union only delivered the technology and it was the 
official Finish company whose responsibility was to design and manage the project, then it 
became possible to add safety elements and safer designs. 
Event 4: Surprise in Moscow 
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“IVO engineers had already visited the nuclear power stations in Obninsk and Novo Voronesh. Both experiences were 
far from satisfactory. The safety culture in the Soviet nuclear power stations was poor and the Soviet reactors were big 
and clumsy if compared to the high technology products in the West.” (page 43) 
“The first meeting set the tone for the summit. Soviet experts saw no need to improve the security of the reactors. 
Soviet nuclear technology represented the highest technological and scientific level in the world and the Soviet Union 
had long experience in nuclear technologies. Soviet scientists had calculated that a catastrophic accident in a nuclear 
power station was beyond statistical probability.” (page 43) 
“Soviet Union were planning a mass production of nuclear power reactors and unnecessary safety measures would 
make the reactors too expensive.” (page 44) 
“The second document revealed that in fact the Soviet Union only delivered the reactors and turbines and it was IVO 
whose responsibility was to design and manage the project. This way it became possible to add safety elements, steel 
containment and computer based instrumentation (Särkikoski 2011).” (page 46)  
 
In Sweden, no safety concerns were raised in the early years of the nuclear program, during the 
time for the coordinated military-civilian research in 1945-1955, but this changed in the 1960s 
when, on the basis of doubts about safety issues, some technical experts and politicians criticized 
the program (General narrative). Criticisms both from technical experts and politicians (as 
regulators and promoters) about safety requirements of the reactors arose.  
General Narrative 
“The military and some scientists (primarily physicists and chemists) were the first to act: for the military, it was 
naturally of vital importance to get information about this new, extremely powerful weapon and its implications for 
future warfare” (page 6) 
In the late 1960s he did much of his research in California and came in contact with the growing number of American 
scientists and engineers who began to question the safety of nuclear power plants, the difficulties of taking care of the 
radioactive waste from reactors, and the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons materials (page 14). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
During this period safety concerns arose everywhere, which would reveal a new public perception 
of nuclear developments.  
According to the Bulgarian SCR, in response to the 1977 earthquake, the Bulgarian authorities 
(as regulators/promoters) postponed the launch of the two additional reactor blocks and 
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demanded additional safety measures, and later, Western specialists advocated similar 
measures (Event 2).  
Event 2::Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
“Despite significant improvements, the Kozloduy NPP was perceived by nuclear specialists in the West to continue to 
work with one constructive flaw in Western eyes:  They lacked the additional concrete containment of Western nuclear 
plants” (page 37). 
 
In the Finish SCR, new reactors to be built were considered by the nuclear Promoters and 
Regulators far safest than those of TMI or Chernobyl (General narrative). 
General Narrative 
“Also it has been argued that new reactors are safe and they can improve the energy independency.” (page16 ) 
“Two major accidents changed the future of nuclear energy for good. The meltdown of the light water reactor in Three 
Mile Island nuclear power station demonstrated how difficult it was to predict catastrophic accidents in the complex 
systems. Seven years later the explosion in the RBMK reactor in Chernobyl demonstrated how the lack of governance 
and mismanagement caused a catastrophic accident at the nuclear power station. In Finland, both accidents were 
studied carefully and the conclusion was that neither Three Mile Island nor Chernobyl accident could happen here 
(Michelsen, Särkikoski 2005).”  (page 24) 
 
In the F.R. Germany, Public authorities tried to present nuclear power as a clean and safe energy 
source that was not involved in any threats for the public (Event 3), and they maintained this 
image at least until the Chernobyl case. Meanwhile, some Receptors showed concerns about the 
location of the nuclear installation because of safety issues (Showcase). 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology. 
The pilot-scale project SNR 300 motivated promoters due to the limited uranium reserves and regulators hoped for an 
efficient utilization of the minerals by building this reactor. However very soon, the search for a site raised concerns 
among receptors who demonstrated against the project, some of the demonstrators even came from the Netherlands 
as the chosen site was close to the country (page 19).  
Event 3: Wackersdorf (planned but never built reprocessing plant) 
“Up until Chernobyl they kept proclaiming publicly that hazards will not be expected neither from the reprocessing 
plant nor from any other nuclear power plant” (page 28). 
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In the Spanish SCR, the Promoters insisted on the safety of a NPP installation (Showcase), 
arguing that the technology was safe and effective. In the case of Event 1 (Vandellós I incident), 
the Promoters claimed that a major catastrophe did not happen due to the measures they took 
during the incident, demonstrating the effectiveness of the high safety standards applied. 
However, other Public Authorities (regional and local governments) and local social movements 
in the area of the NPP expressed worries about safety, especially regarding emergency 
measures (Showcase, Event 2). In addition, international nuclear accidents, such as TMI and 
Chernobyl, reinforced the claim for safety among the Receptors (Event 3). 
General narrative 
“While local authorities may accept the plants on the prospects of the economic bonus they promised, in many 
occasions the hinterland further away raised opposition due to the conflicting use of the territory and safety concerns” 
(page 18).  
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP 
“Promoters also insisted on the safety of the installation” (page 27) 
 
Event 2: Ascó Nuclear Power Plant 
“In 2014, and apart from safety “which must prevail over everything else”, the mayor valued the impact on the area of 
the NPPs as being positive (…)” (page 41) 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
 “Moreover, the clandestine sabotage of the works of the plant proliferated, casting serious doubt on the safety of ever 
operating the plant.” (page 46) 
 
Regarding the impact of Chernobyl on Swedish public opinion, the SCR shows that some 
Receptors in favour of nuclear power argued that the technology used in Sweden was very 
different and safer than the one used in Chernobyl and, therefore, there was no need to revise 
Swedish nuclear policy (Event 4). Independent experts expressed concerns about the suitability 
of a nuclear waste repository (Event 3). The issue of the suitability of sitting of repositories not 
only raised concerns at local level but also mobilise different type of actors all around Sweden, 
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like independent specialists willing to collaborate in analysing if the proposed place was even 
suitable at geological level. 
General narrative 
Thus, very little questioning of nuclear power occurred in Sweden until the early 1970s, but from 1972 and onwards a 
dramatic shift took place and nuclear power was heavily criticized from many different kinds of actors among receptors 
mainly. Three of these were particularly important: scientists, politicians and environmental activists (page 15).   
Event 3: Local protests against a repository 
At one occasion a local resistance group (in Klipperås) demanded that independent geologists should be allowed to 
make an analysis of the drilling materials. When this was rejected activists dressed as Santa Claus were able to steal 
40 meter of drilling cores, and the independent geologists analyzing this material came to the conclusion that the local 
rock had vast deformation zones making it unsuitable for a repository (page 46). 
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
“The proponents, including scientists, industrialists and trade unionists, claimed that Swedish reactors were 
fundamentally different from Soviet reactors, and that a disaster like the one in Chernobyl was impossible in Sweden” 
(page 50). 
 
The issue of safety was dominant in the UK public debate, and public Authorities made decisions 
based on the assumption that British citizens required confidence that their government had 
chosen the safest available nuclear technology, which, according to its safety standards, turned 
out to be British nuclear technology (General narrative, Events 4 and 5). They felt that this was 
the minimum requirement to have certain success in the deployment of the British nuclear 
program. Regulators reacted to concerns on the safety conditions by providing more scientific 
evidences to ensure a reactor was safe to operate, as receptors were concerned on the material 
used and related safety conditions for the operation. Also the UK SCR mentioned about scientists 
concerned about the safety of steel pressure vessels in the American technology and promoted 
instead the British one. 
General narrative 
“Cabinet concluded that public confidence in the nuclear programme necessitated the choice of the safest possible 
reactor (even if it wasn’t the cheapest) and supported the construction of SGHWRs.(Cabinet Conclusions, 1974) This 
event shows how the balance of this decision rested on the construction of an ‘imagined public’ by Ministers who 
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valued safety over cost.” (page 28) 
Event 4: SGHWR chosen as AGR replacement 1974 
“For the majority of press reportage, the choice was between British technology and American technology: Publicly 
criticised UK reactor choices at Select Committee hearings, and used the press to promote the PWR (page 39). 
“Ministers, UKAEA, and notably Government Chief Scientific Adviser Sir Alan Cottrell were concerned about the safety 
of steel pressure vessels in PWRs.” (page 40). 
Event 5: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
“Raised concerns about the ‘plutonium economy’ and the safety of nuclear power. Criticised the UKAEA’s failure to 
provide a solution for nuclear waste, and (then current) methods of at-sea-disposal”. (page 41) 
 
Ukraine: 
Showcase: Dealing with Chernobyl disaster aftermath  
 “Soviet authorities also ordered the construction of the Shelter Object (in Ukrainian, Ob’ekt “Ukrittia,” but popularly 
known as the “Sarcophagus”) to cover the open reactor building of unit 4 as quickly as possible to limit radioactive 
contamination from spreading further.” (page 24) 
Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
“This secrecy resulted in insufficient and inadequate measures of protection for the nearby population and emergency 
workers sent to do the clean-up of the accident site and the villages in its vicinity.” (page 34). 
 
In the USA SCR anti-nuclear groups (as such as Friends of the Earth, Critical Mass, UCS) raised 
public awareness of safety issues during this period (General narrative, p. 18). In the Showcase 
section an incident at a NPP where the emergency procedure was not followed by those involved 
when reporting the fire is described, evidencing that certain organizational safety deficits had 
happened (Showcase p. 27). Other cases as deficits in seismic design on NPP siting or concerns 
about potential theft and sabotages are described (Event 2). One of the main safety related 
concerns in the USA is the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, which revealed weaknesses in NRC 
regulatory powers and supervision, and the weak safety culture among industry and operators, 
and the slow response of federal and state agencies to safety issues (Event 3). This case led to 
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increased regulatory powers and a renewed safety philosophy among NRC staff and 
administrators (Event 3, p. 37). 
Such anti-nuclear groups raised public awareness of safety issues at the time:  Friends of the Earth, Critical Mass, and 
the UCS. (Gamson, Modigliani. 1989) 
(General narrative, p. 18) 
The Emergency Procedure was not followed by those involved when reporting the fire. The construction workers first 
attempted to extinguish the fire, whereas the procedure specifies that the fire alarm be sounded first. The guard 
reporting the fire telephoned the shift engineer's office rather than calling either of the numbers listed in the 
procedure.”(Comey, 1976) The use of polyurethane foams to plug leaks and polyvinyl chloride cable was a mistake in 
itself because the nature of the material.  Also, the “lack of qualified, experienced, fire protection staffing contributed to 
the conditions which resulted in a direct loss of $10 million and an indirect loss of $30 million related to business 
interruption.”  “Poor design, fire detection and fire suppression provided only on a partial or limited basis; use of 
polyurethane; no management interest in fire safety” all nearly led to a meltdown.(Pryor, 1977) 
(Showcase p. 27) 
According to a U. S. Geological Survey report, the station’s seismic design could not withstand the maximum potential 
quake possible, and this led to retrofitting and upgrading.  The NRC licensed the facility after redesign.(Sneed) 
(Event 2, p. 34) 
Abalone Alliance members worried about  (…) the dangers of theft and sabotage, and the short and long terms 
dangers of NPP.(Direct Action, 1981)   
(Event 2, p. 35) 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) accident was a partial nuclear meltdown on March 28, 1979, in reactor unit 2 near 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the most significant accident in US history.  The accident revealed weaknesses in NRC 
regulatory powers and supervision, slow response of federal and state agencies to safety issues, and lack of 
understanding and trust among the public.  After the accident, a commission under Kemmeny, analyzed the cause of 
the accident and response of station personnel, state and national officials, and the role of the NRC, especially its poor 
oversight, and the weak safety culture among industry and operators.  The Kemmeny Report led to increased 
regulatory powers and a renewed safety philosophy among NRC staff and administrators. 
(Event 3, p. 37) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
According to the Bulgarian SCR, during negotiations with EU for decommissioning several 
Kozloduy NPP reactors, the Bulgarian specialists and experts (Promoters and Regulators) had 
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different opinion and defended its technical and safety characteristics (Event 4). Promoters and 
Regulators expressed their satisfaction with the technical safety issues, in contrast with the 
opinion of international agencies. On the contrary, during the process of proposing building a new 
NPP in Bulgaria, a public committee (Receptors) aimed to engage the public with the problem of 
the safety conditions of the already existing NPP (Event 5). 
 
Event 4: Initial negotiations and contract with the European Union for memberships, which included decommissioning 
of reactor bodies 1,2,3,4 at Kozloduy NPP – 1993- 2004 
“Bulgarian specialists and experts had different opinion and defended the technical and safety characteristics of the 
reactor” (page 39). 
Event 5: Referendum for constructing new atomic power plant in Bulgaria- 2013 
“The safety condition of the Bulgarian current reactors was at first discussed by a group of professors also searching 
for firms for a national referendum. (…) This committee aimed to engage the public with the problem of the safety 
condition of the first four reactors and to renegotiate their fate” (page 43). 
 
In Finland, rigorous testing of materials and processes and safety rules imposed by authorities 
are presented (by Promoters and Regulators) as guaranties of safety. (Event 6, p. 56). 
Event 6: First nuclear debates 
“Heikki von Hertzen’s provocative actions started a nuclear debate that heated up in the summer of 1973. Bjarne 
Regnell and Björn Wahlström from IVO responded to the criticism by pointing out that there was no scientific evidence 
to support von Hertzen’s claims. Nuclear technology was based on the systematic scientific research and rigorous 
testing of materials and processes. No nuclear facility was allowed to be built or operated without special permissions 
from the radiation safety authorities. IVO had followed every norm and rule set by the Finnish and international 
authorities. Safety culture was a holistic approach and it was constantly upgraded.” (page56) 
 
In Sweden, Promoters of a nuclear waste repository gave assurances that they had the 
appropriate technology to build a safe repository, and that the country had appropriate geological 
areas to do it (Event 5). Due to past reactions on the suitability of places to host repositories, the 
Regulators changed their strategy by a more engagement oriented strategy with local 
municipalities that were willing to host the facility. 
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Event 5: A competition for getting a repository 
“In the beginning of the 1990s, SKB made a reorientation of its strategy. Previously it had tried to find sites with solid rocks 
without any cracks, through which water might reach to the surface. But based on more developed safety analyses SKB now 
started to underline that the rock itself was not single most important barrier but that the other components in a repository, the 
copper canister surrounded by bentonite clay, also were crucial parts of a multiple barrier system. This reorientation meant 
that it was no longer necessary to search for the best possible geological location in the whole country, but that the geology 
in large parts of the country was sufficiently good” (page 53). 
 
In Ukraine, nuclear promoters supported by international audience elaborated a new discourse on 
nuclear power insisting on the safety of the new reactors opposed to the Chernobyl ones, 
emphasizing very important differences between the two types. The Promoters said that the new 
reactor models are very different from the Chernobyl type, and therefore safer (Event 3). 
However, Receivers do not agree very much, thinking that they were still far away from Western 
European standards (Event 4). 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
 “In October 1993 the Parliament voted to overturn a 1990 moratorium on construction of new reactors and to keep 
Chernobyl open in order to address projected power shortages for the winter of that year “ (page 45). 
“Environmental activists also pointed out that new reactors would mean additional large amounts of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste, and that the problem of their safe storage and disposal was not solved in a satisfying way 
nowhere in the world, and completely ignored in Ukraine (Tsvetkova, 2016).” (page 47). 
Event 4: Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and public hearings on the completion of the 
Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors in exchange (1994-2000) 
“Activists pointed out that Soviet-designed reactors at K2-R4 were far below Western safety standards.”  (page 51). 
 
In the USA SCR a series of incidents indicates the challenges faced in mastering nuclear 
technology, assuring the public about safety, and the risks that are reveal in station operation that 
may begin from the mundane and move quickly to the near catastrophe (Showcase, p. 25). A 
weak safety design is reported also at the Seabrook nuclear power plant that might cause the 
degradation of some of the installations. It is said also that the regulator (NRC) put the station 
under special oversight until the problem was resolved (Event 5, p. 48). Another NPP (the Davis-
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
118 
Besse NPP) has been described as, in comparison with other NPPs, a poor operating record 
having several serious problems during its operating life, to the point that NRC engineers have 
calculated a minor earthquake or accident could cause the shield building to collapse onto the 
reactor releasing catastrophic radiation (Event 5, p. 49-52).  
The significant number of serious accidents and “contentions” led an NGO dedicated to the health and safety of the 
Hudson River, Riverkeeper, to push to shut down Indian Point NPP. Riverkeeper offered ten reasons to close Indian 
Point including seismic risks, exemptions for safety rules, a weak evacuation plan, a threat to NYC’s water supply. A 
series of incidents – and major accidents – indicates the challenges faced in mastering nuclear technology, assuring 
the public about safety, and the risks that are reveal in station operation that may begin from the mundane and move 
quickly to the near catastrophe. 
(Showcase, p. 25) 
 
In 2009, NextEra Energy Seabrook noted the intrusion of moisture into sections of walls in certain below-grade 
structures at the Seabrook nuclear power plant that might cause the degradation of some of the concrete as evidenced 
by pattern cracking.  The NRC put the station under special oversight for 3 years until the problem was resolved.(US 
NRC, 2016c) 
(Event 5, p. 48) 
 
The Davis-Besse NPP has, in comparison with other NPPs, a very poor operating record. (Wasserman, 2015)  In 1977 
a stuck relief valve was a “precursor accident” to the 1979 Three Mile Island meltdown.  In 1985 a LOCA, the worst 
since Three Mile Island, closed Davis-Besse for a year.  In 1998 a tornado caused a total loss of power, destroying the 
plant's warning, communication and emergency systems, threatening a meltdown.  And in 2002, the operating 
neglected maintenance and upkeep that allowed leaking borated water to ate a 7” hole in the reactor's pressure vessel 
lid, leaving only a 3/16" liner to contain the coolant and prevent a meltdown.(US NRC, 2008) The plant closed for two 
years costing ratepayers $600 million and resulted in a $33.5 million fine, the largest in NRC history.  In 2010, the 
utility discovered it had to replace the vessel head again. 
(Event 5, p. 49) 
 
How safe is the station today?  To replace aging, deteriorating, damaged parts, the operator made four unprecedented 
large cuts through the Davis-Besse concrete shield building that prevents release of lethal radiation. In 2011 a series 
of cracks and concrete voids were discovered, the cause of which is unknown.  NRC engineers have calculated a 
minor earthquake or accident could cause the shield building to collapse onto the reactor releasing catastrophic 
radiation 
(Event 5, p. 52) 
 
To date, no comprehensive action has been taken to solve the problem of the accumulation of radioactive waste and 
spent fuel at power stations around the country, the latter amount which has reach 70,000 tons stored in basins or in 
dry cask storage at the power stations themselves and may be at risk, according to the US Academy of Sciences, from 
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terrorist attack. 
(Appendix 4, p. 78) 
 
According to the National Academy of Sciences, spent nuclear fuel stored in pools at some of the nation’s commercial 
nuclear reactors may be at risk from terrorist attacks.  The Board on Radioactive Waste Management issued a report 
that calls on the NRC to conduct additional analyses to obtain a better understanding of potential risks and to ensure 
that power-plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the possible consequences of such attacks. 
Because potential threats may differ according to a specific plant's design, the committee recommended that plant-by-
plant vulnerability analyses be performed.  
(Appendix 4, p. 80-81) 
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A.2. Economic dimension 
This dimension refers to the perception of factors related to economic issues, both in positive 
and/or negative ways. After conducting an in-depth inductive analysis, it addresses topics such 
as: 
 Job creation. 
 Industrial progress and new business related with the construction or managing of the 
nuclear sector. 
 Security of energy supply. 
 Consumer economics (concerns about energy prices, etc.). 
 Resource requirements. 
 Potential economic losses due to nuclear incidents. 
 
A.2.1. Job creation 
Under this sub-section, perceived issues of potential and/or actual job creation are analysed. 
Although it is expected to be an important factor in modulating public responses, it appears few 
times in the SCRs.  
 Period 1950-1970 
In early times, only the Fininsh SCR remarks that bringing employment to rural areas was one of 
the arguments used by promoters and regulators when searching for a place to build a new 
nuclear power plant (Event 5). 
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
The town itself was a small bilingual coastal town whose best days were in the past when fishing and agriculture gave 
employment and welfare to approximately 15.000 inhabitants. Now the times had changed and Loviisa was suffering 
from unemployment and loss of industrial enterprises. This development had sent young people and educated middle-
class professionals out of town to search for a better future. K.G. Wahlström wanted to reverse the tide and nothing fit 
better in his plans than the first nuclear power project. It was not only a major investment, but also the biggest ever 
industrial project in Finland. For sure, it would bring fame and fortune to Loviisa and encourage other businesses to 
invest in Loviisa (Björn Wahlström 25.1.2001). (p. 48) 
K.G. Wahlström did not let these problems to disrupt his mission. This was “a onetime only opportunity” that should not 
be missed. It was estimated that the construction work alone would bring about 1000 new jobs to town and when the 
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plant was operating Loviisa would get more than 400 well paid middle class residents. (p. 49) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
Spanish Promoters and Public authorities tended to highlight the creation of jobs and the 
socioeconomic development related to the NPPs, both at local and national levels (General 
narrative, Showcase, Event 2). This argument was welcomed by local governments hosting the 
NPPs, usually located in poorly developed rural areas. The promised jobs were of two types: 
builders of the NPP and operators of the NPP. Other economic compensations for the 
municipalities were provided in the form of taxes or other municipal incomes. These factors, the 
economic prosperity and the employment brought by the NPP, led the Promoters and Public 
Authorities to expect no opposition. However, local environmental movements had a negative 
perception of the economic benefits that the NPP apparently provided, which they saw as 
conflicting with other activities in the territory (Showcase). On the other side, the end of the 
lifetime of the NPP created economic uncertainties in the local population. Also the stopped NPP 
(because of the moratorium) was perceived as economically damaging to the municipality and 
employment in the area (Showcase). 
General Narrative  
“The typical location of a nuclear power plant was a rural landscape with sufficient water to cool the reactor. Bringing 
thousands of jobs to rural areas was a major selling point for the nuclear . (…) Municipalities located in Zone I of the 
Nuclear Emergency Plans identified the consequent impact of nuclear facilities in the socio-economic development 
of towns and geographical areas where they were located. The end of the lifetime of the NPP creates economic 
uncertainties about the future benefits of hosting a nuclear site  in the local population.” (page 7-8) 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor)  
“During the first period, the Promoters of Valdecaballeros linked technological and economic progress to the nuclear 
power plant, both at the local and at the national level. The economic arguments justified the location chosen: a 
disadvantaged region which would develop thanks to nuclear energy. NPP villages’ receive substantial amounts of 
money from the government, for job creation and other activities. Thus, it was said that thanks to the prosperity and 
the employment that the NPP would bring “opposition is not to be expected” (page 30). 
However, local environmental movements had a negative perception of the economic wealth that the NPP apparently 
provided, which they saw as conflicting with the traditional uses of the territory (page 28).  
In fact, while local authorities accepted the plan, the hinterland a little further away rose opposing the two reactors from 
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early on due to the conflicting use of water by downstream irrigated landowners (page 28).  
With frequent droughts, they argued, the Guadiana River would be insufficient to meet the needs of both the nuclear 
power plant and the irrigated lands (page 26). 
When the halting of the NPP became a reality, the local government was disappointed with the decision. Thus, over the 
years several mayors of the municipality demanded redress for the economic damages they had incurred due to the 
fact that the nuclear plant had not been built, and for the lack of alternative projects. From the local government they 
suggest that the Minister does not want to hand over the fields in case they could be used in the future, if Spain bet on 
nuclear energy again (page 29). 
Event 2: Ascó Nuclear Power Plant  
The press announced, on 27 February 1970, that “the new factory of Ascó” would provide 300 jobs and while it was 
being built even 2,000 workers would be needed (daily newspaper La Vanguardia, 27 February 1970). The reaction of 
the francoist town hall was one of euphoria celebrating the possibility for the population (Garcia, Reixac & Vilanov, 
1980, p. 68) (page 40). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
Refering to recent times, the Finnish SCR stated that nuclear energy projects were framed as a 
way of fighting against the unemployment crisis in the 90’s. However, it is also said that the global 
capitalism trends moved the industrial production to other countries and the Finnish parliament 
decided to support more sustainable and environmental friendly energy solutions, instead of 
investing in nuclear power (General narrative).  
General Narrative 
It was in 1993, when the Finnish parliament received a new proposal. It was accompanied by heavy lobbing from the 
industry and labor unions. It was also expected that the Parliament would allow the new project to move forward 
because Finland desperately needed large scale industrial projects that could reduce the unemployment crises. 
Finland had sunk in a deep economic slump in 1991 because the Soviet Union collapsed, and the domestic financial 
markets were deregulated prematurely. In 1993 more than 300 000 people were listed as unemployed. The Parliament 
declined the nuclear power project, and for many this signaled changing attitudes towards nuclear energy and the 
energy policy in general. Instead of investing in nuclear power, the Finnish parliament decided to support sustainable 
developments and environmental friendly energy solutions. This was possible because the industrial production had 
suffered during the economic crises. Energy intensive industries struggled to compete in global markets, and many 
companies decided to close the factories in Finland and move the production to Asia. (p.24-25) 
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Also the Swedish SCR made references to job creation, considered as one of the main factors in 
the negotiations among the municipalities competing to be selected as a repository site (Event 5). 
Event 5: A Competition for Getting a Repository: 
Receptors from the two municipalities argued about the risks of hosting the repository and an important argument was 
the job creation. The job argument was important in all the four municipalities under consideration, but in Storuman and 
Malå the environmental dangers with a repository became the dominant argument. In the later stages of negotiations, 
the job argument became dominant, and two of the municipalities engaged in a contest for the repository (page 54). 
 
 
A.2.2. Industrial progress and new business  
Industrial progress and new business related to the construction or managing of the nuclear 
sector appeared in the SCR when talking about nuclear energy and societal relationships. This 
dimension is strongly related to the previous one (job creation), but here we focuse more on the 
creation of wealth and industrial technological development and modernization in general. 
 Period 1950-1970 
According to the F.R. Germany SCR, in the early years experts and public authorities considered 
that having a powerful nuclear industry was crucial to the country’s overall economic 
competitiveness. Nuclear scientists advocated both early and strongly for peaceful use of atomic 
energy as for them a powerful nuclear industry was crucial to the overall economic 
competitiveness of West Germany. However, in the 1970s there was a shift of opinion towards 
more pessimistic views of the effects of the technology. While the regulators strongly advocated 
nuclear energy as a trigger for technological and industrial modernization during the 1950s and 
1960s, they developed into a critic of nuclear energy in the 1970s. (General narrative, p. 12)  
General narrative 
“The transition from optimism to pessimism manifested in Germany’s political landscape too. While the 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) strongly advocated nuclear energy as a trigger for technological and 
industrial modernization during the 1950s and 1960s, it switched sides and became a critic of nuclear 
energy in the 1970s.” (page 12)  
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The Finish SCR states that nuclear developments promised better future by enhancing 
industrialization, urbanization and the development of modern industrial Finland (General 
narrative).  
General Narrative: 
“Nuclear energy boosted transition from the agrarian society into modern industrial society. Nuclear power stations 
need educated operators, systematic scientific and technological research and organized society that governs, 
manages and controls the nuclear industry.” (page14)  
“In sum, Atoms for Peace project was one of the few positive initiatives after the devastating war. It promised better 
future by enhancing industrialization, urbanization and the development of modern industrial Finland (Michelsen 1993).” 
(page18) 
 
The USA report shows how since the 50’s the Regulator (AEC) promoted nuclear power and 
encouraged the private sector to join in, offering funding to private companies for conducting 
research and development on proposed reactor designs. (General narrative, p. 7-8, Event 1, p. 
29). 
Throughout the demonstration program, from 1955 to 1963, the AEC offered funding to private companies for 
conducting research and development on proposed reactor designs; waived charges for the loan of source and special 
nuclear fuels for up to seven years; and provided free research and development in government laboratories for 
certain mutually agreeable projects.(Mazuzan, 1980: 343) This established a tradition of direct and indirect subsidies 
to the private sector industry that persists into the 2010s, for example through insurance. 
(General narrative, p.7-8) 
To encourage industry to join onto the AEC reactor push, the US Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act (1957) with 
a limit on liability of $560 million.  The industry was required to obtain as much insurance as the private insurance pool 
would provide and the federal government would provide the rest of the insurance up to a maximum amount of $500 
million. Since the private insurance companies were willing to put up only $65 million, a tiny sum compared to the 
damages that might result from a meltdown, the federal government determined to pick up the rest.  Critics of the 
proposal pointed out that, not only would the public taxpayer be paying for private industry's insurance, but that the 
limit might leave thousands of victims unindemnified in case of a catastrophic accident (see Reactor Accident Safety 
Studies, Appendix 5 below), and the public (the US government) would be responsible for any further cleanup and 
other costs 
(General narrative, p. 8) 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the regulatory process evolved under the AEC’s mandate to promote nuclear power and 
encourage the private sector to join in.   
(Event 1, p. 29) 
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 Period 1970-1990 
In a country in transition from a dictatorship towards a democratic regime, as such it was Spain 
during the second half of the 70’s, the Promoters and the Public Authorities argued that nuclear 
energy was necessary for the development of Spanish industry as a whole, as well as for the 
hosting regions (Event 3). Promoters warned of the risk of a return to underdevelopment if the 
nuclear path was abandoned (Event 4). 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement  
Promoters stated the strengthening of the nuclear aspect in the production of electrical energy (Basque Country). The 
Minister of Industry highlighted also the crucial influence that these facilities would have on the development of the 
whole Spanish industry (page 45). 
Event 4: Nuclear Moratorium 
The energy sector entrepreneurs’ performed a campaign in favour of atomic energy, with warnings of the risk of a 
return to underdevelopment if the nuclear path was to be abandoned. According to their arguments, nuclear was the 
only way out of the economic crisis (in the 80’s) (caused indeed by the strong dependence on petroleum) (page 50).  
 
During this period, in the F.R Germany the interest of Promoters in nuclear development reduced 
once energy consumption rose slower than expected (Showcase). This showed that fluctuations 
in the overall economic context could influence the profitability of nuclear projects. 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology 
“Moreover, since energy consumption had risen slower than expected, electricity suppliers were no longer interested in 
the commissioning of the reactor” (page 22). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
Economic progress motives are argued again in Spain during this period. For instance the 
economic debate also appears as polarized when analysing the case of the NWR (Event 5), 
which the Public authorities justified on the grounds of ‘economic diversification’ (of a poorly 
developed rural area), and its stoppage was interpreted as a harm to the whole nation’s 
economy. Besides, some local associations (Receptors) considered that the NWR would activate 
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the economic opportunities for the region, sharing territory with other relevant local economic 
driving forces such as the agri-food industry and tourism.  
Event 5: Nuclear Waste Repository: 
Public bodies mainly justify the NWR on the grounds of ‘economic diversification’ – as a technological centre would go 
together with the repository, providing other ways of living (besides the NPPs). And the National government (PP) 
argues that work stoppage of the NWR will cause economic damages (page 54). 
“The mayor of Ascó used very similar arguments to support the candidacy: economic interests and local development 
(page 55) 
The Platform against the Nuclear Repository in Cuenca (formed by 49 organizations) declared that they “reject the site 
because it is against their proposal for the local development based on renewable energies, sustainable tourism and 
high quality foodstuffs industry” (page 57). 
 
The USA report shows how the promotion of the nuclear sector was interpreted as a strategic 
sector that deserves to be subsidized by the state (i.e. General narrative, Event 2). 
Throughout the demonstration program, from 1955 to 1963, the AEC offered funding to private companies for 
conducting research and development on proposed reactor designs; waived charges for the loan of source and special 
nuclear fuels for up to seven years; and provided free research and development in government laboratories for 
certain mutually agreeable projects.(Mazuzan, 1980: 343) This established a tradition of direct and indirect subsidies 
to the private sector industry that persists into the 2010s, for example through insurance. 
(General narrative, p.7-8) 
 
PG&E had applied for licenses to extend operating lifetime Diablo Canyon, but in 2016 agreed with the state of 
California to close the reactors by 2025, in spite of industry claims that the station contributes about $1 billion annually 
to the local economy and is safe to operate. The utility also agreed to invest in energy efficiency, renewable power and 
electricity storage to offset the power that will no longer be produced by the nuclear plant. 
(Event 2, p. 36-37) 
 
A.2.3. Security of energy supply  
Ways and arguments for ensuring energy supply are present in several SCRs. We are defining 
this topic as security in the amount of the energy provision and avoiding fluctuations through time. 
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Other closely related topic is that of national’s ‘energy independence’, which recalls to self-
sufficiency on energy generation by each country (a topic that we will see later, in the Political-
institutional analytical dimensions section). 
 Period 1950-1970 
In early period this argument was well developed in the Finnish SCR, where the security of 
energy supply was one of the main arguments to take decisions about nuclear projects. The quick 
grow of the industrial sector recalls for a balance of the irregularities of the traditional production 
of energy, and this role could be played by the nuclear energy. It is argued that it was difficult to 
build a modern industrial society without secure supply or electricity and heat, and in Finland this 
was especially important because much of the country is located in the arctic environment. 
(General narrative, p. 18-20, 24). 
General Narrative:  
“Finnish government appointed the Energy Committee to prepare Finnish participation in the Atoms for Peace process. 
The committee predicted that new hydro power stations in Lapland and the reconstruction of the national grid would 
satisfy the need of electricity until the beginning of the 1960’s. Conventional thermal power stations were needed to 
complement the hydro power and balanced the irregularities of the production of electricity.” (page 18) 
“The currency was devaluated several times during the 1950s and 1960s. Domestic energy production was able to 
respond to the economic growth, but not for long. The consumption of electricity had already climbed from 8,8 TWh in 
1960 to almost 22 TWhs in 1970 and the prediction for the next decade showed that the growth would continue. In 
order to satisfy the need, Finland had two alternatives. Conventional thermal power stations could carry a bigger load 
or Finland could start to invest in nuclear power. The first option was technologically easier, but it would put additional 
stress to the trade balance that was already negative throughout the 1960s. Nuclear power stations, on the other hand, 
used imported fuel, but the cost of fuel was relatively low compared to the total value of production (Voimalaitoskomitea 
1974). Two nuclear power projects were launched in the early 1970s.” (page19) 
“Finland climbed in less than two decades from the third income level to the top level in Europe. Much of this depended 
on energy production. It was impossible to build modern industrial society without secure supply or electricity and heat. 
In Finland this was especially important, because much of the country is located in the arctic environment.” (page20) 
“Nuclear energy did not replace any other source of energy, but it increased the total electricity production. This was 
needed to secure the electricity supply to industries, cities, towns, and municipalities. Finland believed in economic 
growth and everything possible was done to enhance industrialization and modernization of the society. This is why so 
many waited anxiously that four nuclear power stations would be connected to the national grid.” (pages 20-21) 
“When the four nuclear reactors started to supply nuclear electricity to the national grid almost simultaneously, the 
second oil crises was still holding back the economic growth in Finland. There was no more lack of electricity. In 
contrary, nuclear power reactors produced plenty of electricity that few conventional thermal power stations could be 
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temporarily closed. (…)There was no evidence that the demand of energy and electricity would slow down in the future. 
The growth continued, and in order to satisfy the demand it was time to start building additional capacities.”  (page24) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
The Promoters in the Spanish SCR argued with the guaranty of energy supply (Showcase), 
because there are so many electricity demands in the country to meet up. 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor)  
“When the moratorium becomes definitive in the 1990s, there were attempts to revive the option to reopen 
Valdecaballeros. Most of the communication for and against such possibility happened though the national media. The 
promoters insisted in the need to open Valdecaballeros to meet electricity demands in the country and to avoid the cost 
incurred by stopping it..” (page 32). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
No news about this topic has been found in the SCRs for this period. 
 
A.2.4. Consumer economics 
Some issues related with the perception of energy prize evolution are found here. 
 Period 1950-1970 
The prize of the electricity is one of the mentioned topics in the Finnish SCR. At the beginning, 
the promoters and regulators promised inexpensive electricity thanks to the nuclear power. 
(General narrative, p. 20; Event 1, p. 35). 
General Narrative: 
 “This is why so many waited anxiously that four nuclear power stations would be connected to the national grid. Almost 
2000 MWs of electricity promised inexpensive electricity that was critically needed for investments in industry, 
infrastructure and consumption.” (page 20). 
Event 1:  
“Newspapers and magazines were full of propaganda that promised inexpensive and inexhaustible source of 
electricity.” (page 35) 
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 Period 1970-1990 
In Sweden, the public controversy for deciding to maintain or not nuclear power development, 
some Unions argued that a shutdown could increase electricity tariffs (but other trade unionists 
claimed for sustainable growth and renewable energy) (Event 4, p. 50-51). After the Chernobyl 
accident, Regulators’ argued economic reasons either to phase out or maintain the nuclear power 
were a controversy in the government. The new energy policy was strongly contested by leading 
trade unionists, which traditionally had been a strong faction within the Social Democratic Party. 
Some of them argued that the shutdown could increase electricity tariffs and others claimed on 
economic sustainable growth based on efficiency and renewable sources of energy. 
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden  
“More importantly, many leading trade unionists, which traditionally had been a strong faction within the Social Democratic 
Party, also opposed it. They argued that a “premature phase out” – as they called it - would lead to increased electricity 
tariffs, which in turn would threaten jobs in industry.” (page 51). 
“In the following year the Party experienced fairly strong internal conflicts that were referred to as the “War of the Roses” (a 
red rose is the symbol of the Social Democratic Party), between an economic growth oriented faction around the trade 
unions, and a more environmentally oriented faction around the youth´s and women´s organizations of the party.” (page 50). 
 
Most of the actors in the UK seemed to consider that nuclear energy contributed to maintain 
electricity tariffs at a competitive level (General narrative, p. 7). The cost-effectiveness of nuclear 
power also impacts the public opinion. 
General narrative: 
“Pessimism about the cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy seems to have affected UK public opinion particularly as the 
AGRs continued to over-run continually extended construction time and cost estimates in the mid-1980s. (…). 
However, since privatisation, nuclear power stations (and particularly the AGRs) have provided 20% of British electricity 
requirements and do so at a cost the public view as competitive (page 7). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Finland SCR it is also said that nuclear power stations are not the ideal types of energy 
sources for today’s needs (it is said that post-industrial society needs flexible, sustainable energy 
systems that can respond quickly to the changing needs of customers) (General narrative, p. 16, 
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p. 26). In this periode, international prices of electricity have dropped questioning whether nuclear 
energy is today economically feasible (Showcase, p. 30). 
General Narrative: 
“Opponents of nuclear energy emphasize the structural changes in the Finnish society. Finland is no longer dependent 
on energy intensive industry, but the consumption of electricity is fragmented. Instead of feeding electricity to giant 
factories, energy companies today are serving small and midsize companies and environmentally-aware customers. 
Therefore, nuclear power stations are not the ideal types of energy sources for today’s needs. Post-industrial 
society needs flexible, sustainable energy systems that can respond quickly to the changing needs of customers.” 
(page16). 
“Meanwhile, climate change advances rapidly, and radical actions are necessary to control rising temperature. The 
price of electricity has dropped, and it is questionable whether nuclear energy is economically feasible in the future.” 
(page 26). 
 
Showcase: 
“Nuclear energy is no longer an economically superior source of energy because the price of electricity dropped down, 
and the energy policy in Finland and other European countries favor renewable and alternative energy sources.” (page 
30) 
 
A.2.5. Resource requirements  
This category refers mainly to the need of investments (economic and other resources) in nuclear 
programs than should be detracted from other social or industrial needs. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In the F.R. Germany, at early stages, according to the German SCR, some of the promoters were 
critical of nuclear power for cost reasons and because of technical uncertainties (General 
narrative). Once established, nuclear industry developed into the core proponent of nuclear 
energy and continuously attempted to enlarge nuclear markets both domestic and abroad. The 
key role of the State in promoting nuclear development in the FRG is clear. Since the very 
beginning of Germany’s atomic endeavours nuclear energy was criticised by receptors in 
economic terms focussing overall on the high cost of nuclear waste disposals. (General narrative, 
p. 8) 
General narrative 
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 “Private companies have been vital in the construction of German reactors. In the foundational period of the 1950s, 
however, industry was hesitant to engage in the nuclear sector and it needed the state to set the scene.  Once 
established, nuclear industry developed into the core proponent of nuclear energy and continuously attempted to 
enlarge nuclear markets both domestic and abroad” (page 16). However, at the beginning some of the promoters were 
critical with nuclear power mainly for cost reasons and technical uncertainties, as it was a new and unproven 
technology (page 8).  
 
In Finland, when nuclear energy became a suitable way to cover the increasing energy demands, 
significant investments had to be made into research and education (General narrative, p. 4-5). It 
appeared also the need of great investments in high quality jobs in order to attract talent of those 
engineers studying abroad. (Event 2, p. 38). 
General narrative 
“Finland joined the atomic family in the middle of the 1950s when the Atoms for Peace – program was launched and 
the first international conferences were organized. Although Finland needed desperately new sources of energy, it was 
understood that atomic energy could not provide an instant solution to the demand of inexpensive energy. Before 
commercial power reactors could be built, significant investments had to be made into research and education. In 
addition, it was calculated that at least a decade was needed before one commercial reactor could go critical. 
Therefore, nuclear energy was, and it still is, regarded as one sources of energy when the energy policy decisions are 
made.” (page 4-5) 
Event 2: Finnish nuclear power project 1955-1962 
“Some young scientists and engineers who got chance to visit the United States or Sweden did not want to return 
home. This was understandable because the standard of living in Finland was lower comparing to the living standard in 
Sweden and Denmark, and it is needless to mention the United States. Erkki Laurila feared that brain drain would 
empty his critical mass before a nuclear power project would even start. The problem was solved by offering the 
returning experts a steady job with a pay that was higher than for example in universities or research centers.” (page 
38) 
 
The Spanish SCR shows the importance of the financial support that Spanish electric companies 
(Promoters) received from foreign banks since early times. In this case, the nuclear program was 
seen as cheaper than expected. These financial facilities were and continue to be crucial for the 
business decision makers in order to proceed with or cancel their nuclear projects. (General 
narrative, p. 13). 
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General narrative 
Turnkey projects, offered at a price just equivalent to coal fired plants, made losing money to the reactor manufacturers 
for a while. But it can also be considered a private demonstration program that allowed manufactures to create enough 
market for latter generations of reactors. These financial facilities were in the past and continue to be crucial for the 
business decision makers in order to go ahead or cancel their nuclear projects (page 13). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In Bulgaria, Regulators and Promoters expressed their concern about the high cost of the nuclear 
program. (Event 2, p. 33). 
Event 2: Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
“Regarding nuclear power, former vice-minister of electrification Oved Tadzher remembers that his Ministry of 
Electrification officials were not convinced Bulgaria was ready to operate a nuclear station. According to Tadzher, these 
officials considered the nuclear plant too expensive and too sophisticated for Bulgaria’s existing technological 
capabilities.” (page 33) 
In the F.R. Germany, one of the reasons that made regulators to do not take the project of a 
research institute (Showcase) was the high costs their might suppose the commissioning and the 
further use of complex buildings. (Showcase, p. 22) 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology. 
“The price was rather low for an object that had cost multiple times that to build, but since the German government did 
not want to cover the cost of dismantling the nuclear facilities at Kalkar itself it agreed to the price.” (page 22). 
 
In Spain, the changing economic context in the 80’s made the whole nuclear programme 
unaffordable, leading the Spanish Government to proclaim a moratorium. The economic costs 
had skyrocketed and could not be met. With the moratorium, the utilities got rid of their debts and 
obtained compensation for the estimated losses incurred from stopping their nuclear projects. 
The high potential costs (of NPP and of radioactive waste management) had to be paid for with 
public resources. In fact, when analysing the Spanish nuclear moratorium (Event 4), it was 
interpreted by most of the actors as a way of addressing the financial adjustment of the energy 
sector. Nuclear energy became increasingly expensive because more and more safety 
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requirements were demanded, and the oil crises made the construction of NPP much more 
expensive. In this sense, the moratorium acted as a financial rescue allowing the electric 
companies (Promoters) to recover their investments. This was an economic benefit for the 
companies, but a loss for citizens who had to pay for this with their taxes and invoices. The 
Regulators agree that the nuclear moratorium responded to excess of borrowing of the power 
companies and the banks. The government portrayed the moratorium as the necessary 
rationalization of the electricity sector and the only viable option to restore their wrecked finances. 
A financial rescue that had to be done without harming the share price on the stock market of the 
companies involved and seeking the complicity of the international banks to continue financing 
them. (Event 4, p. 50). 
General narrative 
The first elected Parliament in 40 years rescaled down the nuclear project in 1979. The socialist government elected 
1982 faced plenty of challenges in the midst of an economic recession. After a period of consultation and negotiation 
with the power companies, when it became clear that the sector required rationalization, since the sheer size of the 
project had become unaffordable (page 18).  
The private utilities contracted the credits and owned the nuclear power plants. The Spanish government however, 
guaranteed many of the international credits, particularly the early ones.  The bulk of the credits were paid back by the 
utilities. Yet those pertaining to the moratorium, as in the Italian moratorium, they were securitized in bonds 
guaranteed by the Spanish Government, and the cost being paid on the electric tariff by consumers (page 15).  
The economic and political cycle played a crucial role in slowing down and eventually paralyzing the Spanish nuclear 
program. The two oil crises (1974 and 1979) slowed down the economy and the expected electricity needs, but also 
implied the devaluation of the peseta and a period of high inflation, thus contributing to make the financial burden of 
the nuclear projects unbearable for the private utilities. With the moratoria, the utilities got rid of their debts and 
obtained compensation for the estimated losses incurred from stopping their nuclear projects (page 17). 
Event 4: Nuclear Moratorium 
The energy sector entrepreneurs’ performed a campaign in favour of atomic energy, with warnings of the risk of a 
return to underdevelopment if the nuclear path was to be abandoned. According to their arguments, nuclear was the 
only way out of the economic crisis (in the 80’s) (caused indeed by the strong dependence on petroleum) (page 50). 
The Spanish nuclear moratorium is fully interpreted by most of the actors in terms of economic issues. Following the 
TMI and Harrisburg incidents, international reports were warning that nuclear power ceased to be a cheap source of 
energy once the costs of radioactive waste management and the dismantling of defunct power plants were included 
(page 50).  
 His depiction helps to understand how the major electricity companies have driven themselves into heavy 
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overinvestment resorting to international debt: a tiny group of people held the power over the decisions being made 
(page 50). 
Unlike the electricity firms, the nuclear industry was never involved in the discussions with the government about their 
fate regarding the moratorium and looked for eventual compensation through their contracts with project owners (page 
53). 
 
The Sweden SCR shows how the economic framework of the nuclear program changed towards 
a scenario of rising costs and availability of different, cheaper energy sources (General narrative). 
In the time of the “Swedish path” promoters became more pessimistic about the future for nuclear 
energy (due to decreasing oil prices and increasing construction costs). The Receptors that were 
against the development of atomic weapons were also concerned about the high costs for their 
development as well as for related research; therefore they rather propose to invest instead in 
other human activities like development aid (Event 1). However, the Public authorities 
(Regulators included) argued that it would be an enormous economic loss not to use the reactors 
that had been built or were under construction (Event 2). They acknowledged that nuclear power 
had problematic aspects and should be phased out in the long run, when there were renewable 
energy technologies that could replace them.   
General narrative 
The economic prospects seemed gloomier with decreasing oil prices and increasing construction costs for nuclear 
plants (page 12). 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy 
It was co-authored by a well-known novelist and pacifist, Per Anders Fogelström, and a social democratic student leader and 
reservist officer, Roland Morell. They argued that Sweden should abandon the bomb and instead use the money for 
development aid (page 35) 
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power  
Line 1 and Line 2 also acknowledged that nuclear power had problematic aspects and should be phased out in the long run, 
when there were renewable energy technologies that could replace them. But they argued that it would be an enormous 
economic loss not to use the reactors that had been built or were under construction and that this would threaten jobs and 
economic welfare (page 33). 
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According the USA SCR, substantial cost overruns characterized the building of NPP, and social 
movements consider nuclear projects too expensive. Some studies state that recurrent design 
failures and the need to build in redundancies in safety systems multiplies some nuclear projects 
costs. (Event 2, p. 32, 35-36, 45). 
Substantial cost overruns characterized the building of this NPP on an active earthquake fault characterized the construction 
phase of this reactor  (…).  Utility spokesmen initially estimated costs at $400 million for two units, but by 1976 the bill had 
risen to $1.2 billion.  When unit 1 opened on May 7, 1985, and unit two on March 18, 1987, the total cost of the plant was 
$5.52 billion.   
(Event 2, p. 32) 
Abalone Alliance members worried about faulty and inflated projections for nuclear power, the economic catastrophe of 
NPPs, (…) Direct Action, 1981)   
(Event 2, p. 35) 
Such other groups as Mothers for Peace, Friends of the Earth, and Redwood Alliance also have worked to derail nuclear 
power as unsafe, undemocratic, and expensive. (Direct Action, 1981) 
(Event 2, p. 36) 
A RAND study estimated that construction costs of nuclear power plants would double in real dollars every six years or less 
because of recurrent design failures and the need to build in redundancies and other safety systems. This was surely the 
case with Seabrook.(Mooz, 1979; Bove, 1978: 37) 
(Event 4, p. 45) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
According to the Finnish SCR, nuclear power stations are capital intensive and investments in 
nuclear energy are deducted from renewable energy sources. In fact, the recent construction of 
the fifth reactor has been tarnished by delays after delays, and the costs have more than 
doubled. (General narrative, p. 16, p. 26). 
General narrative 
“This solution is denounced by those who emphasize the complexity of nuclear energy. Although it is almost CO2 free, 
nuclear power stations are capital intensive and investments in nuclear energy are deducted from renewable 
energy sources. In addition, building new nuclear power stations and modernizing old ones delays the transformation 
from centralized into decentralized energy systems. (Leiserowitz 2006). History of modern Finland can be written into 
this framework. Finland industrialized after the war and the modern industrial society was built during the 1950s and 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
136 
1960s. The development was interrupted by the oil crises in the middle of the 1970s and the industrial society never 
really recovered from the crises. Instead there was a slow movement towards the post-industrial society during the 
1980s. Industrial and post-industrial societies were developed in parallel until 1990 when the Finnish society 
experienced dramatic political and economic changes. Soviet Union collapsed and Finland integrated to the European 
Union. During the past two decades energy intensive industries have moved to Asia and other low labor cost countries 
and high technology industries and service economy has taken over.” (page 16)  
“Both nuclear power projects have become great disappointments. The construction of the fifth reactor has been 
tarnished by delays after delays, and the costs have more than doubled. The reactor might go critical in 2018, but the 
exact date has not yet been confirmed. Fennovoima project has had equally many dramatic changes, and the final 
building permission is still pending in the Finnish parliament.” (page.26) 
 
In Spain, some social movements mobilized against a nuclear waste repository argue concern by 
high potential costs to be paid with public resources. (Event 5, p. 57). 
Event 5: Nuclear Waste Repository 
The Platform against the Nuclear Repository in Cuenca declared that similar experiences in other NPP areas showed 
that they do not generate wealth, and worried by high potential costs of radioactive waste management to be paid with 
public resources: Thus, they stated that there is no real social consensus, the transport of wastes is not safe, a nuclear 
waste repository would no generate long-term wealth, and natural and cultural values in the surrounding areas could be 
affected(tourism) (page 57). 
 
The high costs of the nuclear program were also discussed in the UK report, with Public 
authorities recognizing the need for a large amount of economic resources. Regulators concluded 
that nuclear power might result an unattractive option due to economics. This made governments 
to take a decision based in a public consultation. (Event 7, p. 49). 
Event 7: Government repositioning on new build NPPs 2006 
“In 2003 the Department of Trade and Industry’s White Paper concluded that the economics of nuclear made it ‘an 
unattractive option for new, carbon-free generating capacity’ and pledged that ‘Before any decision to proceed with the 
building of new nuclear power stations.” (page 49). 
 
In Ukraine, the Promoters stressed the economic viability of nuclear power, requesting an end to 
the moratorium (Event 3). However, the environmental activism movement from the receptors 
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side insisted that completion of two pending reactors lacked economic efficiency as the most 
efficient to compensate Ukrainian energy system for the closure of the Chernobyl NPP (Event 4). 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“Nuclear promoters, with the support of their foreign colleagues, regained some influence on the policy-makers and 
advanced a new post-Chernobyl public discourse on nuclear power. (…) They reminded the public of the economic 
importance and viability of nuclear power and the need to overturn the moratorium on the construction of new reactors 
in Ukraine.” (page 47) 
Event 4: Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and public hearings on the completion of the 
Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors in exchange (1994-2000) 
The NGOs protesting against the project insisted that completion of the two reactors was not economically the most 
efficient way to compensate Ukrainian energy system for the closure of Chernobyl (page 51). 
 
According to the USA SCR, opponents to nuclear energy consider that nuclear power is more 
costly that supporters contend, and that there appears to be great support in Congress for the 
nuclear sector in spite of the history of cost overruns (General narrative). 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 offered extensive subsidies for nuclear power and other alternatives to fossil fuels. It 
offered billions of dollars in tax credits, loan guarantees for advanced nuclear reactors or other emission-free 
technologies up to 80% of the project cost, $2 billion in insurance to cover licensing delays to the industry, extension 
for 20 years of the Price Anderson Act for nuclear liability protection, and support for advanced nuclear technology.  
Opponents of these costs question subsidization of such an industry in a free market economy.  Yet there appears to 
be great support in Congress for the industry in spite of the history of cost overruns. (Alexander, Whitehouse, 2016) 
(General narrative, p. 10) 
Opponents note that nuclear power is more costly that supporters contend, indeed has a history of cost overruns 
(General narrative, p. 17) 
 
 
A.2.6. Economic losses due to nuclear incidents 
Data on this dimension appear only among those countries that had suffered nuclear incidents 
with radiation released to the environment. 
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 Period 1950-1970 
In the UK report a case of released radiation is described (Windscale fire, Event 3), including 
comments on the financial damage generated to farmers and about the compensatory economic 
measures adopted by the government.  
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
Affected local communities raised concerns locally at public hearings about the effects of the fallout on their livestock. 
Although a milk ban was in place for a month farmers were protected from financial damage by compensation by the 
government (page 36). 
 
According the USA report, insurance sector was not able to cover the potential damages in case 
of nuclear accident, and for that reason the guarantee has to be provided by the state with public 
money, a trend that started in the 50’s and lasts until today. (General narrative, p.8-9) 
In simple terms, Price-Anderson covered a 10-year term. All stakeholders hoped that during that ten-year period the 
industry would gain experience, that the problems of reactor safety would be to a great extent solved, and also that the 
insurance industry would develop experience on which to base a strong program of their own.  Since 1957 the Act has 
been extended several times, most recently in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that extended it through December 31, 
2025, and offers the nuclear power industry roughly $12 billion in liability insurance protection to compensate the 
public in the event of a nuclear accident. 
(General narrative, p.8-9) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
The case of Chernobyl is described in the Ukraine report, which caused several material and 
human damages (Event 1). From an economic point of view, the arguments used by actors were 
mainly related to compensations claimed by the affected population (Receptors) (Event 2). Other 
arguments coming from independent experts stated that the Public Authorities (Regulators) 
established an unacceptable threshold in defining the safe situation in polluted areas, avoiding 
paying some of that compensation, which allowed the State and the Promoters to save economic 
resources but threatened people’s lives (Event 2). 
Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
They also made it harder for irradiated people to qualify for the status of “liquidator” or victim of the accident and to be 
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entitled to social and health benefits and compensations from the state (page 29). 
 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991). 
As regulators, under a certain threshold, they assumed that people could continue living without any restrictions or 
rights to protective measures or relocation. Ukrainian (and Belarusian) scientists (others) denounced this threshold as 
unacceptable, because while it allowed the state and industry to save a lot of money, it threatened the health and life of 
the people (page 41). 
 
The USA report includes references to the economic costs caused by the TMI accident, both in 
terms of total cleanup costs, as well as in terms of the increased budget devoted to regulatory 
activities in the aftermath (Event 3). Improved regulation would increase economic operating 
costs in the future. 
The total costs of cleanup were $1 billion over 12 years. The accident was rated a five on the seven-point International 
Nuclear Event Scale as an “Accident With Wider Consequences.” (Ibid.) 
(Event 3, p. 39) 
 
Dorothy Nelkin wrote that the NRC responded to the post-TMI criticism with some energy.  As a result of the accident 
and subsequent criticism of the NRC, its staff grew by 14 percent from 2,841 to 3,240 in one year, and its annual 
budget increased from $325.8 million to $423 million. Requirements were developed for additional training of reactor 
operators. Emergency plans include telephone hotlines to a commission emergency response center. The inspection 
system was improved and the structure of the commission itself reevaluated. But "improved" regulation will inevitably 
increase operating costs and it may also exacerbate the problems of complexity, com-pounding the difficulties of 
management and the risk of systemic effects.(Nelkin, 1981: 138) 
(Event 3, p. 42) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
None excerpt related to this period has been identified in the SCRs. 
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A.3. Socio-cultural dimension 
The socio-cultural dimension refers to several factors identified by two different theoretical 
approaches: the Psychometric paradigm and the Cultural Theory of risk. It is well known that 
some factors can influence individual risk responses, such as unwillingness to be exposed, 
familiarity with the risk, the controllability of the consequences, the deferred appearance or not of 
damage in time or space, etc. (risk attributes in terms of Fischhoff et al., 1978; Vlek and Stallen, 
1980; Slovic 1984, 1993, 2000). Besides, risk could play a role in the maintenance of a certain 
social order (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), therefore, certain groups emphasise the perception 
of certain risks over others generating different social identities. All these factors can be 
summarised as follows: 
 Individual risk attributes (unwillingness to be exposed, familiarity with the risk, the 
controllability of the consequences, the deferred appearance or not of damage in time or 
space, etc.). 
 Social networks and territorial identities (collective identities, conflictive land uses, etc.). 
 Cultural traditions and lifestyles (social and ethical impacts, etc.). 
 
A.3.1. Subjective attributes of risk  
Here we consider the influence of perceptions of factors such as unwillingness to be exposed, 
familiarity with the risk, controllability of the consequences, or the deferred appearance or not of 
damage in time or space. The nature of the SCR makes it difficult to find information relevant to 
this topic, which probably would require data at a more individual and subjective level. However, 
some clues have been found. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In the Finnish SCR some word about the difficulty of calculating nuclear risk (and the correlative 
distance between experts and lay people) can be found (“engineers and scientists tend to be 
overly optimistic. (…) Anti-nuclear groups spread alternative truths about the nuclear risks”) 
(Event 5). Also the concept of ‘unwillingness’ to be exposed to risk explains some of the public 
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attitudes against nuclear infrastructures (from the receptors’ side) (as such the case of the 
residents of the town of Loviisa, where a NPP was proposed) (Event 5).  
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
“The risk was a complex issue that could not be easily understood and explained. Engineers and scientists tend to be 
overly optimistic. The risks were there, but the probability was less than nothing. Anti-nuclear groups spread alternative 
truths about the nuclear risks. Nuclear technology was novel technology and nobody was able to tell for sure how the 
reactors behaved under heavy pressure for decades. There were also other open questions concerning nuclear waste 
and possible terrorist attacks against nuclear power stations. For local politicians and landowners these questions 
weighted heavily against the economic benefits of nuclear power.” (page 46) 
 “K.G. Wahlström had also forgotten to ask the opinion of local fishermen, farmers and summer guests. They were the 
core of the Swedish folk party (RKP) constituency that was the biggest political force along with the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) in the bilingual town of Loviisa. Fishermen were worried about thermal pollution and also possible leaks of 
radioactive waters into the sea. Summer residents came mostly from the capital region and it was not in their interest to 
get a massive nuclear power station to spoil the beautiful sea view.” (page 48)  
 
In the UK the public perception of the controllability of the technology became a key factor in 
social acceptance, according to the Promoters and Regulators. In the case of Windscale fire a 
governmental report claimed that the cause of the incident was a “human error by well-trained but 
unfortunate plant staff”, which inform of a weak point on the confidence granted to the 
controllability of the plant (Event 3).  
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
William Penney conducted a review of the accident for UKAEA which was sent to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. The 
report claimed that the Ministry of Defence requirement for tritium (for the H-bomb programme) had been a major 
cause along with defective management of the crisis by UKAEA. However, the report released by the government 
(some months after the fire) claimed that the cause was human error by well-trained but unfortunate plant staff. (Arnold, 
1992). (page 36). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
Public authorities and Receptors in the F.R. Germany perceived low controllability of the risks of 
the technology in the case of a Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and a 
research centre for limnology (Showcase). The critique to the project was even greater after TMI 
because a reactor of this type was seen not easily to be taken under control and therefore 
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involved more risks. Concerning regulators, some of them considered the commissioning as 
irresponsible, because the risks were ultimately not calculable. 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology 
“The minister of social affairs and labour of North-Rhine-Westphalia, Friedhelm Farthmann (Social Democratic Party), 
who was responsible for the planning permission, argued that the commissioning was irresponsible because the risks 
were ultimately not calculable. According to the atomic law the federal government was able to enforce the 
authorization, but did not want to carry the responsibility for the controversial SNR project alone. One reason for this 
decision was the disaster in Chernobyl that had happened in April 1986 and caused the atmosphere in West Germany 
to become increasingly critical of nuclear energy (Interview Avena 2016).” (page 21) 
 
In Spanish SCR several dimensions of technological colonialism (at international level) and 
imposition over local society (at national level) were discussed (Showcase, Event 1). In both 
cases we find the notion of “unwillingness” to be exposed to a risk, one of the key factors 
underlying public responses. Besides, Promoters and Public Authorities expressed their views 
that people living near the NPP were coping with similar risks in their everyday life (such as road 
accidents) in order to minimize its importance (Event 1). Perception of catastrophic risk, very 
different from that expected by the experts, can also be detected (Event 3). 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP 
“The rhetoric of the anti-nuclear movements include aspects identifying nuclear power with technological colonialism 
and imperialism given the crucial role played by the US on its expansion in Spain, but also by the Spanish electricity 
companies and the Administration that impose their will on the locals” (page 27).   
 
Event 1: Vandellós I 
“The director of Vandellós I plant in an interview asserted that “people killed in road accidents caused by tourism 
deserve more attention than nuclear accidents listed” (El Correo Español, 21 September 1974).” (page 36) 
“Local governments related to the fact that the population is “familiar” with the risks. This is especially so in the case of 
Vandellós, where in the 1980s a second reactor was installed. Apart from the familiarity, the access to information 
about the risk management provided by ENRESA is highly valued.”  (page 37) 
 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
“Besides, the maximum provincial institution (public authority) commissioned a report to international experts who give 
in part reason to antinuclear: risk multiplied in a densely populated area.” (page 46). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
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In Spain some Receptors expressed beliefs about the familiarity of the local communities with the 
NPP because its presence became part of their daily life (as some local governments said, other 
nuclear facilities had been in the area), or it is considered as similar risk as any industrial facility 
(Event 5). 
Event 5: Nuclear Waste Repository 
“For the associations in favour of the ATC, the nuclear waste repository is considered a passive facility involving the 
same risk as any industrial facility.” (page 55). 
 
In Sweden ‘familiarity with the technology’ seems to play a role in the absence of strong 
opposition, according to the Promoters (“the population were already accustomed to nuclear 
facilities and did trust in the nuclear industry”). (Event 5). 
Event 5: A competition for getting a repository  
“In both the two proposed municipalities, Östhammar and Oskarshamn, the population were already accustomed to 
nuclear facilities and did trust in the nuclear industry. This implied that no strong opposition emerged.” (page 54). 
 
 
A.3.2. Social networks and territorial identities 
The arguments and perceptions found in this section can be classified in three main categories: 
a) those related to national and/or scientific pride; b) those related to territorial identities; and c) 
those related to socio-political identities. 
  
a) National / scientific pride 
 
The actors tend to justify their activities and opinions by appealing to national pride or (national) 
scientific progress.  
 Period 1950-1970 
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In the Bulgaria SCR, sometimes the actors’ discourses have to do with the collective identities 
they seek to promote. For instance, some actors justify their support for nuclear energy because 
it was a symbol of scientific progress and, therefore, of national pride (Event 1). This can be 
understood as a collective identity that some actors would like to be shared by all national actors 
(mainly Promoters and Regulators). Instead, Receptors fear to be accused by future generations 
for their support of nuclear developments. 
Event 1: Starting the experimental reactor IRT-2000 NEAR SOFIA IN 1962 
“On Soviet side it was the expansion of their scientific and technological model. For Bulgaria it was announced as sign 
of brotherhood and big scientific step.” (page 32). 
 
The Finnish SCR insists several times in the key role played by the ‘national scientific pride’ in 
justifying the nuclear projects decisions. Nuclear program helped in establishing high quality 
scientific and technological research and education institutions, and allowed Finnish experts and 
politicians to participate in key international conferences during the Cold War. (General narrative, 
Events 1 and 2). 
General narrative: 
Secondly, in order to build and operate nuclear power stations, Finland needed to establish high quality scientific and 
technological research and education institutions. Helsinki University of Technology was waiting to move from the 
downtown campus to the Otaniemi campus, but the project had been delayed for years. Atoms for Peace initiative 
could be used to enhance this project, too.” (pages 17-18)  
 
Event 1: From isolation into transnational networks 
“Eisenhower’s speech was immediately registered in Finland. The largest daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, praised 
the initiative. Scientific and engineering communities also studied the proposal with great enthusiasm. Finland had 
been isolated from the high technology and big science research but at that time the tide was changing. Atoms for 
Peace program offered a chance to conduct ambitious scientific research and to get access to classified information. 
(Rauhan atomi, HS 13.12.1953).” (page 34) 
“Finnish delegation was invited to participate in the First International Conference for the Peaceful Use of Atomic 
Energy. The conference was organized by the United Nations and held in Geneva in August 1955. Finnish delegation 
had six members and they were seated in French alphabetical order, right behind the United States delegation. This 
was a glorious moment because in front of the unknown Finnish scientists and engineers sat the scientists and 
engineers who had worked in the Manhattan Project. This was also the first time when Finnish scientists and engineers 
felt that they had equal opportunity to participate the international conference (page 35) 
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Event 2: Finnish nuclear power project 1955-1962 
“Having established networks with Scandinavia, the United States and also the Soviet Union, Erkki Laurila felt that 
Finland was ready to apply membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Soviet Union opposed the 
idea, because the political role of the IAEA was unsettled. The Soviets feared that the transnational institution would 
become an institution which is fully controlled by the United States. It had taken several years and negotiations before 
the IAEA was established. Finland was invited to be one of the 67 founding members, but the Finnish government 
turned down the offer. It was understood that Finland would be nothing more than one small nation among the others if 
she were to accept the founding member status. However, Finland would be recognized as a competitive nation if the 
IAEA would send a separate invitation to Finland to join the organization. This strategy worked, and Finland became 
the first invited nation to the IAEA in September 1958 (Fisher 1997).” (page 39) 
 
In the UK the nuclear developments (even for military purposes) were justified by Promoters and 
Regulators as a matter of prestige and British supremacy in the international community. For the 
government, the major reasons for going ahead were prestige, and to maintain Britain’s place at 
the ‘top table’ of international politics. 
Event 1: First nuclear weapons test 1952 
“The programme was not common knowledge in Parliament until 1948, and not common knowledge amongst the public 
until the first successful weapons test on 3 October 1952.(Hennessy, 2007) Government regulated the weapons 
programme at an executive (Ministerial) level using small Cabinet committees to manage the nascent programmes.  
Even before the cold war had begun, the government sought to maintain British prestige, and Britain’s place at the ‘top 
table’ of international politics through its nuclear expertise and weapons.” (page 31) 
 
In the USA report some words were devoted to the special prestige of scientists owing to their 
success in the Manhattan Project and in role in the unfolding Cold War military-industrial struggle 
with the USSR. (General narrative, p. 10) 
One explanation for the strength of the industry is the special prestige of scientists owing to their success in the 
Manhattan Project and in role in the unfolding Cold War military-industrial struggle with the USSR.  Scientists generally 
played a major role with little public concern about their power and influence in federal agencies in technology 
assessment until the 1970s. 
(General narrative, p. 10) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
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In the F. R. Germany SCR it is said that being in support or against nuclear power is a matter of 
how to be seen by future generations: as a traitor or as a hero. It implies the generation of an 
identity shaped for the pro or anti attitude. (General narrative) 
General narrative 
“First, nuclear opponents feared future generations’ accusations that their ancestors had failed to act against the atomic 
industry and had become its accomplices instead; children and grandchildren had made similar arguments regarding 
the country’s national socialist past. Those who did not wish to be seen as traitors and followers had a duty to oppose 
nuclear power. Additionally, large parts of the population frequently mistrusted the state and the energy industry, and 
faith in the problem-solving strategies of experts and academics faded.” (page 13). 
 
According to the Swedish SCR, one of the arguments to support nuclear developments in 
Sweden was the importance for the country in terms of its good position in the international 
community. Thus in 1972 when the Swedish king inaugurated the Oskarshamn plant, he 
remarked on the importance of this milestone for the country in terms of technological 
development and the beginning of a new epoch. (General narrative) 
General narrative 
“On May 18, 1972 the nuclear power plant in Oskarshamn was inaugurated by the king of Sweden, Gustav VI Adolf 
with the following words: 
"Nuclear power is a proof of man's ability to develop his surroundings. In an ever-increasing pace it has come to stand 
out as the rescue out of a feared energy crisis. In a time when the epoch of hydropower development is coming to a 
close and difficulties are being discerned regarding the supplies of fossil fuels nuclear power has been realized. 
Sweden's first commercial power plant thus marks the beginning of a new epoch in our country´s energy supply. The 
completion of this nuclear power plant is a milestone in our country´s industrial development. Swedish industry has with 
foresight and skillfulness independently developed a technology of which we today can see the application. The 
Oskarshamn power plant represents a technical achievement which well matches the great innovations in Swedish 
industry." (Citation in Gimstedt 1990) 
The inauguration was a moment of great pride for all participants and the future for nuclear power looked very bright 
indeed. The participants made up what could be called a “nuclear-industrial complex” encompassing ASEA-Atom, 
Vattenfall and the private power companies, government and government agencies and technical universities. This 
complex planned to build 24 plants in the coming decades and the prospects for exporting nuclear technology were 
also promising. 
(p. 12-13) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
147 
In Spain, Promoters showed themselves proud of their knowledge and experience in 
decommissioning nuclear installations (Event 1). Although in this case the Promoters failed in 
managing the NPP (a serious incident happened in 1989 leading to the closure of the NPP), they 
try to present themselves as reliable managers, and the failure is presented as a learning 
opportunity to become better specialists. In this sense, they are proud of their good knowledge 
and experience in decommissioning the NPP. This argument can be considered as a matter of 
professional status, as a way of maintaining their place in their social networks. Besides, 
according to the Spanish SCR, Promoters (and some Receptors) of a nuclear waste repository 
(Event 5) considered that nuclear developments would lead the country to scientific excellence, 
allowing high level scientific jobs in the area. 
Event 1: Vandellós I 
“In an interview to the newspaper El Mundo (2003), the director of the decommissioning NPP highlighted the 
knowledge and technical experience gained at the decommissioning of Vandellós I, guarantying the high reliability and 
safety levels, generating international benchmarks for decommissioning nuclear power plants.” (page 37). 
Event 5:Radioactive waste repository 
“Promoters argued that it is good for the region because hundreds of jobs will be created during the building process. It 
is a safe and effective technology, and, besides, the ATC will lead Spain to the scientific excellence.” (page 56) 
 
b) Land use conflicts / territorial identities 
 
Sometimes the nuclear projects collide with other activities developed on the territory, altering the 
ways of living of some people in the area. It is linked to the perception of inequality, feelings of 
comparative grievance, and perceptions of an unequal distribution of advantages and 
disadvantages between territories with and without a NPP. These issues can be related to the 
distributional justice debate (Jenkins et al. 2016, Tyler 1994; Walker 2009), and easily become a 
source of conflicts with territorial and social identity frames.  
 Period 1950-1970 
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In the process of finding a place for the first nuclear power plant in Finland (1966), land owners 
and community politicians were suspicious about the search for sitting a nuclear energy 
installation. Several municipalities were reluctant to the sitting decision because the project did 
not fit in its future development plans (Event 5). 
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
“Search teams were sent to the west coast of Finland where a number of promising locations were discovered. 
However, land owners and community politicians were suspicious about nuclear energy.” (page 46) 
“IVO negotiated with all three communities, but none of them responded favorable. Hanko had free space for the 
nuclear power plant, but the town hesitated to make a decision. Tvärminne community was reluctant to even consider 
the possibility. University of Helsinki had marine biology research center in Twärminne and the community wanted to 
remain industry-free zone. Porkkala was interested, but the nuclear power project did not fit in the future plans of the 
community. Porkkala wanted to develop its unique natural environment to serve summer guests, golf players and 
farmers. (page 47) 
 
In the UK Windscale event concerns about potential pollution of local food products were raised 
by the Receptors (Event 3). This recalls to a conflict between social and economic activities and 
land uses in the area where the NPP was located. 
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
“Also concerns were raised about the status of local products, in this case milk. Affected population had concerns on 
the effect of the accident in local products (milk).” (page 37). 
 
According to the USA report, the Enrico Fermi NPP licensing process may be the first time in US 
history that public individuals began to oppose nuclear power. It is said that the head of the 
United Auto Workers became convinced that the NPP would endanger Detroit, the auto industry 
and auto workers themselves, and brought sought against the station (Event 1). It describes a 
conflict between different economic activities in the same territory, by defending concrete ways of 
living. 
The Enrico Fermi licensing process with court intervention may be the first time in US history that public individuals 
began to oppose nuclear power.  The head of the United Auto Workers Walter Reuther became convinced that the 
Enrico Fermi NPP would endanger Detroit, the auto industry and auto workers, and brought sought against the station.  
Leo Goodman, a union activist who had helped to organize nuclear workers, convinced Reuther to oppose the 
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construction of the station.  This led the UAW to bring suit to stop construction. 
(Event 1, p. 29) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In the F.R. Germany, the pilot-scale project SNR 300 motivated promoters due to the limited 
uranium reserves and regulators hoped for an efficient utilization of the minerals by building this 
reactor. However very soon, the search for a site raised concerns among receptors who 
demonstrated against the project. Many of the demonstrators even came from the Netherlands as 
the chosen site was close to the country’s borders (Showcase). In this case land conflicts were 
related to political territorial borders. Also in the F.R. Germany, by locating the planned repository 
site in the economically underdeveloped hinterland the government tried to avoid opposition 
against the project, which failed because the level of protest increased. (Event 4) 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology 
“Soon criticism arose about the building of the fast breeder, based on doubts about the safety of nuclear energy, and in 
1974 around a thousand people, predominantly from the Netherlands, took to the streets. A mass rally three years later 
was attended by 40,000 people (some authors speak of 50,000 [Tompkins, Grassroot(s) 2016, 129] or even 60,000 
people, [Mende 2011, 332]) from France, the Netherlands and West Berlin.” (page 19) 
 
In Finland, Event 6 reported concerns about the sitting of nuclear power plant right next to large 
urban areas. It was argued that six large scale reactors would need massive amounts of cooling 
water and fresh water and also an industrial size infrastructure, which was a great impact for a 
small community. Besides, it was said that “nuclear power stations would also destroy the image 
and identity of Kopparnäs” (Event 6). Threats to local identities were a source of public reactions 
against nuclear developments. 
Event 6: First nuclear debates 
“Kopparnäs community council could not make the decision. IVO’s plan was too extensive and complex and it was 
impossible to estimate all the consequences. The project would multiply tax revenues, but also turn the quiet coastal 
community into a massive construction site that would go on for decades. Nuclear power complex would also alter the 
ethnic structure of the community. The dominant language in Kopparnäs was Swedish, but construction workers and 
nuclear operators would most likely speak only Finnish. Kopparnäs community tried to evaluate the environmental 
consequences of the project. If the discharge waters were directed to the district heating network, the thermal pollution 
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in the Gulf of Finland would cause no harm to the marine biology. However, six large scale reactors would need 
massive amounts of cooling water and fresh water and also an industrial size infrastructure. Nuclear power stations 
would also destroy the image and identity of Kopparnäs.” (page 55) 
 “IVO’s plans took nuclear power reactors right next to the large urban areas. This caused fear and anxiety. Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto were far away from urban centers, but Kopparnäs was less than 40 kilometer away from Helsinki. The 
question was how safe it was to live right next to a nuclear power station. Academician Erkki Laurila had full confidence 
in nuclear energy. He could very well live next to the nuclear power station, because “no technology that has been 
invented by man has been so thoroughly researched, tested and inspected as nuclear energy.” (page 58) 
 
In Spain, territorial/regional identities played a crucial role in accepting or rejecting nuclear 
projects. In some instances, when the central government or other centralised authority took the 
location decision, the opposition to nuclear power became a fight for regional identity vs. the 
central government and the economic power imposition in the territory. This happened, for 
instance, with the early attempts to locate the first NPPs in Spain (General narrative), or with the 
Valdecaballeros case (Showcase). In many cases Spanish environmental movements (receptors) 
denounced the unequal distribution of risk among territories, with the area treated as a landfill of 
dangerous and/or annoying infrastructures (Showcase, Event 2). In some way there is also a 
conflict between a rural world which feels forgotten and an urban world that holds the main 
benefits. From the Receptors opposing the NPP, it is argued that that territory concentrates 
already too many industrial risk facilities (petrochemical, nuclear, etc.). Other argument is that it is 
a rural area disadvantaged, in crisis and losing population, which instead of giving a positive 
development reserve a role of landfill of what favored areas do not want (perception of inequality, 
comparative grievance). Behind the conflict of Ascó there is a tension between a rural world 
which feels being forgotten and the urban world that holds the main benefits. 
General narrative 
Electricity utilities began to clash with local interests in virtually all locations chosen for their central second- and third-
generation (pre-authorizations granted between 1973 and 1976). And municipalities played a decisive role in their fate. 
While local authorities may accept the plants on the prospects of the economic bonus they promised, in many 
occasions the immediate hinterland rose opposing due to the conflicting use of the territory. The conflict of interest 
was clear: tourism entrepreneurs, owners of holiday homes and the town council understood that the location chosen 
was placed in a territory qualified in the Urban Plan of Peñíscola approved in 1960 area, as developable area excluded 
from any use commercial or industrial, with the sole exception of the uses of hostelry. In many cases, the fears derived 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
151 
from the alteration of land use and conflicts of interests and identities that nuclear power plants generated (page 15). 
This becomes clear on the interviews with antinuclear leaders, all of which started their activity when a nuclear project 
was announced on their territory (village, hinterland, birth place, etc.) (page 21). 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros 
It became a fight of the regional identity versus the central government and the economic power (represented by the 
utilities) (page 20).  
The regional president of Extremadura also recognized, some years later, “once we won the battle of Valdecaballeros, 
people began to think we [the regional government] had a heavy responsibility and great power. Valdecaballeros 
represents a turning point for Extremadura’s autonomy. It was from that collective triumph, when we began to seriously 
assess the expectations that opened in our land with autonomy (page 24). 
 
In Sweden, exploration activities looking for repository sites involved, at local level, specific 
protests with a NIMBY (‘Not In My Backyard’) emphasis from the Receptors (Event 3). This was, 
however, a first step towards a more general critique of nuclear developments, which included the 
defense of local territories. 
Event 3: Local protests against a repository  
“They developed a more general critique of the intended method for a repository with the aid of counter experts. Their 
resistance was thus not primarily of a NIMBY character but questioned the plans for final storage in general” (page 47). 
“The local organizations first argued against a repository in their own backyard (NIMBY), but soon developed a more 
general critique of the intended method for a repository with the aid of counter experts.” (page 48). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
During this period in Spain new warnings on unequal distribution of risk among territories have 
been detected, with some areas treated as a landfill of dangerous and/or annoying 
infrastructures. For instance, the sitting process for a nuclear waste repository has unleashed a 
sharp political contest between several social movements and public administrations, with a large 
dose of territorial and social identities in between. (Event 5) 
Event 5: Radioactive waste repository 
The Platform against the Nuclear Repository in Cuenca declared that they “reject the site because it is against their 
proposal for the local development based on renewable energies, sustainable tourism and high quality foodstuffs 
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industry” (page 56). 
 
c) Socio-political identities 
 
This sub-section describes the actors’ arguments related to political identities. In several of the 
analysed events, the affected population was organized into social movements that protested 
against a particular political regime, including nuclear power in its protests. In this sense, the 
public rejection was instrumental (functional) and linked to the rejection of other actors 
characterized by their support of nuclear developments.  
 Period 1950-1970 
The Finland SCR shows that the Finnish nuclear program played a political role in the 
international position of the country, located in between West and East, helping in building a 
Finnish identity adapted to the geopolitics of the Cold War. (General narrative, Event 1) 
General Narrative: 
“Nuclear power was a part, but not the most visible part of the modern industrial Finland. During the 1950s and 1960s 
Finland came out of the isolation and integrated to Europe without forgetting her special relations to the Soviet Union. 
Finland was located in between West and East and concretely on the Iron Curtain. Loviisa nuclear power plant became 
the symbol of this polarized situation. The reactors came from the East, but the safety and control technology was 
purchased from the West.” (page.20) 
Event 1: From isolation into transnational networks 
“The Geneva conference 1955 ended a decade long isolation that had blocked Finnish scientists and engineers out of 
the international scientific community. The symbolic value of the conference was indispensable. The Geneva 
conference also relaxed political and ideological tensions and helped to establish a transnational network of scientist, 
engineers, corporate managers and authorities.” (page 36) 
 
According to the USA report, in Cold War times being pro or against nuclear energy was 
sometimes interpreted as being pro or against the national sentiments. For this reason, some 
cases of early protesters were qualified (and pursued) as communists. The East-West 
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competition at that time seemed to frame the whole nuclear debate in the USA. (General 
narrative, Showcase) 
The framing is directed toward a potentially confused or uneducated public, perhaps even towards those with 
dangerously anti-American sentiments.  For example, protestors against construction of a reactor at Bodega Bay were 
equated by the utility PG&E with communists. (Walker, 1990)  In his study of opposition to Diablo Canyon, Wills 
argues that antinuclear activism reflected more concerns about “about human ties with nature” than East-West 
competition or anger over big government. (Wills, 2006: 9). 
(General narrative, p. 17) 
As protests grew, PG&E played hardball accusing the association of being a communist front organization. 
(Showcase, p. 23) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In Bulgaria, during this period, the dependency on the Soviet Union’s nuclear technology was 
presented as a symbol of brotherhood between Communist countries (Event 2). 
Event 2: Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
The final decision was that the team of Bulgarian specialists would do the actual work, while the Soviet team would 
have a controlling and observing role. It is clear that the young Bulgarian specialists had a lot of respect for their Soviet 
supervisors; they amply praised Soviet professionalism and said they learned very much from it (page 35). The 
construction and operation of this NPP was again seen by promoters (Soviet Union) as a symbol of brotherhood 
between Communist countries (page 37). 
 
In the case of Spain, many of the anti-nuclear movements are difficult to distinguish from the anti-
dictatorship movements (Event 2). The fact that the nuclear developments took place during the 
dictatorship linked symbolically this technology to this political regime. Additionally, the nuclear 
debate polarized the interrelationships between the actors in the Basque region, where a terrorist 
group (ETA) made anti-nuclear speech one of their hallmarks (even having been pronuclear in 
the past, as a way of instrumentalizing the growing public opposition to the NPP sitting 
processes) (Event 3). 
General narrative  
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“Many of these movements are difficult to distinguish from the anti-dictatorship movements and in many occasions 
arose directly within.  Through the 1970s the antinuclear protests remained rooted in strong regional identities –
particularly so in the case of the Basque and Catalan regions (Rüding 1990, 216). Yet opposition to nuclear power also 
came from people within Franco’s regime (mayors, provincial governments, religious associations, agricultural unions, 
etc.) expressed their dissatisfaction and opposition to the decisions to locate nuclear power plants in their territory.” 
(page 16) 
Event 2: Ascó 
“In this way, Ascó activists looked for support among scientists and lawyers, they established links with the academic 
world of Barcelona and together with it links to well-organised political movements who fought against the Franco 
regime.” (page 41). 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
“The (then) recently legalized political parties should make their position known within the conflict. With broad stroke, 
organizations of the left and extreme left positioned against Lemóniz (with great prominence of radical “abertzale” –
Basque nationalist on the far left- which made anti-nuclear speech one of their hallmarks), while right-wing parties are 
pronuclear (including a Christian Democrat party as PNV –the Basque nationalist on the right).” (page 46). 
“Through the 1970s the antinuclear protests remained rooted in strong regional identities. In the Basque case it crossed 
the line of violent action (over 300 attacks, 13 lives). The Committee for the Defence of a No Nuclear Basque Coast 
(CDCVNN) formalized in May 1976, amalgamated antinuclear neighbourhood associations, cultural groups and, 
professional associations. Their commitment with the defence of the territory steam from the possibility of a serious 
accident in Lemóniz. Such event "would mean the disappearance of the Basque people, and the disappearance of 
Euskadi as a political project".” (page 47). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Ukraine, the anti-Chernobyl protest became part of a broad independence movement that was 
centred to a large degree on environmental concerns (Showcase, Event 2). Chernobyl became a 
symbol of colonial power and fuelled the independence movement. However, later public opinion 
seems to realize that nuclear energy was a condition for national independence, leading to a kind 
of “reluctant acceptance” (in terms of Bickerstaff et al. 2008) of it. The issue of “reluctant 
acceptance” for nuclear power like a condition for national survival was raised among receptors 
(Event 5), even if the negative consequences of Chernobyl continue to haunt Ukraine, some of 
the public opinion still think that nuclear energy is the condition for the national survival. 
General narrative 
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“The explosion of reactor four on April 26, 1986, led to heavy radioactive contamination of regions of Ukraine, Belarus 
and Russia.  After the extent of the disaster was finally revealed to the general public in 1989, a broad independence 
movement developed that was centred to a large degree on environmental concerns and the belief among many 
participants that Moscow’s Russian-centred economic development policies had contributed to the degradation of 
Ukraine. In response the Ukraine parliament in August 1990 voted to adopt a moratorium that lasted until 1993 on the 
construction and commissioning of new nuclear power units.” (page 8). 
Showcase: Dealing with Chernobyl disaster aftermath  
“The pre-eminence of nationalist movements in the Chernobyl protests led to the “nationalization” of dominant public 
narratives of the Chernobyl disaster. The accident appeared in public discourse first of all as a crime of colonial 
communist authorities – in Moscow, in the Kremlin – against Ukrainian nation and its people. They considered full-
blown political, economic and cultural independence of the nation as the only possibility both for a national renaissance 
and to save people from Chernobyl (Dawson 1996; Phillips 2004: 159-85).” (page 42). 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
Chernobyl was seen as a symbol of Soviet colonial power by those receptors, which were among the nationalism 
and environmental activism movement. They believed that officials in Moscow took the decisions about building nuclear 
power plants in the republic without considering the potential danger to the Ukrainian people and local environment 
(page 43). 
Event 5: Start-up of the Kmelnytska 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors (2004) as part of strategy aiming at “nuclear revival” 
and new public information effort 
 “These depictions of nuclear power convey the message that Ukraine accepts this technology, is strengthened by it 
and protected from its negative impact. Even if the negative consequences of Chernobyl continue to haunt Ukraine, the 
nation, those pictures show, cannot do without nuclear energy: nuclear energy is a predicate for national survival.” 
(page 57) 
In spring 2015 Energoatom organized an artistic competition and a teenager from Varash (formerly Kuznetsovsk), the 
town near the Rivne NPP, won the first prize telling the story of a boy, whose father leaves home to go to war and 
defend his Motherland (page 58) 
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A.3.3. Cultural traditions, values and lifestyles (including military 
imagery) 
The maintenance of certain traditions and lifestyles, certain patterns of social relations, certain 
cultural values and social principles and beliefs, are part of this set of factors influencing public 
perceptions about nuclear energy. 
 Period 1950-1970 
No mention of this dimension in the SCRs for this period. 
 Period 1970-1990 
According to the Finnish SCR, modernization of Finland received very few critical comments 
(General narrative). The values of the post-war generation included a positive view of 
technological progress and of nuclear. Later, environmental movements promoted energy saving, 
environment protection and new life-styles grounded in the idea that less consumption required 
less energy. Besides, in the SCR is said that there is collective memory that shapes the 
interaction between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union regarding nuclear energy issues 
(Showcase). 
General Narrative: 
“Industrialization and modernization of Finland received very few critical comments. Men who had fought the wars and 
women who had waited for them at homes engaged in building the welfare society and they saw no reason to criticize 
the progress. Although industrial and urban development destroyed the old Finland, no organized resistance was 
found. The most intense debates took place in Kuusamo, North-Eastern part of Finland, where power companies 
struggled to gain ownership to the last free flowing rivers (Käsmä 2015).” (page 22) 
“The post-war generation was strongly influenced by ideas and ideologies developed in Europe, the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Although political flags were different, the goals, aims and values were more or less the same. The 
post-war generation questioned beliefs in continuing economic growth, imperialism, colonialism and the nuclear arms 
race. Young generation developed ideas of global village, world peace and sustainable economy and environment 
(Virtanen 2012).” (page 23)  
“Environmental and anti-nuclear groups opposed this view and encouraged the industry, communities and 
municipalities to look at the energy demands critically. In order to save energy and environment, new life-styles should 
be introduced and adopted. Less consumption required less energy.” (page 24)  
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Showcase: Collective memory and the uneasy nuclear collaboration between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union 
“In sum, we assume and even argue that there is collective memory that shapes the interaction between Finland and 
Russia/Soviet Union in nuclear energy.” (page 32)  
 
In Spain there are some perceptions linked to the desire to maintain certain forms of life (such as 
a rural or fishermen's life) (Event 1). Another issue is the moral dilemma the anti-nuclear 
movements in the Basque Country had to deal with, i.e. how much to accept that terrorist 
violence can be useful for its presumably peaceful purposes (Event 3). This shows us a conflict of 
values between several actors shaping public perceptions. 
Event 1: Vandellós I 
Concerns were also raised at this stage by the fishermen from the coastal region, worried about the potential pollution 
of marine resources and their way of life (Le Monde, 03 April 1975) (page 36) 
Local governments related to the fact that the population is “familiar” with the risks. This is especially so in the case of 
Vandellós, where in the 1980s a second reactor was installed. Apart from the familiarity, the access to information 
about the risk management provided by ENRESA is highly valued (page 37). 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
 The social perception of the Basque anti-nuclear movement has been marked by terrorist violence against the only 
NPP that began building in Euskadi: Lemóniz (page 45).  
After many violent acts happened, the private project was nationalized (by the Government). The antinuclear 
movements faced a moral dilemma: to accept, reject or live with terrorist violence to achieve their goals (page 48).  
 
In Sweden, one of the objections expressed by some Receptors was the need to advance 
towards other energy models based on renewable sources and efficiency measures (Event 2), 
equating to a request for a more sustainable development model, which refers to alternative 
worldviews. 
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
“Furthermore it (antinuclear movement) proposed a fast development of renewable energy sources and of more 
efficient energy use. Such a development, it was argued, would make it possible to phase out the six operating nuclear 
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reactors in ten years and replace them primarily with renewables and efficiency measures..” (page 33) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
Public perceptions in Bulgaria seem to have been affected by the change of political and social 
model due to the fall of the communist regime (Event 3). The Green organization – Ekoglasnot, 
acted as catalyser of people concerns on nuclear power, becoming a stake in times of political 
and social changes. 
Event 3: Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident  
Three years later in the end of 1989, the Bulgarian communist regime collapsed, at that time the doors for political 
and social changes were opened. The Green organization – Ekoglasnot, with no pure political aims acted as catalyser 
of people concerns on nuclear power, kept its main themes and demands for environmental prevention and 
information. One of the main questions remained about what were the consequences of Chernobyl accident (page 38). 
 
 Relation to military imagery 
 
In some countries public perceptions of nuclear energy were also shaped by the military concepts 
or imagery. The possibility of building (and using) nuclear weapons is present in several of the 
SCRs as a factor shaping the public perceptions.  
 Period 1950-1970 
In the F.R. Germany report, it is said that military strategic considerations influenced siting 
decision; and this pointed out to military aspects of the peaceful use of nuclear power in early 
West Germany. “Although the scientific community tried hard to present nuclear science as a 
strictly civilian endeavour, not least to strip it of its historical origins in the so-called “Uranverein” 
(a project to develop nuclear weapons) under National Socialism, military rationales did play a 
substantial role in West Germany’s early nuclear history” (Event 1, p. 24). 
Event 1: German Atomic Program – First Nuclear Research Center 
“The intervention of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe in the siting conflict points to the interrelations of 
the civil and military dimensions of the nuclear sector. Although the scientific community tried hard to present nuclear 
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science as a strictly civilian endeavor, not least to strip it of its historical origins in the so-called “Uranverein” (a project 
to develop nuclear weapons) under National Socialism, military rationales did play a substantial role in West Germany’s 
early nuclear history  (Kelleher 1975, Cioc 1988, Küntzel 1992, Hanel 2015) (page 24). 
 
The Finnish SCR shows how it was not easy to separate the civilian and military applications in 
nuclear technologies (Events 3 and 6). This lead to the opposition movements to be critics with 
the nuclear program appealing to anti-nuclear weapons treaties and laws. 
Event 3: Transnational organizations and the Cold War politics 
“EURATOM and the US Congress agreed in August 1958 that the nuclear power plants in Western Europe should be 
built under the US supervision. From the Soviet point of view this agreement created a bilateral bridge between the 
United States and Western Europe for the technology transfer. Although the agreement was specifically only for the 
civilian nuclear technology, it was impossible to separate the civilian and military application in nuclear technologies. 
The Kremlin government interpreted it as a hostile act against the Soviet Union. (Fisher 1997).” (page 40) 
 
Event 6: First nuclear debates 
“Heikki von Hertzen also complained that IVO’s plan violated the Finnish foreign policy. President Kekkonen had 
initiated in 1963 “The Nordic Nuclear Free Zone”. The initiative was made right after the world had witnessed the 
Cuban Crises and almost the Third World War. The President was afraid that similar situation could take place in the 
Baltic Sea region. The Nordic Nuclear Free Zone eliminated the risk of nuclear war by prohibiting nuclear weapons in 
the Nordic region. IVO’s plan challenged the initiative, because; “fission reactors are a part of the military industrial 
complex and they produce plutonium. All reactors produce plutonium and therefore it is possible that plutonium ends in 
the hands of terrorist or military groups that can built nuclear weapons.”” ((page  56) 
 
Protective defence purposes were mentioned in Sweden (Event 1). Among regulators the 
controversy was based on the purpose for the atomic weapons research (how research could be 
conducted). Concerning receptors there was less controversy on this matter; they understood 
research on how to protect Sweden for the risk of nuclear weapons from other countries. The 
receptors directly related the development of atomic weapons with their security and also with a 
perceived increasing risk of war. In this sense, opponents of nuclear weapons were concerned by 
an increase in the risk of atomic warfare affecting Sweden (Event 1). 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy 
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The choice was between on the one hand “protection research” aiming at understanding nuclear weapons better in order to 
construct bomb safe shelters and other protective devices, and on the other hand “construction research” aiming at 
constructing and producing nuclear bombs (page 36). 
The opponents of atomic weapons argued that such weapons would be detrimental to Swedish security and increase the risk 
of nuclear warfare affecting Sweden. Some of them further argued that Swedish security would increase if the resources 
used for nuclear weapons research were used for development aid instead (page 40) 
 
In the UK, maintaining the country’s place at the ‘top table’ of international politics in Cold War 
times seems to have been the motive for appealing to nuclear weapons (Event 1). Nuclear 
weapons were tried to be shown as symbol for the British supremacy for the 
regulators/promoters. Although the issue of Britain’s nuclear weapons became controversial, 
publicly and politically, opinion on the topic varied from supporting unilateral disarmament to 
supporting continued development of nuclear weapons. On the receptors’ point of view, public 
reactions were towards the use of nuclear weapons but not on the nuclear power, in a period of 
public trust on political institutions. However, some early movements started with a growing 
concern about nuclear weapons throughout the 1950s. 
Event 1: First nuclear weapons test 1952 
Established to protest against increased global stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and to agitate for British unilateral 
disarmament. (page 31) 
For the government, the major reasons for going ahead were prestige, and to maintain Britain’s place at the ‘top 
table’ of international politics (page 31). 
In the press, the weapons test was presented to the public by the news media as a major success of independent 
British engineering and ingenuity at a time of austerity (page 31). 
This was a period of trust in government and institutions in general, and as such there is very little initial evidence for 
anything other than public acceptance of this narrative.(Blowers, 2010b; Hennessy, 2007) However, throughout the 
1950s a growing concern about nuclear weapons began to emerge (page 31). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
According to the Ukrainian SCR, sometimes public authorities’ responses facing nuclear incidents 
were framed in a ‘war’ context against external enemies. This can be seen in the Chernobyl case, 
treated by the Public authorities as “an external enemy that Soviet people must fight” (Event 1). 
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More generally, the use of military rhetoric and images was pervasive in the Soviet media at the 
time. Soviet troops and military equipment were heavily involved in the Chernobyl clean-up and 
evacuation operations. 
Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
““The official term of “liquidation” reflected well such aspects of the Soviet post-accident policies as treating the disaster 
as an external enemy that the Soviet people must fight and annihilate. It also described accurately Soviet authorities’ 
efforts literally to erase the accident, to make the traces of it disappear both from the environment and the public 
sphere.” (page 35) 
“More generally, the use of military rhetoric and images was pervasive in the Soviet media. Soviet troops and military 
equipment were heavily involved in the clean-up and evacuation operations. The “war frame” has since become 
extremely important in public narratives and people’s recollections of the disaster (Kasperski 2012: 110-128; Phillips 
2004,164-165; Marples 1993). One of the reasons for this is the importance of the public memory of World War II in 
former Soviet countries. During the Soviet period, the Communist Party created a full-blown cult of the Great Patriotic 
War (the period during which Soviet Union was in war with Nazi Germany), or more precisely of the victory of Soviet 
state and people over fascism to reinforce its legitimacy (Tumarkin 1994).” (page 36). 
 
In the USA report it is said that some environmental movements (as such Abalone Alliance) were 
critics with the direct relationship between civilian and military nuclear power. (Event 2, p. 35) 
Abalone Alliance members worried about  (…) the direct relationship between civilian and military nuclear power (…) 
(Direct Action, 1981)   
(Event 2, p. 35) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
No mention of this dimension in the SCRs for this period. 
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A.4. Political-institutional dimension 
According to the interpretative and contextual theories of risk (Horlick-Jones, Renn, Wynne, etc.) 
it is not so easy to separate perceptions of nuclear issues from their social, economic or political 
context of production. We should consider that when people evaluate a technology or activity, 
they are also implicitly making an evaluation of the institutions that promote, manage and regulate 
it, and generate a judgement about the credibility or trustworthiness that it deserves. From the 
analysis of the SCR we have deduced several topics related to this political-institutional 
dimension: 
 Trust and confidence in institutions (both promoters and regulators). 
 Governance issues (related mainly to political games and energy dependency). 
 
A.4.1. Trust and confidence in institutions 
This section covers all perceptions of nuclear energy affected by trust or distrust in the institutions 
that promote or regulate it. Distrust is related to the perception that these institutions have carried 
out some kind of incorrect or unethical behaviour, for example by favouring private interests 
above the public, by acting against the law or by keeping secrets (which at some point were 
revealed to the public). In fact, we have found several cases where the public raised concerns 
about the secrecy of the information provided by promoters and/or regulators. 
 Period 1950-1970 
The UK is the country where the Regulators seemed to have been trying to achieve more trust 
from the public. Although the Windscale fire (Event 3) had little impact on the nuclear power 
programme at the time, the combined impact of the incident itself, the government’s handling of it, 
and the secrecy surrounding it, led to a decrease in trust in the institutions involved. This 
generated notable criticism of the government and changes to the manner in which nuclear power 
was debated and perceived. 
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
However, the report released by the government (some months after the fire) claimed that the cause was human error 
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by well-trained but unfortunate plant staff (page 36). 
Although impacting little on the developing nuclear power programmes of the 1960s, the Windscale fire, the 
government’s handling of it, and the secrecy around it have decreased trust in the institutions involved by the 
receptors (page 37).   
 
According to the USA SCR the regulators lost the trust of the people. Yet from the start the AEC 
suffered from two weaknesses in the effort to promote nuclear power: first, in early times the AEC 
commissioners were fully beholden to military interests; second, the agency looks as it was 
“captured” by the industry it was meant to regulate. (General narrative). Other sources of distrust 
were found in the promises made by Promoters and Regulators that later were not fulfilled or 
turned out to be false. For instance, yet in spite of the precautions in the design and construction 
of the Fermi reactor, and in spite of the reassurances by the scientists that a serious accident 
could not happen, one did occur. (Event 1) Finally, according the SCR, the regulator (NRC) 
seemed to put industry interests ahead of public concerns that were based on accurate 
evaluation of seismic data and risk, even though at Bodega Bay in the 1960s forced regulators to 
include seismic data in a standard licensing process. (Event 2). In sum, since early times, and 
according to its critics, the regulators (AEC) too often assumed a promotional, not sufficiently 
regulatory role (Appendix 3), which could easily lead to the public distrust. 
In the end, with the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act), the US government created the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to establish civilian control – not military – over this nuclear knowhow and 
technology.  By the late 1940s and 1950s, a series of research programs using experimental reactors, isotopes, and 
the like established the likelihood of applications from power generation to medicine, industry, and agriculture, and to 
transportation that developed largely in AEC-controlled national laboratories. Yet from the start the AEC suffered from 
two weaknesses in the effort to promote nuclear power.  One was that, at least initially, the AEC commissioners were 
fully beholden to military interests; the unfolding Cold War and fear of communism led to a headlong rush into 
designing and testing better nuclear weapons.  The second is that, like so many other regulatory agencies, the AEC 
ultimately was “captured” by the industry it was meant to regulate, and when it embarked on civilian power production 
this was reflected in a closed managerial style that was handicapped by the absence of sufficient internal expertise to 
ensure that reactor design and siting erred always on the side of civilian safety.   
(General narrative) (p. 6) 
 
This led the House and Senate to pass the 1954 Atomic Energy Act to promote private development of nuclear 
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energy, with the AEC providing a variety of incentives and, in the eyes of many critics, paying inadequate attention to 
various safety issues in the effort to promote nuclear power.  As Mazuzan points out, the 1954 AE Act gave the private 
sector right to own nuclear materials and operate its own nuclear facilities:  “Under the broad authority of the 1954 
Atomic Energy Act, the AEC pursued a policy based on the premise that private industry could bring about 
economically competitive atomic power faster than a government-run program. This policy reflected the pro-business 
orientation of the Eisenhower administration. Success rested in large measure with AEC chairman Lewis L. Strauss, a 
strong-willed man with a remarkable talent for being constantly at the center of stormy controversy.”(Mazuzan, 1980: 
342)   
(General narrative, p. 7) 
 
Detroit Edison directors believed private sector should build and run the next breeders, and by 1952 they created a 
not-for-profit division, the Power Demonstration Reactor Corporation (PDRC) to look into building a reactor and 
entering the nuclear age.  As John Fuller writes, 
The developers of the Fermi breeder reactor were very sincere, diligent, and highly qualified individuals to whom the 
safety of the reactor was paramount. Extreme care was taken to insure against the possibility of a serious accident 
occurring. The scientists involved were most confident that they had covered all possible problem areas. They had 
built safeguards on top of safeguards. Yet in spite of the precautions in the design and construction of the Fermi 
reactor, and in spite of the reassurances by the scientists that a serious accident could not happen, one did occur. 
(Fuller, 1975: 54)   
(Event 1, p. 30) 
 
announce groundbreaking for the construction, not to indicate any circumspection.(Fuller: 56) 
In 1959 the AFL-CIO under Walter Reuther filed a brief that the US Court of Appeals upheld in 1960 that the 
construction permit for the Enrico Fermi LFMBR plant was illegal and that building would have to stop within fifteen 
days.  But the US Supreme Court quickly overturned that decision, 7-2, declaring that the AEC had been within its 
rights in permitting the Fermi reactor to be built and that final construction could proceed unhindered.  In the majority 
decision, Justice Brennan stated that the AEC had found “reasonable assurance for present purposes, and that is 
enough to satisfy the arguments of law,” and that a step-by-step process of licensing to operation ensured safety.   
(Event 1, p. 31) 
 
Three years and nine months later, Detroit Edison restarted Fermi 1.  The UCS termed the AEC’s role following the 
accident “more like that of a hall monitor” for its passive review, occasional inspections, and no effort to audit recovery 
effort, let along learn from the accident.(UCS. 1970?: 4) In November 1972, having failed to operate the unit at any 
level close to specification, PRCD determined to decommission Fermi 1, 
(Event 1, p. 31) 
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The regulators (AEC  NRC) lost the trust of the people.  The NRC seemed to put industry interests ahead of public 
concerns that were based on accurate evaluation of seismic data and risk, even though at Bodega Bay in the 1960s 
(NPP rejected by AEC, proposed by PG&E, north of San Francisco, see country report) forced regulators to include 
seismic data in a standard licensing process 
(Event 2, p. 33) 
 
In the effort to encourage rapid commercialization of nuclear power, the AEC encountered the challenge of balancing 
public safety with promotion of nuclear power at a stage when the technology of commercial reactors was at an early 
stage of development. (…)As a result, the AEC too often assumed a promotional, not sufficiently regulatory role. 
(Appendix 3, p. 75) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
The secrecy of information provided by public authorities is present in the Bulgarian SCR (Events 
2 and 3), which frames the public perception of the government itself. This generates a situation 
of distrust of the government as a communicative actor. 
Event 2: Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
“Notably, the agreement also specified the secrecy of technical information: None of the organizations involved was to 
reveal the provided documentation to entities or organizations of other countries.” (page32) 
“As the implementation of this nuclear power project was approaching, opposition voices became stronger. This 
opposition was rooted in the struggle between different groups, in particular the political, economic, and scientific 
nomenclature. (page 33) 
 
Event 3: Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident  
“One of the main questions remained the consequences of Chernobyl accident. On the meeting on 20th of October 
1989 for the first time, the truth about Chernobyl accident and consequences were presented and discussed. A report 
about the criminal behaviour of the communist ruling elite finally shed light on the truth.” (page 39) 
 
In the F.R. Germany lack of trust in government and regulators seemed to be a popular point of 
criticism among the groups against nuclear energy. The criminalization of antinuclear activists 
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was interpreted as a source of mistrust among the receptors, leading to a lack of trust in 
government’s willingness to seriously consider people’s concerns (General narrative). Left-wing 
critics perceived this collusion between the state, the regulators and promoters in terms of left-
wing ideas. Ideas of the high-security ’nuclear state’ also played a role in this debate (Showcase). 
General narrative 
Large parts of the population frequently mistrusted both the state and the energy industry (page 6).  
Moreover, receptors opponents to nuclear development doubted alternative energy supply problems and disapproved 
of the lack of political will to actually invest it (page 6). 
“This mistrust in the truthfulness of state and nuclear industry justified for activists’ militant actions. The police’s 
brutal responses to militant acts and the obvious intention of some politicians to criminalize dissidents only increased 
skepticism and suspicion against authorities and utilities” (page 14). 
Showcase: 
“The German engineer Klaus Traube was managing director of Interatom, which had built the nuclear reactor SNR-300 
in Kalkar. Originally a proponent of nuclear power, Traube reconsidered his views in the early 1970s after having read 
the Club of Rome’s The Limits to Growth. When the German secret service suspected (falsely) that he had passed on 
secret information to the Red Army Faction (RAF), they illegally wiretapped Traube’s apartment and he lost his job 
because the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND), one of the three German secret services, 
informed his employer about the issue. The illegal operation was uncovered in 1977, Traube was cleared of all 
charges, and the government was plunged into a crisis, as a result of which the then federal minister of the interior, 
Werner Maihofer, was dismissed (Mrusek 2011). “ (page 20) 
Event 4: Gorleben (repository site) 
Government’s handling of it was perceived as inappropriate by the anti-nuclear movement and the broader public 
alike (page 31). 
 
In Spain the promoters began building the Ascó NPP (Event 2) without the compulsory reports 
and official permits. In all cases, the public authorities later legalized those illegal works 
(Showcase, Events 2 and 3). The legislation was adapted to the NPP interests generating great 
distrust among the public (receptors). There were also cases where the Promoters did not tell the 
truth about their intentions when acquiring land for siting the NPPs (they said they want to 
promote chocolate factory in Event 2). This increased distrust among an important part of the 
affected people. 
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Showcase: Valdecaballeros 
“The (nuclear) companies had also hired personnel and began building on site in June 1975 despite the lack of the 
preliminary reports from the water authorities, the environmental evaluation by the national and regional 
governments, the proper expropriation of the affected lands, and the required construction permits. Some of these 
issues were legalized by government decree in 1979, when the government –now democratically elected – gave the 
definitive authorization for the construction of the plant, which was well advanced already.”  (page 23).   
Event 2: Ascó 
 “The NPP compelled all its employees to take up residence in Ascó so that they could vote in local elections and in this 
way contribute to decisions inside the municipality which favoured the nuclear plant .” (page 42). 
“As in another cases it was the property developers’ strategy to hide the real reason for acquiring land in the 
municipality by pretending to build a “chocolate factory” until it was leaked that the real reason behind it was to build a 
nuclear power plant which to the people deep in the countryside did not mean much.” (p.38-39) 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
“Iberduero, the promoter, did not apply for definitive building permit until September 1976, and for the required 
reclassification of the land from rural and natural to industrial uses until March 197.” (page 45). 
 
The UK is the country where the Regulators seemed to have been trying to achieve more trust 
from the public. They emphasized the need of guaranteeing the choice of the safest available 
nuclear reactor technology (Event 4). 
Event 4: SGHWR chosen as AGR replacement 1974 
The Secretary of State for Energy, Eric Varley was above all concerned that ‘the Government’s choice of nuclear 
reactor would command public confidence’ and determined that in light of ‘the recent disaster at the chemical plant at 
Flixborough’ the government should choose the safest option (page 39). 
 
In Ukraine the affected population (receptors) perceived a lack of information flow regarding the 
Chernobyl accident (general narrative) and even a falsified narrative about how the management 
was done (Event 1). Public trust seemed severely damaged in Ukraine by the event and the 
associated secrecy surrounding its consequences and management, which played a key role in 
the resistance of Ukraine against Soviet rule. However, key changes in the political scene in 
Ukraine led also to changes of public attitudes towards nuclear power, in the sense that they 
reacted less once Ukraine was constituted. The antinuclear local mobilization from the receptors 
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contributed to the moratorium on the construction and commissioning of new nuclear power units. 
Public trust had been severely damaged by the event and the associated secrecy surrounding its 
consequences and management, which played a key role in the resistance of Ukraine against 
Soviet rule, with many experts proposing informational and educational work with receptors as a 
method to address such mistrust, reflecting the knowledge deficit model of gaining support 
through the provision of scientific facts to create a better informed public and therefore overcome 
societal concerns. Regarding how regulators managed information, the receptors perceived a 
lack of flow of information to act adequately in an emergence status. In general, there were great 
fears it may collapse or decay and trigger another nuclear incident. This lack of management 
and/or coordination from the authorities in dealing with the accident could be noticed among the 
receptors. 
General narrative 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, public attitudes (receptors) toward nuclear power changed dramatically and 
the belief among many participants that Moscow’s Russian-centred economic development policies had contributed to 
the degradation of Ukraine (page 8). 
“Ukraine has achieved little beyond political declarations.  Among the main reasons has been the unwillingness of 
authorities and the people to pay the high costs necessary to restructure the economy and to modernize the industry. 
More important, the energy sector is extremely corrupt and controlled by private or corporate interests, that is, groups 
who profit greatly from the current situation and oppose to any changes (Balmaceda 2008: 65-143).” (page 11) 
 
Showcase: Dealing with Chernobyl disaster aftermath  
Ukraine gained independence with the break-up of the USSR in 1991 with a nuclear moratorium in force and the public 
fully against nuclear power (page 25). 
The Chernobyl disaster has had a tremendous impact on the development of the nuclear power not only in Ukraine and 
former Soviet countries, but throughout the world. The accident and its aftermath are also crucial to understand very 
different types of interaction between the nuclear establishment and society: secrecy, disinformation or other 
communications on nuclear technology and its dangers; anti-nuclear protests related to nuclear power; and new forms 
of nuclear communication and public participation procedures put in place to remediate post-Chernobyl public distrust 
(page 33.) 
More than three decades after the disaster, controversies continue to rage over what made such an accident possible 
and what are its on-going public health impacts. These debates remain essential to the discussions about the future of 
the nuclear power as well as about the relationship of industry with the public not only in Ukraine but in other parts of 
the world.  A number of reports, studies, testimonies and memoirs have described Chernobyl accident as due to 
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inherently Soviet causes, and thus impossible in other countries. Yet in her recent study of Soviet nuclear program and 
official and dissident experts’ explanations of the accident, Sonja Schmid (2015) warns against such simplistic accounts 
(page 28). 
Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
Soviet authorities made all efforts available to show an optimistic and heroic narrative about successful “liquidation” 
of the accident’s consequences and the return to a normal life in Soviet media. As well as to make clear the efficiency 
of the central and local authorities in dealing with everyday problems related to evacuation, health control, cleaning-up 
operations.  (page 35).  
At the same time, the receptors lacked trust on this official optimistic discourse about the liquidation of the disaster 
consequences. The SCR described that interviews with inhabitants and analysis of archival sources show that many of 
local inhabitants of the areas close to the accident site were aware that the accident at the nuclear plant was far more 
serious and dangerous that officials wanted to admit. Soviet authorities as regulators/promoters are described in 
the SCR how they tried accurately to erase, to make the traces of the disaster disappear both from the environment 
and the public sphere (page 36). 
Among local population the secrecy resulted in insufficient and inadequate measures of protection for the nearby 
population and emergency workers sent to do the clean-up of the accident site and the villages in its vicinity (page 37). 
 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
Activists, new political representatives, Ukrainian public intellectual and scientists involved in the protests denounced 
the secrecy of the information on the disaster consequences during first years after the disaster, the 
mismanagement of the radioactive fallout impact that criminally jeopardized the health and life of the Chernobyl 
victims, and they voiced claims for extensive emergency protection measures and relocations and compensation 
payments (page 41). 
As the regulators/promoters did not stop moving forward with the construction of the new reactors in Ukraine, the 
receptors had a strong resentment of the Moscow reinforced by fears of new accidents. Receptor’s distrust towards 
nuclear power was raised in the atmosphere of secrecy typical for the Soviet management of the civil nuclear projects 
always closely related to the military uses of atom (page 42). 
Like the partisans of the “public understanding of science” ideas in the ‘70s in western countries, they believed that to 
restore the prestige of nuclear science and technology and overcome people’s fears they needed to produce a better 
informed public (page 44).  
 
According to the USA SCR, the Regulator (AEC-NCR) is seen as low trustworthy due to several 
non-congruent behaviours. First, for its supposedly inefficient functioning (“the NRC routinely 
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licenses plants on extremely thin financial, safety, and environmental evidence”) (General 
narrative, p. 11). Second, the licensing of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station revealed the 
ad hoc nature of the regulators (AEC and NRC’s) treatment of seismic characteristics in 
adjudicating safety concerns and points to why many citizens do not trust either the NRC or the 
utilities. (Event 2). Third, in the aftermath of the TMI accident, the Kemmeny Report indicated the 
poor regulatory operations of the NRC (Event 3). Finally, the Regulator (NRC) lost a great deal of 
trust among people when it accepted an industry-sponsored emergency evacuation plan, in a 
place where geographic and demographic characteristics of the seacoast area make it difficult to 
evacuate safely under any conditions. (Event 4) 
He demonstrated clearly that the NRC routinely licenses plants on extremely thin financial, safety, and environmental 
evidence.  For Seabrook NPP neither state nor federal environmental review had a significant impact on the choice of 
sites or the range of alternates considered.  As others have noted, the NRC all too often and in this case accepted the 
utility’s safe information on faith since it lacked capability to make independent evaluations.  Stever concluded that 
time-consuming licensing processes were more the result of the NRC's inefficient way of doing business, not the 
product of environmentalist delay tactics.  All of this called for a more independent and objective NRC.(Stever, 1980:  
168). 
(General narrative, p. 11) 
 
In the 1970s it became clear through an FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request from Friends of the Earth that the 
AEC had actually suppressed publication of a 1964 update of WASH-740 (US AEC, 1957), a reactor safety study, that 
estimated a worst-case scenario accident leading to at least 3,400 deaths and $7 billion of property damage, well over 
the amounts covered by the indemnities of the Price-Anderson Act with a limit on liability of $560 million. 
(Event 2, p. 34) 
 
The licensing of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station revealed the ad hoc nature of the AEC and NRC’s 
treatment of seismic characteristics in adjudicating safety concerns and points to why many citizens do not trust either 
the NRC or the utilities.  The rulings and evaluations indicated the difficult effort to balance the accepted need for 
power generation with public concerns and safety. 
(Event 2, p. 36) 
 
The Kemmeny Report indicated the poor oversight and regulatory operations of the NRC:  “To prevent nuclear 
accidents as serious as Three Mile Island, fundamental changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures, 
and practices -- and above all -- in the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent that the 
institutions we investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry.  This conclusion speaks of necessary fundamental 
changes. We do not claim that our proposed recommendations are sufficient to assure the safety of nuclear 
power.”(Ibid.: 7) 
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(Event 3, p. 41) 
 
The NRC lost a great deal of trust among New Englanders when it accepted an industry-sponsored emergency 
evacuation plan for 10-mile radius.  Massachusetts Gov. Michael S. Dukakis has refused to file plans for the 
northeastern Massachusetts towns, contending that geographic and demographic characteristics of the seacoast area 
make it impossible to evacuate safely under any conditions. 
(event 4, p. 45) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
Finland has a governance system including authorities, nuclear companies and government 
agencies deciding together in closed cabinets, but having high levels of trust among public 
opinion. However, during last times some projects are accumulating troubles and nobody is able 
to say when the power stations were ready and how much they would eventually cost. (General 
narrative, p. 5, p. 19). 
General narrative 
“One key concept is the “triangle of power”. Nuclear power projects in Finland have been controlled and governed from 
the day collectively by authorities (Radiation Safety Agency), nuclear companies (IVO/Fortum and TVO) and 
government agencies (AEN, KTM). This triangle of power has had almost unlimited powers to establish the rules of the 
game and enforce rules in all situations and all circumstances.” (page 5) 
“Nowadays Olkiluoto NPP attracts a dramatic attention because in 2003 the energy company Teollisuuden Voima 
(TVO) received a permission to finally build the “fifth reactor” in Finland. This reactor has been planned, debated and 
decided for more than 20 years. The French company AREVA and the German company Siemens are jointly 
constructing the nuclear power plant that should have been commissioned by 2010 but the project is still unfinished. 
Therefore, Olkiluoto project is scrutinized by social scientists, historians and environmental scientists because its 
completion accumulated various problems and troubles.” (page 10) 
“TVO’s project was plagued by labor and management problems. According to the initial time table both nuclear power 
stations were supposed to feed electricity to the national grid by 1970, but the deadline was pushed back year after 
year. Finally nobody was able to say when the power stations were ready and how much the project would eventually 
cost (Michelsen-Särkikoski 2005).” (page19) 
 
Showcase: Collective memory and the uneasy nuclear collaboration between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union 
“This strange arrangement has been criticized in Finland but nothing has been done to change the situation. The 
Finnish government had number of occasions to stop the project and cancel the deal with Rosatom. The Finnish 
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parliament has also had several occasions to put the end to the project.  However, Fennovoima moves on, although it 
has broken rules and regulations, and time after time the authorities have complained the management of the project.” 
(page 31) 
 
Event 4: Surprise in Moscow 
“Imatran Voima (IVO), the state owned energy company had struggled to find a contractor for the first nuclear power 
station. The international bidding had started already in 1965 and after two unsuccessful rounds IVO was not able to 
declare the winner. The Finnish government had terminated the process, but because of the political pressure from 
Moscow, the negotiations were restarted in 1969. The group of men in black had come to Moscow to learn more about 
the offer made by the Soviet nuclear power company Technopromexport. (Särkikoski 2011).” (page 43) 
 
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
“IVO’s nuclear power project was sliding into a total catastrophe. The company was committed to evaluate fairly all 
offers, but the project was eventually decided by the Finnish and Soviet governments. This would tarnish IVO’s 
domestic and international reputation for good.” (page 50) 
 
In the Spanish SCR the issue of vested interests was raised by several actors (mostly regarding 
supporters of a waste repository (Event 5). The existence of contradictory external reports (about 
the siting features or nuclear impacts) was a source of distrust among the actors too. 
Event 5: NWR 
Part of the local population distrusted the mayor of Ascó, as he was perceived to be linked to the nuclear industry and, 
therefore, with vested interests (page 54). 
Environmental associations, such as Greenpeace or Ecologistas en Acción, criticised the performance of the Nuclear 
Safety Council (CSN) as, in their view, the regulator submitted the preliminary authorization for the site without 
enough information. In their view, Villar de Cañas was chosen for political reasons; there was no technical reason to 
justify it, neither the quality of the place nor the proximity of nuclear installations (page 56). 
The regional government argues irregularities in the planning; and alerts of no safety guarantees because 
contradictory external reports (page 58). 
The Provincial Council (PP) highlights vested interests of La Junta de Castilla-La Mancha (regional government) to 
stop the economic development of the province (Cuenca) (page 56). 
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In the UK some receptors showed a lack of trust in the reactor management performed by private 
companies following a culture of secrecy (Event 7). The receptors demanded more public 
information about power stations, and this was especially the case in local communities affected. 
General narrative 
“At first the Labour governments of 1997-2010 avoided taking any decision on nuclear power (or nuclear 
weapons).(Adams and Eaglesham, 2005) The early 2000s, however witnessed a conjunction of the depletion of North 
Sea gas reserves from 2005 (changing Britain from a net energy exporter to an energy importer), a capacity crisis 
(caused by ageing plant) and the growing importance of climate change mitigation.” (page 30) 
“Cabinet concluded that public confidence in the nuclear programme necessitated the choice of the safest possible 
reactor (even if it wasn’t the cheapest) and supported the construction of SGHWRs.(Cabinet Conclusions, 1974) This 
event shows how the balance of this decision rested on the construction of an ‘imagined public’ by Ministers who 
valued safety over cost..” (page 28) 
Event 7: Government repositioning on new build NPPs 2006 
“Although the 2008 consultation showed public acceptance of a role for nuclear energy in providing the UK with low-
carbon electricity, it did highlight a lack of trust in the privatised operators of nuclear power plants. Members of the 
various consulted groups were concerned that private companies would be less prepared than the government, or a 
public sector body, to take choices which were expensive but safer: “Would they try to get away with only minimum 
standards due to concerns about their profits?”.” (page 50) 
 
In Ukraine, at regulators level, the debate was on the European West-East distrust situation, as 
western partners should assist Ukraine on exchange of closing Chernobyl. Ukraine officials were 
disappointed by the Western partners who, according to the Ukrainian side, failed to fulfill their 
1995 commitment to assist the country in exchange for closing the Chernobyl plant. For instance, 
the Western side didn’t provide the funds necessary to complete K2-R4. (Event 4, p. 21). 
Event 4: Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and public hearings on the completion of the 
Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors in exchange (1994-2000). 
“Ukrainian officials were disappointed by Western partners who, according to the Ukrainian side, failed to fulfil their 
1995 commitment of assistance to support Ukraine’s energy sector in exchange for closing the Chernobyl plant. In 
particular, the West failed to provide the funds necessary to complete K2-R4. In a speech at the meeting on the 
opening of the Khmelnytska NPP in 2004 Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma blamed the Western governments: “We 
have waited for five years, but the West evaded its obligations under various pretexts, laying down new requirements to 
Ukraine in return. And after obtaining the closure of Chernobyl it forgot about its promises for good”.” (page 51) 
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In the USA some critic groups (such as the Union of Concerned Scientists) considered that the 
license-renewal process “was designed to limit the scope that could be considered, specifically 
the ability of the public to intervene” (Showcase), growing distrust among some social groups. 
According to Edwin Lyman, a senior scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, the license-renewal process 
itself risks public safety in that it “was designed to limit the scope that could be considered, specifically the ability of the 
public to intervene” by requiring stations to address “contentions” by showing the operator has a plan to correct a 
specific problem.(Thielman, 2016) 
(Showcase, p. 25) 
 
The GAO was critical of the NRC in the early 2000s for its monitoring and supervisory roles, although noted 
improvement.  According to the GAO in 2006, the NRC improved its safety oversight functions. Between 2001 and 
2006 it produced over 4,000 inspection findings for failure fully to comply with safe operating procedures, and the NRC 
subjected 79 of the 103 plants – 80%– to increased oversight for some time, and 5 plants to the highest level of 
oversight – due to the “more systematic nature of performance problems.”(US GAO, 2006a: i) 
(Event 5, p. 51) 
 
A.4.2. Governance issues 
Other aspects related to governance and political relations between actors have been found in 
the SCR analysis. On the one hand, we observed political strategies that collide with one another 
and influence the NPP siting decisions. On the other hand, energy dependence and mutual 
international relationships are described in several of the SCRs.  
a) Political games 
 
Here we are selecting the SCR excerpts connecting actors’ perceptions to the existence of some 
kind of political game that interferes with decision making processes, especially regarding NPP 
siting decisions.  
 Period 1950-1970 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
175 
In Finland, the history of nuclear energy is linked to strategic international political relationships of 
the country. So, it is said that Finland became member of the United Nations organization due to 
its participation in nuclear projects (General narrative). The diplomatic relationship with the Soviet 
Union conditioned some decisions on nuclear programs (Events 1, 2 and 5). 
General Narrative: 
“Finland had tried to become a member of the United Nations, but the Soviet Union had denied the access. Atoms for 
Peace – initiative was coordinated by the United Nations and therefore it could open doors for full membership.” (page 
17) 
“Thirdly, Eisenhower’s initiative called for international collaboration and this was exactly what the Finnish scientists, 
engineers and corporate managers needed after the war.” (page18) 
“As mentioned above, the Finnish energy policy aimed at higher degree of energy independency. This aim was pushed 
further because the imports of oil, coal and minerals connected Finland to the Soviet Union. Nobody knew how to break 
the tie. If Finland had purchased higher valued industrial goods from the Soviet Union, the imports of fossil fuels would 
have decreased. Unfortunately there were not enough high technology industrial goods that had any markets in Finland 
or outside Finland. This is why nuclear power reactors and steam turbines were very important.” (page 21) 
Event 1: From isolation into transnational networks 
“The Finnish government founded a special committee to make necessary recommendations for the future energy 
production in Finland. Professor and the Nobel laureate A.I.Virtanen was expected to be the chairman of the 
committee, but Virtanen had criticized the Soviets and he was declared a persona non grata. His place was taken by 
Professor Erkki Laurila, an experienced scientist and engineer, who was a personal friend of the Prime Minister and 
soon-to-be President Urho Kekkonen. Laurila accepted the nomination but with one condition. He refused to lead “the 
Atomic Energy Committee’, but instead “the Energy Committee”. Laurila realized political and ideological tensions that 
were built in the Atoms for Peace program, and he did not want to tie his hands before the work had even started 
(Michelsen, Särkikoski 2005). (page 34) 
Event 2: Finnish nuclear power project 1955-1962 
“Erkki Laurila concluded that there was no need to rush into investing to heavily in nuclear power. Reactors were going 
to be developed, and prices would come down as manufacturing reaches the commercial level. Uranium chain had to 
be controlled and governed by the United Nations. Instead, Finland should spend wisely time before full-size nuclear 
power reactors would come to market. Finland needed research and training programs as well as networks with 
Western countries.” (page 37) 
“Other problems emerged in the late 1950s when the Soviet Union offered similar training programs for Finnish 
scientists and engineers. It became clear very quickly that the Soviets were not interested in educating Finnish 
scientists but in learning more about their experiences in the United States. Laurila understood the danger in this 
political game. His program was built on trust and if Americans would find out that tacit knowledge slipped from Finland 
into the Soviet Union, the Finnish training program would be closed. Laurila needed help from the West, and the best 
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and easiest way to educate the critical mass of nuclear engineers was to send them out to the world class research 
institutions.” (page 38) 
Event 5: Becoming the “Atom town” 
“IVO had not yet closed the international bidding for the nuclear power project. The painfully slow evaluation was 
ongoing and behind the scenes nuclear companies and national governments lobbied to get their reactor offer 
accepted. (…)It was IVO’s responsibility to end the bidding and announce the winner. With plenty of hesitation, the 
company decided to go for the AEG reactor. It was technologically most advanced and it promised the best economic 
results. But nuclear energy did not follow the fair game rules. For Finland, it was politically impossible to buy the first 
nuclear reactor from West Germany. Soviet Union would never accept such a decision. Even if the reactor would come 
from West Germany, IVO would never get enriched uranium from anywhere.”  (pages 49-50) 
 
In Spain, in the early phases of nuclear development, the industry created its own rules by 
manoeuvring within the dictatorship and even ignoring the law in their dealings (General 
narrative). The lack of checks and balances in the dictatorship helped it and shaped the public 
image of the nuclear sector among the public for long time. 
General narrative 
In many cases, bid negotiations were well advanced before government pre-authorization was granted. The electricity 
companies often ignored the law in their dealings, and this attitude helped in increasing public opposition (page 15). 
Spanish electrical utilities, mostly privately owned and organised as lobby, had working relations with the US 
multinationals since the 1920s and managed to manoeuvre within the government in order to play a dominant role 
in the ordering of nuclear power plants (page 8). 
One of the main differences between Spain and the rest of Western Europe developing civil nuclear programs is 
precisely that the former was a conservative-authoritarian dictatorship (1939-1975 Franco’s Regime) and the later 
democracies. As a working hypothesis we propose that this difference defined how decisions were made: in the 
Spanish case without any checks or balances. In fact, Spain was the only dictatorship among the early civil nuclear 
adopters in Western Europe (page 8).  
 
 
In Sweden, the issue of nuclear weapons became a contested political issue for the receptors 
when the knowledge about the military aspects became more generally known. But at the political 
level people that were in favour of research on nuclear weapon also argued that this would act as 
a deterrent by showing the world that the country was capable to build it. On the other hand, the 
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public debate was somehow neutralized by the regulators and political parties due to the coming 
elections, reaffirming that this was a controversial issue for the political scene. 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy  
“The proponents argued that Sweden needed “tactical” nuclear weapons to effectively defend itself against an attack from 
the Soviet Union. They argued that the Soviet Union would use tactical nuclear weapons irrespective of if Sweden had such 
weapons or not, and that Sweden would be much more effective in its resistance if it also possessed such weapons. Thus 
the possession of such weapons would reduce the risk of an attack, as the cost for the attacker would be much higher. They 
demanded that research and development of nuclear weapons should continue and that the future Swedish reactors should 
be designed to produce weapons grade plutonium.” (page 40). 
“The main purpose of the study group was to “neutralize” the nuclear weapons issue in the coming parliamentary elections in 
September 1960.” (page 36) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
According to the German SCR, the proximity of political elections was the main factor that 
influenced the government to postpone the choice of the place where a NPP should be built. 
(Event 2) 
Event 4: Gorleben (repository site) 
“With locating the repository site in the economically underdeveloped hinterland the government tried to avoid 
opposition against the project: Reasons for the choice were political and economic, especially the closeness to the East 
German border and the low population density of the area. As in the Wackersdorf case, they underestimated the 
protest potential of the local population.” (page 30). 
 
In Spain, there are several examples of political games that created distrust among the public: 
sometimes a political party expressed its anti-nuclear principles but later, when governing, 
changed opinion and maintained or supported NPPs (Event 2); and the opposite happened 
between different territorial levels, even governed by the same political party, e.g. when the 
central government supported nuclear siting and the regional (autonomous) government stopped 
it (trying to increase its legitimacy by demonstrating sensitivity to social demands in the region) 
(Showcase). 
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Showcase: Valdecaballeros 
Social and environmental movements denounced the unequal distribution of risk over the territory, and the fact that 
Valdecaballeros was chosen because it was a disinherit village and nobody cared if they host the “worst industry” 
(page 27). 
Event 2: Ascó 
“The village of Ascó lies in a predominately rural area based on agriculture. In contrast to other villages in the 
surroundings, Ascó had no touristic potential. The power plant was built when the area underwent a structural crisis in 
agriculture and the rural population increasingly migrated to the cities. The movement against the building of nuclear 
power plants started to rally in areas which were affected by the construction work. In this way, L’Ametlla de Mar  and 
Ascó turned into the centres where the hard core of resistance against these installation took shape. As in another 
cases it was the property developers’ strategy to hide the real reason for acquiring land in the municipality by 
pretending to build a “chocolate factory” until it was leaked that the real reason behind it was to build a nuclear power 
plant which to the people deep in the countryside did not mean much.” (pages 38-39) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In the Bulgarian SCR the political fight between pro and anti-European parties conditioned the 
national nuclear agenda (Event 4). While pro-EU parties agreed with the shutdown and change of 
nuclear reactors, the anti-EU parties advocated keeping all of them. At political level, again the 
nuclear power discussion among regulators/promoters was used as an issue of how the country 
is positioning in the new membership for the EU. Specifically, on the issue of changing 
technology to other reactors (whether to keep old reactor or adapt them to new technologies). 
Bulgarian socialists wanted to keep all of the reactors with the argument of their strength and 
profitability. While Bulgarian democrats and pro-EU parties and officials were willing to 
compromise arguing that such step would be better for the Bulgarian country. 
Event 4: Initial negotiations and contract with the European Union for memberships, which included decommissioning 
of reactor bodies 1,2,3,4 at Kozloduy NPP – 1993- 2004 
“For Bulgarian socialists, the question was why Bulgarian reactors had to be decommissioned as condition for 
acceptance, while Slovakian and Lithuanian politicians used nuclear facilities as strategic objects in the same type of 
negotiations.” (page 40) 
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In Spain there are cases in which a political change in the local and regional government halted 
the nuclear plans (Event 5). In these cases (such as those happened in the former period) the 
relevant issue is that policy makers changed their orientations and decisions towards concrete 
nuclear developments due to political strategies of the electoral arena, even contradicting 
themselves and their explicit political principles. 
Event 5: NWR 
 “On 30 December 2011, the Council of Ministers designated the municipality of Villar de Cañas, a village of less than 
500 inhabitants in the province of Cuenca, as the site for the ATC. The Socialists took power in the region on July 
2015, ousting the conservative Popular Party, which rules at the national level. As of 2016, ATC works remain politically 
blocked and the firms are building their own storage at nuclear plant sites (El País, 26/12/2016).” (page 53) 
The Catalan Parliament rejected the proposal of the nuclear waste repository in Catalonia in 3 occasions (page 55).  
“According to the CANC (environmental movement), Villar de Cañas was obviously chosen for political reasons; there 
was no technical reason to justify this piece of land: neither the quality of the place nor the proximity of nuclear 
facilities.” (page 57). 
 
b) Energy dependency 
Several SCR bring out arguments about the key geostrategic role of energy in national industrial 
development and in political struggles in the international arena. In this sense, the debate about 
energy dependency becomes one of the key governance factors shaping public perceptions on 
nuclear issues. The strong influence of leader countries in a context of Cold War, as well as the 
technological colonization spread from some central scientific countries also played a role in 
conditioning these perceptions. 
 Period 1950-1970 
The Bulgarian SCR explains the country’s vast dependency on the Soviet Union’s technology and 
development model (Event 1). 
Event 1: Starting the experimental reactor IRT-2000 NEAR SOFIA IN 1962 
“The process of starting the functioning of the reactor it was the expansion of their scientific and technological 
model, on Soviet side. For Bulgaria it was announced as sign of brotherhood and big scientific step (page 32). 
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The Finnish SCR is full of references to the debate about national energy dependence and/or 
self-sufficiency. The whole nuclear program is justified from the beginning and during several 
decades as a key factor to ensure energy independency. The particular geostrategic position of 
the country during the Cold War, in-between East and West, facilitate the political preferences for 
an energy source that could guarantee a high degree of energy independence. The energy 
dependence from the Soviet Union is presented as a reiterate concern. 
General Narrative: 
“Massive investments in hydro, thermal and nuclear energy plants have been made during the past 70 years, but the 
goal of the energy policy is still out of reach. The latest estimation made by the Finnish government shows that even if 
all current energy projects are successful, Finland could cut the energy dependency to 50% by the end of this decade. 
Although it is widely accepted fact that Finland can never construct an energy system that is fully independent from 
foreign sources of electricity and fuels, high level of self-sufficiency is and has been the main goal of the energy policy. 
Because of this, nuclear energy has established a permanent position in the Finnish energy system.” (page 5) 
“Also it has been argued that new reactors are safe and they can improve the energy independency.” (page16) 
“This would require systematic investments in education of nuclear engineers and operators and ambitious research on 
nuclear sciences and technologies. Finnish energy policy aimed to improve the self-sufficiency in energy production 
and to limit the need to import fossil fuels and electricity from abroad (Michelsen – Särkikoski 2005). (…)Finland was 
able to maintain a high level of self-sufficiency and only 5% of the total consumption of electricity came from the 
imported resources.” (page 18) 
“Finland had signed bilateral trade agreements with Soviet Union in 1950 and the agreement guaranteed the imports of 
crude oil, coal and natural gas. The Energy Committee concluded that the first commercial nuclear power reactor could 
start in the beginning of the 1970s. Since then the economic growth and industrialization required new nuclear reactors 
almost annually.” (page 18) 
 
“Finland was not self-sufficient in energy production, hence contacts had to be built with the neighboring countries for 
imports of fossil fuels and electricity. One of the most important agreement was the bilateral trade agreement with the 
Soviet Union. Finland exported industrial and consumer goods to the East and imported oil, coal and minerals. Before 
the nuclear power stations were ready, almost half of the energy production in Finland was based on imported oil and 
coal. This arrangement resulted from the internal mechanism of the bilateral trade. When the Soviet markets grew, the 
exports of energy products to Finland also had to increase accordingly. This fueled industrialization and modernization 
process in Finland (Hirvensalo, Sutela 2017).” (page 20) 
“Policy makers had their point view. Finland depended on foreign imports of fossil fuels and electricity, and in the future 
these dependencies should be eliminated. Finland had unused fossil fuels and hydro power resources, and several 
new nuclear power stations should be built in order to cover the growing demand.” (page 24) 
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“Meanwhile a new paradigm seemed to emerge. NOKIA mobile phones conquered the global markets, and the ICT-
cluster developed new business opportunities. According to social scientists, Finland was moving rapidly away from the 
industrial society into post-industrial or knowledge society. Factories or nuclear power stations were no longer needed 
because high technology companies innovated sustainable energy sources. If more electricity was needed, it was 
purchased from the Scandinavian electricity markets or Russia, or Estonia. Self-sufficiency was no longer the central 
issue in the Finnish energy policy. Instead, it was a flexible and decentralized energy system that utilized smart grids, 
intelligent energy networks and energy saving (Kyllönen 2004).” (page 25) 
 
In Sweden national independence of energy supply was an aspect of nuclear development 
subordinate to the competitiveness or reliability of the nuclear energy sector. 
General narrative 
“The Swedish power industry was made up of the State Power Board, called Vattenfall which produced about 40 % of 
all power and a dozen private power companies (many owned by municipalities and/or energy-intensive industries). For 
the power industry the national independence aspect of nuclear reactors was subordinate to their competitiveness and 
reliability.” (page 10). 
 
One of the arguments mentioned in the UK report related to the reduction of dependency on 
foreign energy sources (considered also more expensive). Nuclear energy offered a chance to 
reduce British reliance on coal and expensive imported oil amongst concerns of air pollution and 
a fuel crisis. 
Event 2: First nuclear power station opens 1956 
 (...) Something reflected in the Queen’s speech upon the plant: ‘…this new power, which has proved itself to be such a 
terrifying weapon of destruction, is harnessed for the first time for the common good of our community (page 33). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
The Finnish SCR continues to give high importance to this argument. So, public authorities in 
Finland noted the country’s dependency on energy imports and that the level of self-sufficiency 
had dropped since the early 1960s meanwhile the demand of energy continued to grow. The 
conclusion was that if no new nuclear power stations were built, self-sufficiency would go 
progressively down. 
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Event 6: First nuclear debates 
“Nuclear debate continued until the end of the summer. The final word was given to industry advisor Leo Neuvo from 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. He laid down the hard facts. Finland depended on energy imports and the level of 
self-sufficiency had dropped since the early 1960s. Meanwhile the demand of energy continued to grow almost 6% 
annually and there was no sign of levelling off. At this point Finland could supply only 28% of the total demand from her 
own domestic sources. If no new nuclear power stations were built, self-sufficiency would go down to 10% by 1990. 
Even if all the still unused energy sources were utilized, nuclear power was an option that would increase the level of 
self-sufficiency (Suomen riippuvuus… IU 28.9.1973).” (page 58) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Bulgaria, the building of a new NPP (Event 5) reactivated the debate on energy (and political) 
dependency because it might help to diminish the energy imports from Romania and Turkey, 
while increasing dependency on Russian technology (Event 5). 
Event 5: Referendum for constructing new atomic power plant in Bulgaria- 2013 
Supporters for the construction of the new NPP argued that this would mean the lack of dependency in buying 
electricity from Romania and Turkey. While opponents claimed that it would increase the country's energy 
dependence on Russia as the Russian firm Atomstroy export was contracted to build the plant (page 27). 
 
In Finland during last years there are some nuclear developments that would help to decrease 
energy imports (from Russia) and improve self-sufficiency, but due to unavoidable geopolitical 
decisions Finland became depended on Russian nuclear technology. (Showcase, p. 29-31) 
 
Showcase: Collective memory and the uneasy nuclear collaboration between Finland and Russia/Soviet Union 
“Russia’s opinion on political, economic and also social issues must have been taken into account when Finland has 
decided her own stand. This has been very clear especially in energy policy. Russia is an energy superpower and most 
of its national income is based on production and export of various energy goods. As Steven Woehrel (2010) writes, the 
line between Russian energy policy and foreign policy is far from clear and many countries next to Russia are 
concerned that Moscow may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or to force them to make 
foreign policy concessions.” (page 29) 
“Finland depends and has depended on Russian energy source for more than a century. There are currently two 
transmission lines crossing the Finnish-Russian border and approximately one fifth of electricity consumption in Finland 
is covered by imports from Russia. Since the World War II Russia has been the biggest oil, gas and coal importer and 
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most of the enriched uranium comes also from Russia. According to Professor Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen (2015), the 
energy dependency from Russia is today more than 60% of the total energy production in Finland.” (page 30) 
“Therefore, it can be assumed that Fennovoima nuclear power station is going to produce the share of electricity that is 
currently imported from Russia. According to definition, this will decrease imports and improve self-sufficiency level. 
However, there will be another type of dependency. Rosatom will install the reactor, and most of the instrumentation 
comes from Russia. Therefore, although Fennovoima nuclear power plant cuts the need in importing electricity from 
Russia, Finland becomes depended on Russian nuclear technology.” (page 31) 
 
After Ukraine gained political independence, the perception of the Chernobyl NPP turned from 
being a sign of colonial domination by Russia into an important source of the electricity production 
that crucially contributed to the nation’s economic survival and independence (Event 3). The 
public authorities hoped that nuclear power would ensure high degrees of independence from 
Russian oil and gas, but they had not been able to break free of this relationship because of 
heavy dependent on Russian nuclear services (as their nuclear development was linked to the 
former soviet model) (General narrative). In order to achieve a better public image, the Promoters 
of NPP tried to introduce rules of transparency and accessibility to the nuclear sites (Event 5). 
General narrative 
“Today, especially because of Russia’s proxy war in eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in 2014, many in 
Ukraine see nuclear power as a way to achieve energy independence from Russian oil and gas. However, the country 
also relies on Russia for nuclear fuel and technology for Ukraine’s Soviet-designed reactors. Only recently it turned to 
the EU and western corporations to supply fuel and technology.” (page 4)  
“As this report indicates, Ukraine’s nuclear industry is determined to build on the Soviet heritage by extending the 
licenses of existing reactors and building new reactors.  As part of a government strategy to lessen dependence on 
Russia for energy needs, most notably gas, industry and government are seeking to meet the needs for nuclear fuel by 
developing Ukraine’s uranium, zirconium, and other capacities, and also by buying fuel from abroad, notably from 
Westinghouse, rather than relying on Russia exclusively for fuel and spent fuel handling and nuclear technology.” (page 
5) 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“When Ukraine gained its independence in 1991 attitudes towards nuclear power changed and the country embarked 
on policies to preserve nuclear power generation capacity.” (page 45).  
“After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, public attitudes toward nuclear power changed dramatically. The nationalist 
dimensions of anti-nuclear protests lost their importance in the public arena after the Ukraine became an independent 
nation. The Ukrainian people began to see Chernobyl less as a site of colonial domination by Russia and instead as an 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
184 
important source of the electricity production that contributed to the nation’s economic survival and independence, 
including from Russia itself. The hard bargaining by the Ukrainian authorities with European countries and 
organizations over the closure of the Chernobyl NPP in late 1990s-early 2000s (see Event 4) indicates how important 
its continued operation was for the country.” (pages 46-47) 
 Event 5: Start-up of the Kmelnytska 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors (2004) as part of strategy aiming at “nuclear revival” 
and new public information effort 
“Public communication also emphasized the way nuclear technology is important for national prosperity and 
independence and that nuclear installations operate in harmony with human activity and natural environment.” (page 
55). 
 
In the USA, supporters of nuclear energy emphasize the facts that nuclear power will help secure 
US energy independence (General narrative). However, in the early 1990s the United States and 
Russia reached a landmark agreement that would turn former Soviet nuclear weapons material 
into fuel to power America’s civilian nuclear reactors. The “Megatons to Megawatts” partnership 
provided enough fuel to generate 10% of America’s electricity needs (Appendix 4), and it could be 
interpreted as a way of losing energetic autonomy. 
Generally speaking, supporters of nuclear energy emphasize the facts that nuclear power will help secure US energy 
independence; (…) and is crucial to provide base load for energy demand into the 21st century.  They argue that 
NPPs operate as intended. 
(General narrative, p. 17) 
 
The only US facility that enriches uranium in 2016, USEC, in Eunice, NM, has struggled with bankruptcy pressures, so 
that uranium enrichment, pioneered in the US, “may become primarily a European and Russian technology.”(Wald, 
2014) Currently, almost all the uranium used in US commercial reactors is imported. After reaching a peak in 1980, 
domestic mining now accounts for only 10% of the fuel used in US reactors.   
(Appendix 4, p. 82) 
 
In November 2013 the DOE announced that it had selected a proposal from Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) to build a 
plant to enrich uranium.  In the same announcement, the DoE said it would enter negotiations with Areva to process 
off-specification uranium hexafluoride as blend stock for domestic nuclear fuel. This would be carried out using Areva's 
existing nuclear fuel fabrication facility in Richland, Washington.  DOE said that the GLE and Areva projects 
represented "an important next step" in planning for potential future uses and clean-up efforts at Paducah as well as 
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reducing the costs to the taxpayer of the clean-up operation 
(Appendix 4, p. 83) 
 
“In the early 1990s, the United States and Russia reached a landmark agreement that would turn former Soviet 
nuclear weapons material into fuel to power America’s civilian nuclear reactors.  The company played a key role in 
implementing the deal, marketing the downblended material to U.S. utilities and arranging for deliveries.  From 1993 to 
2013, the “Megatons to Megawatts” partnership provided enough fuel to generate 10% of America’s electricity 
needs.  It was the most successful non-proliferation effort in history – eliminating more than 20,000 warheads worth of 
weapons-grade material.  
(Appendix 4, p. 83-84) 
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B. Public engagement in the selected case studies 
Based on the flow of information between participants and promoters, i.e. those who have 
commissioned a particular engagement initiative, we have differentiated between three 
engagement types: Public communication; Public consultation; and Public participation. In 
addition, we suggest designating engagement actions initiated by the public and directed towards 
the regulators or nuclear companies as ‘public-initiated engagement’. 
 
B.1. Public communication 
Public communication refers to a process where information is transferred from the sponsor of an 
initiative to the public without any feedback being sought. Here we include several modalities of 
one-way communication, ranging from the absence of communication to actors’ communication 
through diverse tactics and channels. Different ways of ‘public initiated engagement’ are also 
identified and described through examples from the SCRs. 
 
B.1.1. Selective Communication / Secrecy 
Some SCRs describe cases of absence of communication, where information about nuclear 
issues was top secret or was disseminated only among a few people (elites) and hidden to the 
main population. 
 Period 1950-1970 
According to the Finnish SCR, decision making on nuclear projects in Finland had been made for 
long time by a small group of politicians, engineers and corporate managers. Therefore, it was 
managed and governed by politically, socially and technically superior individuals (General 
narrative). However, we should take into account that at the same time there was a true interest 
for knowing the public opinions. So public opinion surveys had been used to get knowledge about 
public attitudes towards nuclear energy in general, or towards the sitting of a NPP 
General Narrative: 
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“Laurila also emphasized political and ideological aspects of nuclear power. Finland, which is located between East and 
West and “squeezed” between two hostile superpowers, was unable to make independent decisions concerning 
nuclear energy. Therefore, nuclear energy in Finland could never be a “democratic” decision. Instead, it was managed 
and governed by politically, socially and technically superior individuals. (…)The latest historical research confirms 
Laurila’s interpretation at least partially, but argues that the picture has more colors. Indeed, the nuclear history in 
Finland was shaped by a small group of politicians, engineers and corporate managers who exercised what Gabrielle 
Hecht has called “technopolitics” (Hecht 2009).” (page 9) 
“Nuclear energy represents a centralized energy production and an authoritarian technology. Future energy systems 
are decentralized, intelligent and flexible. (Lovio 2017).” (page 14)  
 
According to the USA report, the accident of the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1, was 
kept secret at the time (1966) (Event 1). Besides, through less-than-opaque review procedures 
and secrecy, the AEC (regulator) kept its review of safety and other issues out of public scrutiny. 
The Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1, located in Monroe County, Michigan, near Detroit, was an LFMBR (liquid 
metal fast breeder reactor, cooled by sodium), designed for 430 MW, although the maximum reactor power with the 
first core loading was 200 MW.  It suffered a meltdown in 1966 that made the reactor inoperable and endangered 
millions of people. The accident was kept secret at the time. 
(Event 1, p. 28) 
 
Detroit Edison formed the Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC) to move Fermi ahead.  In the late 1950s the 
United Auto Workers brought suit to halt construction because of safety concerns, and lost eventually in the US 
Supreme Court, 7-2.  Other public concern was limited by AEC secrecy. (US SC, 1961) 
(Event 1, p. 29) 
 
Through less-than-opaque review procedures and secrecy, the AEC kept its review of safety and other issues out of 
public scrutiny. 
(Event 1, p. 29) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In early times in Bulgaria there was an agreement with the Soviet Union to maintain secrets about 
technical nuclear information (Event 2), and later information flowed but only among selected 
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people. When the Chernobyl accident happened the government did not inform the population 
about its real scale and consequences, nor about the accident in general nor about specific safety 
measures that the affected population should have taken, and in this case also information flow 
was mainly provided at close people to the government (Event 3). The media did not report the 
accident, until a year later a TV documentary mentioned the accident and the population became 
aware of its importance. (Event 3) 
Event 2: Starting the NPP Kozloduy and the Vrancea earthquake – 1974-1977 
“The agreement between Soviet Union and Bulgarian authorities also specified the secrecy of technical information: 
none of the organizations involved was to reveal the provided documentation to entities or organizations of other 
countries.” (page 32) 
Event 3: Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident 
The Bulgarian communist government did not inform the population on 26 of April 1986 when a serious accident 
happened on the Ukrainian nuclear power plant Chernobyl. Information flow was mainly provided at close people 
to the government and yet they take actions to secure their families. Only the people close to the party nomenclature 
knew the seriousness of the situation and ordered special supplies, clean from radiation pollution, for them and their 
families. Army forces were also protected by the officials (page 37). 
When the accident occurred, the Bulgarian communist government did not inform their population about the real scale 
and consequences of the accident and the national media remained quiet, saying only that there is no serious danger 
after the accident. Three years later in the end of 1989, the Bulgarian communist regime collapsed. The Green 
organization – Ekoglasnot, with no pure political aims acted as catalyser of receptors’ concerns on nuclear power, 
demanded mainly information about the environmental pollution caused by big technological projects and by the 
Chernobyl accident. One of the main questions remained about what were the consequences of Chernobyl accident. 
(page 38). 
The general public awaking happened in late 1987, when a short documentary by the journalist Jurii Zhirov find its 
place on a national television broadcasting which was not even about Chernobyl or other nuclear issues, but mentioned 
it slightly (page 38).  
 
According to the Spanish SCR, in the case of the nuclear moratorium (Event 4) the government 
seemed to disregard any strategy for communicating to the public. The communication flows 
between the government and the stakeholders were hidden to the public and instead developed 
through private initiatives and channels. For example, the government disregarded any 
communication strategy for explaining the moratorium to the public, the media would inform 
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without guidance from the government, and neither antinuclear movements nor local populations 
were consulted about the moratorium according to sources at both ends. 
Event 4: Nuclear moratorium  
 “There were many private meetings between the government delegates and the electric utilities and the banks 
(national and international).  None of that discussion transcended. The government disregarded any communication 
strategy for explaining the moratorium to the public. The media would inform without guidance from the government. 
Unlike the electricity firms, the nuclear industry was never involved in the discussions with the government about their 
fate regarding the moratorium and looked for eventual compensation through their contracts with project owners. 
(…)Neither antinuclear movements nor local populations were consulted about the moratorium according to sources at 
both ends, our interviews and, the available evidence.” (page 52) 
 
In Ukraine the information about the Chernobyl disaster existed but was mainly restricted to 
optimistic messages about management control and heroic soldiers and firemen’s efforts 
(Showcase). By 1988, it was very difficult for the regulators to keep concealing information on the 
disaster’s impact and its mismanagement by the government. Regarding how regulators 
managed information, the receptors perceived a lack of flow of information to act adequately in an 
emergence status. The reality of the situation falsified, by the persistent narrative provided by 
regulators of the successful management of the consequences from the accident for a number of 
years after in the state controlled media, asserting the reality of life returning to normal and no 
grounds for concern, and instead focussing on stories of the heroism of emergency workers 
against a depicted radioactive monster. In some way the reality of the situation was falsified by 
the narrative provided by public authorities (promoters / regulators). In this case the lack of 
communication was not on the accident itself but about its serious consequences (Event 1). The 
liberalization of the second half of the 1980s and revelations about the true scale of the 
Chernobyl disaster fuelled anti-nuclear, environmental, and nationalist movements that 
sometimes overlapped. 
Showcase: Dealing with Chernobyl disaster aftermath 
“By the end of 1988, it had become increasingly difficult for Soviet federal and republican authorities to conceal 
information on both the impact of the Chernobyl disaster and its mismanagement by the Soviet state. This situation 
related not only to the extreme gravity of radioactive contamination, but also to the progressive liberalisation of the 
Soviet political regime. The latter unfolded with glasnost and perestroika, introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, and 
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led to freer circulation of information, weakening of censorship and the Communist Party’s control over society, more 
possibilities for public expression of political and social discontent, and pluralisation of political life.” (pages 38-39) 
 
Event 1: Chernobyl disaster (April 26, 1986) 
“Between May 1986 and the beginning of 1989 the official optimistic narrative about successful “liquidation” of the 
accident’s consequences and the return to a normal life remained dominant in the Soviet media. The information about 
the scale of the accident and the danger of its consequences was replaced by a vivid account of a heroic battle of 
emergency workers (the so-called liquidators) against what was painted as a radioactive monster, with some living 
creature features, an atom that went out of control or an external enemy. The press, radio, and television that were 
totally under the control of the State and the Communist Party described the solidarity of the Soviet people facing the 
disaster as one united family and the efficiency of the central and local authorities in dealing with everyday problems 
related to evacuation, health control, cleaning-up operations (Kasperski: 110-128, Montaubrie 1996).” (page 35) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
No mention of this dimension in the SCRs for this period. 
 
B.1.2. Direct actors’ communication through the media and other 
channels 
The actors used several means and channels to disseminate their news and viewpoints on 
nuclear issues, trying to influence the other actors’ views. Sometimes the actors used traditional 
media (newspapers, radio, and TV) and new Internet media (websites, social media). Other times 
they tried to spread information directly to the public by themselves, using several communicative 
strategies. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In the UK a series of government films were published presenting nuclear energy as somewhat 
necessary for the country’s future and showing that Britain was ready to lead the scientific and 
political world (Events 1 and 2). A serious incident (Windscale 1957) challenged the media 
approach and information about it was heavily restricted and controlled by the government. 
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Event 1: First nuclear weapons test 1952 
“Part of a series of government films, this was the first major description of the British nuclear weapons programme, 
and the first publication of the reasoning for the programme on a nation-wide scale by the UKAEA and distributed by 
COI.” (page 32). 
Event 2: First nuclear power station opens 1956 
“Part of a series of government films, this was the first major description of the British nuclear energy programme, 
presenting nuclear energy as clean, safe, and necessary. The film highlights Britain’s achievements in constructing the 
first full-scale nuclear power station, and in other peaceful uses (such as isotope production).” (page 34). 
“As with the first British nuclear bomb test press coverage of the opening of Calder Hall was overwhelmingly 
positive.(Jay et al., 1954; Welsh and Wynne, 2013) For many, nuclear power was the ‘good’ face of nuclear power, 
something reflected in the Queen’s speech upon the plant.” (page 33). 
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
“Public information about the fire was heavily restricted and controlled by the government. There was intense 
newspaper coverage of the events; however, this was dependent on the release of information from government.” 
(page 37). 
 
In the USA, regulators and public authorities made during the 50’s and 60’s a long series of films 
about nuclear energy, which were seen by millions of people. 
Spencer Weart points out that in mid-1960s American agencies and corporations made twice as many films about 
reactors and three times as many about safety and environment as in the preceding five years.  In the 1960s roughly 
40 million people attended AEC film screenings and many times more on TV.  Weart writes, “The result was less to 
excite the public about AE than calm them.  The films toned down the utopian promises of 1950s films,” focusing on 
electrical energy rather than on “medical and agricultural fantasies.”(Weart, 1988: 299)  Among the AEC films of the 
1950s included “Power and Promise:  The Story Of Shippingport Nuclear Power Plant,”1 “Nuclear Energy Goes Rural,” 
“Atomic Venture,” “Atomic Power Today:  Service with Safety.” 
(General narrative, p. 18) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
According to the Spanish SCR, classic mass media (newspapers, TV and radio) had been used 
to announce the intentions of Promoters and Regulators of NPPs. Whilst national media was 
available to them, most of the Receptors instead had only access to local press to launch their 
mesagges. Sometime national newspapers where used by public authorities of different territorial 
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levels, but local receptors felt useless during the decision process because the location of the 
nuclear central power “came from above” (Showcase). In any case, little information was spread 
by press at the early stages of nuclear development in Spain, although after the Vandellós I 
incident (1989) the Promoters began producing periodical news about the decommissioning 
process, which had also been in some degree publicised and informed through the website 
(Event 1). In some cases the Promoters held press conferences to present NPP construction 
projects, and announced in the press the NPP's entry into operation as a way of making the 
population aware of the irreversibility of the NPP (Event 2). Other times the nuclear industry paid 
for full pages in the newspapers and made declarations in TV and radio reclaiming the need to 
restore the original nuclear plans (Event 4). 
General narrative 
“Official information, both from the JEN during its existence, and the Nuclear Safety Council thereafter, as well as the 
Ministry of Industry, appeared in the Official State Gazette (BOE), in the form of laws, decrees, ministerial orders and 
instructions and inspection records of the JEN.” (page 30).  
“The public voice could also be heard, especially in regions where building nuclear power plants had already 
commenced, and local press coverage brought lobbying by stakeholder groups into the public’s eye.” (page 16). 
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor) 
“Few efforts in communication activities seem to have taken place. As the Valdecaballeros mayor said: “We were 
cheated vilely, they put the nuclear power plant without asking our opinion, and they took away in the same way, 
without considering the people living in the territory .” (page 32). 
“The mayors of Valdecaballeros and Castillblanco (a neighbouring village) expressed their feeling of uselessness 
during the decision process because the location of the nuclear central power was only political (not technical) and it 
“came from above.“ (pag 26).   
Event 1: Vandellós I (nuclear incident in 1989) 
“The communication policy of the decommissioning company (ENRESA) was quite different of that of the company 
operating the plant (HIFRENSA). In an interview to the newspaper El Mundo (2003), the director of the 
decommissioning NPP highlighted the knowledge and technical experience gained at the decommissioning of 
Vandellós I, guarantying the high reliability and safety levels, generating international benchmarks for decommissioning 
nuclear power plants.” (page 36-37) 
Event 2: Ascó Nuclear Power Plant 
“At a press conference in February 1970, FECSA (Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña SA – Electric Power of Catalonia 
Ltd.) published their project beginning of the construction in 1971 (before asking for the permission of the municipality).” 
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(page 38).  
Event 4: Nuclear moratorium: 
“Unlike the electricity firms, the nuclear industry was never involved in the discussions with the government about their 
fate regarding the moratorium and looked for eventual compensation through their contracts with project owners.  But it 
paid for full pages in the newspapers claiming the disastrous effects of the moratorium on employment and the 
industrial development of the country.” (page 52) 
 “Between 1984 and 1994 the electricity companies and the nuclear industry privately attempted to have the 
government to revise the moratorium. Declarations in newspapers, TV and radio reclaimed the need to restore the 
original nuclear plans.” (page 53). 
 
In Sweden, to cope with the Chernobyl impact on public opinion, the regulators organised and 
participated in numerous communication activities through the media trying to calm the general 
public. (Event 4). 
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
“The Radiation Protection Agency, SSI organised and participated in numerous communication activities as a reaction 
in order to calm  the general public, i.e. appeared on the TV news almost every evening for a couple of weeks.” (page 
49).  
“Mass media were again filled with articles concerning the pros and cons of nuclear power.” (page 50). 
 
In the UK the public authorities implemented an intensive advertising campaign in newspapers 
about alternative reactor types with the aim of generating (supposedly) public confidence (Event 
4). In the 70s, a report from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution was published 
(Event 5) bringing the problem of nuclear waste to a wider public audience.  
Event 4: SGHWR chosen as AGR replacement 1974 
“Westinghouse and Atomic Energy of Canada (amongst others) advertised their PWR, BWR and CANDU systems in 
national newspapers, highlighting their safety, economy and reliability – hoping to influence the public debate 
surrounding the choice.” (page 40). 
Event 5: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
“Publication of the report began public debate in the UK over longer-term solutions for nuclear waste, and gave 
legitimacy to groups using this issue to attack continued deployment of nuclear power.” (page 44). 
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In Ukraine a variety of ‘information units’ were established in many territories after the Chernobyl 
accident providing information about levels of radioactivity and educating the public on nuclear 
technology in a broad sense (Event 2), thus, the regulators were making constant press-releases. 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
“Thus, to overcome the negative consequences of secrecy and distrust, many experts proposed informational and 
educational work with the public. Like the partisans of the “public understanding of science” ideas in the ‘70s in western 
countries, they believed that to restore the prestige of nuclear science and technology and overcome people’s fears 
they needed to produce a better informed public. For that matter, information units were established at many stations 
that produced, for example, short press releases about the levels of radioactivity in the surrounding environment, 
important events at the plant, and educational material about nuclear power and radioactivity. Some also started 
organizing the excursions to the station for the general public. Also, the All-Union Nuclear Society as well as the 
Ukrainian Nuclear Society were created in 1989 and 1992, respectively, with one of their goals to educate general 
public about the benefits of nuclear technologies.  Nuclear information centres have spread throughout Russia and 
Ukraine, especially in the first decade of the twenty-first century.” (page 43).  
 
In the USA the message that nuclear power represents progress has been deployed by images, 
meanings and messages set forth in TV, newspapers and journals, cartoons, and opinion 
columns. (General narrative, p. 17-19) 
According to one analysis, several images frame attitudes toward nuclear power.  A prevailing view among proponents 
suggests that nuclear energy represents progress with its promise of clean energy, efficiency and “technofixes” with 
their implicit rejection of Luddism.  An opposing position finds that nuclear technology leads to the destruction or 
disruption of nature.  This framing plays out in media which are crucial in the construction of public understandings 
with their images, meanings and messages set forth in TV, newspapers and journals, cartoons, opinion 
columns.(Gamson, Modigliani. 1989) 
(General narrative, p. 17) 
 
The authors conclude that media discourse provides “an essential context for understanding the formation of public 
opinion on nuclear power. More specifically, it helps to account for such survey results as the decline in support for 
nuclear power before Three Mile Island, a rebound after a burst of media publicity has died out, the gap between 
general support for nuclear power and support for a plant in one's own community, and the changed relationship of 
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age to support for nuclear power from 1950 to the present.”(p. 1) 
(General narrative, p. 18-19) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Spain the public authorities published reports on the decision about the siting of the nuclear 
waste repository in a special website (Event 5). 
Event 5::NWR 
A study was carried out and published saying that radiation emitted by nature is higher than the ones from NPP. 
Results from the study were published on press. The National Government published a report on the decision about 
the sitting of the repository in a website created on purpose: www.emplazamientoatc.es. Actors pro and against the 
NWR sitting made a wide use of Twitter and website resources. (page 58) 
 
In Ukraine environmental activists illustrated the supposed lack of safety of nuclear installations 
by putting out constant press-releases.  
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“(Environmental activists) They illustrated the lack of safety of Ukrainian nuclear installations by putting out constant 
press-releases on various incidents that could one day become another Chernobyl.” (page 47). 
 
 
B.1.3. Visitors’ information centres 
In the SCRs there are some references to visitors’ information centres as a way of better 
communicating and promoting transparency on nuclear issues. These centres are managed by 
the promoters of NPPs, usually in the same plant installations or nearby. In the case of Sweden, 
research centres were promoted to help in disseminating nuclear understanding among general 
people. 
 Period 1950-1970 
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In the F.R. Germany the promotion of “research centres” on nuclear issues had been part of the 
communicative efforts to make technology more acceptable (even among its potential promoters). 
But it is said that the plan to promote research to generate arguments against critics of nuclear 
energy worked only in part. (General narrative) 
General narrative 
“In an effort to make a case against critics of the nuclear energy industry, the German government established major 
research centers in Karlsruhe and Jülich in 1956 and 1962 that soon became influential in European nuclear research 
and development. The plan to promote research to generate arguments against critics of nuclear energy worked only in 
part. This time, opposition came from civil society, especially women. Local women’s associations in Karlsruhe were 
critical of the research centers because of the danger posed to citizens in a city with a high population density.” (page 
8). 
 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
No mention of this dimension in the SCRs for this period. 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Spain, since 2009, the Promoters enabled a part of some NPP in a visitors centre trying to 
reach a more interactive communication approach. (Event 2). 
Event 2: Ascó 
“In 2011 the information centre at the NPP was renovated. For the companies running the plant, this new equipment, 
designed as an interactive space for the dissemination of energy and the operation of a nuclear power plant "responds 
to the multiple objective of meeting the existing demand for visits to the plant and at the same time generating added 
value That complements the offer of attraction of visitors of the region of the Ribera d'Ebre ". (page 43) 
 
In Ukraine, Promoters put in a lot of effort to improve awareness of nuclear activities, to inform 
local populations about the operation of nuclear reactors, and to explain why national atomic 
industry was safe, open, economically beneficent and important to insure national sovereignty 
and prosperity (Event 5). But the persistent lack of financing hindered efforts significantly. While 
the information centres expanded and developed new infrastructure and exhibitions, much of this 
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came from local initiatives without common communication strategies directed to outside 
communities. One interesting communicative activity is that of children drawing contests on 
nuclear themes. The information centres of each of 4 operating Ukrainian power stations 
announce artistic competition every year. Children living within 30 and up to 100 kilometres 
diameter zones are encouraged to send their works. The drawings seem to circulate quite widely. 
Event 5: Start-up of the Kmelnytska 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors (2004) as part of strategy aiming at “nuclear revival” 
and new public information effort 
“The renewed public relations effort has aimed at promoting the atomic industry as safe and open to the public, 
economically beneficial for local communities and the whole nation, and different from “Soviet” nuclear technology with 
its secrecy and such accidents as Chernobyl. “Public communication also emphasized the way nuclear technology is 
important for national prosperity and independence and that nuclear installations operate in harmony with human 
activity and natural environment.” (page 55-56). 
“Children drawing contests on nuclear themes are a good example of the contemporary nuclear communication effort 
as well as of cultural representations of the nuclear energy in Ukraine. Already in the early 1990s nuclear specialists in 
professional societies in Ukraine advanced the idea of working with children’s drawings to engage both younger and 
older audiences, and the information centres have embraced them fully.  They see children as potential future young 
cadres for nuclear industry and as easier to engage than adults. It is also possible to reach adults through children 
(Barbashev 2015).  
Drawing competitions on nuclear themes were introduced through local initiative at some plants early on. They became 
particularly popular in the late 2000s and are now coordinated by the nuclear operator Energoatom. The information 
centres of each of 4 operating Ukrainian power stations announce artistic competition every year. Children living within 
30- and up to 100 kilometres diameter zones are encouraged to send their works to the information centres of the 
plants, which then select several of them to participate in the second round at the national level. Children submit 
drawings and sometimes handicrafts or animation movies. The number of participants may vary but often reach one 
hundred or more in these contests. The best works are usually rewarded with material prizes.  
The contests are very much local initiatives and rely on the enthusiasm of local teachers and information centers 
workers who are also very often former teachers or have worked in secondary education. They are also local as a 
celebration of local communities whose lives revolve around power stations.  
At the same time the drawings seem to circulate quite widely: present on the walls of information centers, on official 
web-pages and social media and in printed publications of nuclear organizations. They are even offered as presents to 
some foreign guests of the nuclear operator Energoatom. As a consequence they also contribute to standardize visual 
representations of nuclear power. From year to year drawings repeat some of the same themes or even copy the 
drawings from previous years the children can find on the internet or displayed in the information centers.” (pages 54-
55) 
 “However, constant changes in the direction of the industry, new appointments at the head of Energoatom, and 
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different communication teams coming to power has meant the absence of common methods or approaches in the 
effort at public outreach. Thus, for example, Ilona Zaets, the chief of the PR and communication in 2016, came into the 
office with the new president of Energoatom, Iurii Nedashkovskii, who was appointed in the early 2014 after the political 
crises in Ukraine in 2013 and 2014 and the flight of former Ukrainian President Yanukovich from office in February 
2014 (Zaets 2014, 2016). A persistent lack of financing has also nagged efforts significantly. While the information 
centres expanded and acquired new buildings and exhibitions, much of this came from local initiatives and often 
without common communication strategies directed to the outside communities..” (page 54). 
 
 
B.2. Public Consultation 
Public consultation refers to a process of conveying information from members of the public to the 
sponsors of the initiative, following a process initiated by the sponsor (Rowe & Frewer 2005). In 
this process, there is no formal dialogue between individual members of the public and the 
sponsors. The analysis of the SCRs allowed the identification of several types of consultation 
method, such as surveys (opinion polls), some consultative referendums and different kinds of 
informative meetings and public debates. 
 
B.2.1. Surveys and opinion polls 
Some forms of consultation seek to know the opinion of large population samples on a specific 
topic (the location of a repository, the suitability of a moratorium, etc.). 
 Period 1950-1970 
In Finland, public opinion surveys had been used to get knowledge about public attitudes towards 
nuclear energy in general, or towards the sitting of a NPP in a concrete territory. (Event 5) 
General Narrative: 
“Nuclear energy is still one of the cornerstones in the Finnish energy policy. Moreover, nuclear energy is also supported 
by majority of Finnish people. According to current surveys, about 45% of Finns favor nuclear energy, and only about 
25% vote against it.” (page 26) 
Event 5: 
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“Even if no more reactors will be built on Hästholmen, the town will still be remembered as the first atom town in 
Finland. Public perception to nuclear energy in Loviisa has remained surprisingly positive throughout the last 50 years. 
Latest surveys show that vast majority of the members of the town council would welcome a new reactor any day. 
Those who oppose nuclear energy, usually support alternative energy source. Today there is a plan to build a large 
windmill park right next to Hästholmen (Rosenberg 2004).”  (page 52) 
 
In the USA, poll surveys on public opinion about nuclear energy were already done in the 50’s 
(showing a large majority of people having no fear of having a plant located in their community). 
(General narrative) 
One poll published before 1962 (in 1956) showed 69% of Americans had no fear of having a plant located in their 
community.(Erskine, 1963) 
(General narrative, p.18) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In Spain quite a number of public opinion polls have been found (at the national and the local 
level) since 1978 (not before), but with little consistency in terms of the survey design therefore 
limiting the possibilities for longitudinal analysis. 
General Narrative: 
“Opinion polls can provide useful insights on public attitudes towards nuclear energy and its changes (if any) through 
time, both at the national and at the local level. Notably, although quite a number of public opinion polls have been 
found (at the national and the local level) there is little consistency in terms of the survey design, its specific objectives, 
and the sampling. Thus, the polls have addressed a quite wide range of diverse nuclear related issues in different 
historical moments, so there are strong limitations in terms of historical and comparable data or longitudinal analysis.  
Even though, the available evidence does provide a useful overview of the Spaniards opinion’ towards nuclear. 
(…) 
 
Opinion surveys were used in Sweden to gain knowledge of public attitudes towards nuclear 
power after the Chernobyl accident. (Event 4) 
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
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Mass-media gave generous coverage to the increased radiation levels, and this caused much anxiety (page 21). Also, 
the poll institutes registered a large increase of negative attitudes to nuclear power (page 49). 
 
Opinions surveys were conducted in the UK to find the degree of public support for new nuclear 
plants. (Event 5) 
Event 5: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
“A public opinion survey conducted in 1977 found that whilst a majority of the public were in favour of the construction 
of nuclear plants (49% to 32%), this dropped to a tie (43%, with fewer ‘don’t knows’) when the interviewee was first 
asked to consider the problem of nuclear waste.” (page 42).  
 
In Ukraine post-Chernobyl surveys about public attitudes towards nuclear power had been also 
used in order to better understand the protests and the moratorium vote trends (Event 2). The 
public authorities tried to keep the protest movement under surveillance, and, unsuccessfully, to 
control and limit its scope.  
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
“An important survey of public opinion was conducted in 1990 by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the All-Union 
Center for the Study of Public Opinion on the attitudes of the people towards nuclear power. It focused on the 
population around several nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union (in Ukraine it was the case of the Khmelnytska 
NPP). The results showed a rather even split of the population in favour and against the development of the nuclear 
power (up to 40% in each case). Another opinion poll, ordered by the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, was 
conducted in 1991. It included the population around Zaporizhzhya and South-Ukrainian power plants, where up to 
80% of residents of the 30km zone around NPPs were against the continued operation of the plants.” (page 42-43). 
“State and party officials tried to keep the protest movement under surveillance, and, unsuccessfully, to control and 
limit its scope.” (page 42). 
“To remediate the public distrust towards nuclear power one needs to produce a better informed and educated public 
(page 44). 
“Another opinion poll, ordered by the Soviet Ministry of Atomic Energy, was conducted in 1991. It included the 
population around Zaporizhzhya and South Ukraine stations where up to 80% of residents in the 30km zone around the 
NPPs were against their continued operation (Gedroits 1991; Tsentr obshchestvennoi informatsii 1991a). The 
sociologists also claimed to identify a negative link between levels of education and what respondents knew about 
nuclear power and the fears they expressed with regard to its development.” (page 42-43) 
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According to the USA report, surveys testing the public opinion towards nuclear energy had been 
reported several times in the SCR. (General narrative, p. 11, 19-20). 
Further, in the 1970s, as more and more experts and groups entered controversies over nuclear power, citing, safety 
and so on, the public grew restive and confused, and this contributed to the decline of nuclear power by effectively 
tarnishing the reputation of experts.(Balogh, 1991)  Balogh concludes that government officials must open the policy-
making process fully in the early stages and “test for demand rather than seek to create it artificially”(Balogh, 1991:  
326). 
(General narrative, p. 11) 
 
In 1984 OTA published Nuclear Power in an Age of Uncertainty that considered “Public Attitudes Toward Nuclear 
Power.”  The study noted that “public attitudes toward nuclear power have become increasingly negative over the past 
two decades, with the most recent polls indicating that a slight majority of Americans opposes further construction of 
reactors.”  In the 1950s pollsters hardly studied the issue, while in the 1960s several opinion polls noted that less than 
a quarter of the public opposed nuclear power.   
(General narrative, p.19) 
 
The accident at TMI led to a sudden decease in the percentage of people who had been in favor of or uncertain about 
continued construction of reactors, with the percentage opposed increasing.  Polls since mid-1982 indicated a slow 
erosion in support for nuclear power with over 50 percent opposed, and a large majority opposed construction of new 
plants in or near their communities.  Nuclear was even less appealing than offshore oil drilling and coal plants, nuclear 
is now the least favored alternative.  In spite of a majority finding nuclear power as potentially unsafe, many people 
saw it as a solution to the country’s long-term energy problems, and the majority rejected a halt to new construction or 
a permanent shutdown of all operating reactors. (OTA, 1984:  chapter 8) 
(General narrative, p. 19-20) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Bulgaria a research consultation sponsored by the public authorities and carried out by a social 
sciences firm was used to decide how to proceed with the nuclear sector when joining the 
European Union (Event 4). 
Event 4: Initial negotiations and contract with the European Union for memberships – 1993- 2004 
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A sociological agency MBMD conducted a research consultation about the invitation from the European Union for 
membership included a question about to what extent population with the statement: Membership in EU needs 
sacrifices and privations now, but its worth for the future?”  (results were 23,9% fully agree, 34,7 rather agree, 15,8 
rather disagree, 11,4% totally disagree, 14,2% without answer). In this period Bulgarian society sees the EU 
membership as better opportunity than keeping the nuclear industry in its former scale (page 41). 
 
The Spanish SCR describes the nature and evolution of the topics of interest for the institutions 
commissioning knowledge on public opinion. (risk perception starts to be important since the 90’s, 
environmental benefits arise as a topic also by 1997, etc.) (General narrative, p. 58-59). 
General Narrative: 
The nature and the evolution of the topics of interest for the institutions commissioning social research on nuclear 
energy in Spain can also provide insights in terms of the issues in the public arena. For instance, it is worth mentioning 
that during the first years most surveys dealt with the understanding and perception of radiation issues. NIMBY (Not in 
My Backyard) does not emerge as a topic until 1990; risk perception becomes crucial from 1993 (including the 
perception of both health and environmental risks); support to research in nuclear energy and the related investment is 
first addressed until 1997; environmental benefits arise as a topic also by 1997, etc.” (pages 58-59) 
 
A public opinion survey was done in Ukraine to know the support of people to a NPP project. 
Event 4: Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and public hearings on the completion of the 
Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors in exchange (1994-2000) 
“Finally referring to the results of the alternative public hearings organized by NGOs, as well as public opinion poll done 
by SOCIS – Gallup International in April 2000, they emphasized the lack of people support of the project (only 14% of 
the respondents supported the project according to the poll).” (page 51). 
 
Poll research to test the social support for nuclear energy was also mentioned in the USA SCR. 
According to the Gallup polling organization, nuclear power seemed fully to recover its standing among citizens in the 
1990s and 2000s, with those in support of maintaining nuclear energy in a strong majority, even after the Fukushima 
disaster until 2016. (Newport, 2012, Reffkin, 2016).   
(General narrative, p. 20) 
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B.2.2. Referenda 
There are several references to popular referenda in the SCRs considered. Some of these were 
consultative but others had a compulsory effect. 
 Period 1950-1970 
No mention of this dimension in the SCRs for this period. 
 Period 1970-1990 
An advisory referendum was held in Sweden (1980), partly in response to the TMI accident 
(Event 2). Despite the result, the Parliament decided to continue nuclear expansion in the short 
run, but to phase out all nuclear power by the year 2010. A full phase out did not occur. 
General narrative 
“In the following years nuclear issues were very high on the political agenda. In 1980, partly in response to the TMI 
accident, an advisory referendum on nuclear power was organized. The referendum campaign engaged hundreds of 
thousands of activists. The outcome was a defeat for the anti-nuclear side. Parliament decided to continue nuclear 
expansion in the short run, but to phase out all nuclear power by the year 2010. In the 1980s Sweden became the 
country with most nuclear power per capita in the world, and it still is. A full phase out did not occur.” (page 4). 
 
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
“The nuclear friendly parties in Parliament - the Social Democrats, the Conservatives and the Liberals – were still 
negative about a referendum and argued that the nuclear issue was too technically complicated for a referendum. To 
put political pressure behind the demand for a referendum the FMA in the beginning of March 1979 launched a 
nationwide campaign to collect signatures on a petition for a referendum. On March 28, in the midst of this campaign, 
the Three Miles Island accident occurred, and all Swedish mass media reported extensively about it. The accident had 
a major impact on the public opinion, and a week later, Olof Palme, the party leader of the Social Democrats 
announced that he and his party had changed stance and now supported a referendum. The Conservatives and 
Liberals soon followed suit. For these parties a referendum was a way to separate the nuclear issue from partisan 
politics, thus preventing the TMI accident from becoming a big issue in the upcoming elections in September 1979. The 
decision to organize a referendum was complemented by a decision to postpone the fuel loading of four new reactors 
until after the referendum (Fjaestad 2008). (…) The details of the referendum were decided after the general elections, 
which brought a new non-socialist coalition into office, with Fälldin as Prime Minister. After negotiations among the five 
parties in Parliament, an agreement was reached in mid-December 1979. When demanding a referendum, the FMA 
had foreseen a straight forward referendum with two alternatives, one for a phase-out and one for a continued 
expansion of nuclear power. However, the pro-nuclear parties split into two alternatives instead of one, for tactical 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
204 
reasons. The Social Democrats did not want to support the same alternative as the Conservatives. There were thus 
going to be three alternatives in the referendum that was to take place on March 23, 1980. Line 1 was supported by the 
Conservative Party, Line 2 by the Social Democrats and the Liberals and Line 3 by the Center Party and the 
Communists (and the FMA). Each of the three lines was given 18 MSEK to finance its campaign.” (pages 27-28)  
 
In USA in the 70’s substantial majorities of the public still favored nuclear power, even as anti-
nuclear referenda appeared on ballots in eight States. 
In the 1970s substantial majorities of the public still favored nuclear power, even as anti-
nuclear referenda appeared on ballots in eight States 
(General narrative, p. 19) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
A referendum was held in Bulgaria (2013) after several years of public debate among pro and 
anti-nuclear supporters (Event 5). Although the proposal won in most of the territories, it didn’t 
reach the minimum turnout of 60% to be valid. 
Event 5: Referendum for constructing new atomic power plant in Bulgaria- 2013 
Regulators started the discussion about this in 2000, when a group of professors and intellectuals established a “Civil 
Committee for defence of Kozloduy NPP”. The chair of this committee was Doctor Stefan Vodenicharov. This 
committee aimed to engage the public with the problem of the safety condition of the first four reactors and to 
renegotiate their fate. In fact this committee served the interests of the socialist party, which represented the old 
political regime. These activists tried to collect over 500.000 signs in order to have the referendum (page 43). 
 
In Sweden a local referendum was also organized by local politicians in the two municipalities’ 
proposed as candidates to host a nuclear waste repository, and in both places a clear majority 
voted against it (Event 5). 
Event 5: A competition for getting a repository 
“Existing geological data, e.g. from prospecting for mines, were analysed in detail, and also other conditions were 
assessed. SKB came to the conclusion that both places could be suitable for a repository. However, local opposition 
had emerged in both places and it became so strong that the local politicians in both places decided to organize a local 
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referendum. In both places a clear majority voted against a future repository (Lidskog 1998).” (page 53).  
 
In Ukraine a local referendum was held in the towns near a NPP (1994) (Event 3). 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“One of the highlights of the campaign was a local referendum on Zaporizhzhia NPP that took place in June 1994 in 
the largest towns situated in the 30 km zone around the station: Nikopol, Marganets and Kamenka – Dneprovskaia. 
More than 90% of participants voted against the completion of the unit 6 of the NPP, against the construction of spent 
fuel storage facility there, and against the exchange of the water between its cooling ponds in the Dnipro River.” (page 
46). 
 
 
B.3. Participation  
Public participation involves information exchange between members of the public and sponsors. 
The most significant feature of a participatory engagement is that there is some degree of 
dialogue in the process. The flow of information is two-way, with the exchange of information 
opening up the possibility of perception and attitude change in both the sponsors and the public 
(Rowe & Frewer 2005). Although there are few participatory mechanisms in the strict sense in the 
SCRs, in this section we outline some initiatives incorporating a participatory dimension (since 
they allow other actors to influence decision making). 
 
B.3.1. Public hearings, informative meetings, and debates 
Some SCRs included references to processes based on informative and deliberative meetings, 
stakeholders’ panels and other types of local public debates.  
 Period 1950-1970 
In Sweden a study group representing both opponents and proponents of atomic weapons was 
created, generating recommendations for government policy (Event 1). 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy 
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 “A special study group was setup to formulate a compromise. This compromise partly led to the dissolution of AMSA, 
which was replaced by a new political organization - inspired by the British CND - organizing protest marches and other 
public events.” (page 39). 
 
In the UK, after the Windscale fire (1957) concerns raised locally were addressed by public 
meetings organised by the promoters’ staff, as well as in meetings with local farmers concerned 
about potential risks to their livestock (Event 3). These meetings provided feedback on the 
perceptions and experiences of locally affected people. 
Event 3: Windscale Fire 1957 
“Public information about the fire was heavily restricted and controlled by the government. There was intense 
newspaper coverage of the events; however, this was dependent on the release of information from government.” 
(page 37). 
“Concerns raised locally were addressed by public meetings organised by Windscale staff, and meetings with local 
farmers concerned about the effects of the fallout on their livestock.(Arnold, 1992; Stretch, 2002) Although a milk ban 
was in place for a month farmers were protected from financial damage by compensation by the government 
(distributed through the Milk Marketing Board).” (page 36). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In Sweden, information meetings with experts of pro and anti-nuclear issues were organized, 
sometimes leading to the conclusion of giving up a siting process (Event 3). 
Event 3: Local protests against a repository 
“The local politicians in both places did their very best to convince SKB about the advantages of their place. SKB arranged a 
number of meetings and consultations with local people in both places to inform them about how the repository would be 
built.” (page 53). 
“After the first attempt to set up a proof drilling site had failed, the organization that was responsible for the proof 
drillings, PRAV, organized several information meetings when their experts explained the principles of the intended 
repository. But Save Kynnefjäll enrolled counter experts that questioned these experts and the local population 
remained hostile to drillings. As a result PRAV decided to give up its attempts to establish a drilling site there.” (page 
45). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
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In Spain, since 2000 local information committees have been created in all the NPPS, which 
included representatives of the main stakeholders. These are official participatory bodies. In the 
meanwhile, similar bodies (local information commissions) were created by the municipalities. 
Informative committees and Joint Commissions including mayors, social representatives and 
regulators were constituted in potential nuclear siting villages (Showcase, Events 2 and 5). Some 
environmental movements did not agree with the way in which such committees functioned (they 
considered them biased). 
General narrative 
“Since 2000, Local Information Committees have been opened in all operative NPPs, a kind of information bodies 
composed of a representative of the Ministry of Industry, the owner of the facility, the Nuclear Safety Council 
(regulator), the Government Delegations and the regional public authorities where the installation is located, the 
General Directorate of Civil Protection and the Municipalities included in Zone 1 defined in the corresponding 
emergency plans. Its functions are to inform the different entities represented about the development of some of the 
activities (only those regulated in the corresponding authorizations) and to jointly deal with those other issues of interest 
to said entities. In this sense, it is an organ that allows a certain participation of several actors (basically members of 
the nuclear industry and of the public authorities in its different levels, whereas the social movements and other citizen 
sectors are not represented). In 2005 the AMAC created other similar bodies (Local Information Commissions) but also 
including cultural, business and union associations in the area. There were plans to coordinate both type of bodies 
(Local Information Committees and Local Information Commissions).” (page 63). 
Event 5: NWR 
“The site for the nuclear waste repository is the first example of a selection process for a site which aspired to be 
inclusive and consensual. The range of the parties involved - public and private, local, regional, national and 
supranational - was very wide indeed. The Government promoted the creation of Local Committees of Information in 
the candidate villages, as suggested by COWAM (Community Waste Management).” (page 58).  
“Environmental associations, such as Greenpeace or Ecologistas en Acción, become active actors in terms of 
engaging with process, as follows: started a litigation questioning the formal procedure of the contract; criticised the 
performance of the Nuclear Safety Council (CSN); and denounced relevant risks involved in the transport of waste as it 
passes through 216 municipalities.” (page 57) 
 
In Sweden, Regulators strived to engage the local receptors in their studies. In the first failed 
strategy, the two selected municipalities showed a local opposition, but in the two municipalities 
which already had local power plants, the strategy was successful and many locals were actively 
involved in deliberations. (Event 5, p. 52-54). 
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Event 5: A competition for getting a repository 
“After a long evalution process SKB reached the decision in 2009 that Östhammar would be the best place for the future 
repository for geological reasons. They simultaneously decided that the future plant for constructing copper canisters for the 
spent fuel would be located next to the existing interim storage facility in Oskarshamn.” (page 52) 
 “The local politicians in both places did their very best to convince SKB about the advantages of their place. SKB 
arranged a number of meetings and consultations with local people in both places to inform them about how the 
repository would be build. After a long evalution process SKB reached the decision in 2009 that Östhammar would be 
the best place for the future repository for geological reasons.” (page 53).  
“When SKB turned to two municipalities with nuclear power plants both politicians and a large part of the population 
were favourable to a repository and even a sort of contest emerged between them.” (page 54). 
 
In the UK an extensive consultation was organised by the regulators in order to address concerns 
about nuclear energy and provide more information, based on citizen’s panels and focus groups, 
which indicated public acceptance of companies investing in nuclear power (Event 7). The ‘public 
consultation’ process organised by the regulators fed back into policy decisions being made by 
BERR (Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) and did have an impact on 
the 2008 Energy White Paper on Nuclear Power. Regulators concluded that nuclear power might 
result an unattractive option due to economics. This made governments to take a decision based 
in a public consultation. The promoters/regulators of nuclear power looked for the energy policies 
and due to their concerns on climate change the put again in the political agenda the issue of 
nuclear power. The controversial debate on nuclear power made difficult to get success on the 
effort for public engagement. Moreover, receptors led by the environmental organisations did not 
attend them believing the decision had already been taken. They were lacking trust on the 
consultation procedures. 
Event 7: Government repositioning on new build NPPs 2006 
“In 2003 the Department of Trade and Industry’s White Paper concluded that the economics of nuclear made it ‘an 
unattractive option for new, carbon-free generating capacity’ and pledged that ‘Before any decision to proceed with the 
building of new nuclear power stations, there would need to be the fullest public consultation and the publication of a 
white paper setting out the Government’s proposals.” (page 50). 
“An extensive consultation was organised by the regulators in order to address concerns on the nuclear energy and 
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provide more information. The following 2008 Energy White Paper on Nuclear Power, published details of its extensive 
consultations in detail. Multiple agencies were contracted to host and analyse citizen’s panels and focus groups 
which would indicate public acceptance of allowing companies to invest in nuclear power. Couched in terms of the 
governments’ response to climate change, the public were asked their opinions on the safety and reliability of nuclear 
power compared with renewable sources, and the extent to which the UK should seek to replace (or increase) its 
nuclear generating capacity. Replies were mixed, highlighting moral concerns about nuclear power, but also indicating 
a reluctant acceptance that nuclear power was a necessary part of the energy mix in a low-carbon economy.” (page 49) 
 
In Ukraine a series of public consultation and public participation procedures were implemented 
in Ukraine. Several public hearings were organized by regulators and promoters in the villages 
situated in the vicinity of the proposed NPPs. Ukrainian environmental and anti-nuclear NGOs 
actively participated in these meetings, but some of these movements also organized alternative 
hearings. (Event 4, p. 50-51). 
Event 4: Controversial negotiations on the closure of the Chernobyl NPP and public hearings on the completion of the 
Kmelnitsky 2-Rivne 4 nuclear reactors in exchange (1994-2000) 
“As for the completion of the K2-R4 reactors, according to the EBRD rules regulating investment projects, a series of 
public consultation and public participation procedures were implemented. EBRD representatives organized a number 
of round-tables and consultations with different stakeholders: government officials, representatives of different nuclear 
organizations as well as NGOs. Several public hearings were organized as part of the environmental impact 
assessment of K2-R4 in cities and villages situated in the vicinity of the plants. Ukrainian environmental and anti-
nuclear NGOs actively participated in these hearings. They criticized the hearings as events organized as a “mere 
formality” as opposed to attempts really to take into account the opinion of the local population (Pasyuk 2016). Several 
local NGOs organized alternative hearings that, according to activists, showed very critical attitudes of local population 
towards the construction project (Fedorynchyk 2000).” (pages 50-51) 
 
 
 
 
B.4. Public-initiated engagement’ 
What we called ‘public-initiated engagement’ refers to the communicative actions directed from 
the public to regulators, public authorities or nuclear companies. Usually these initiatives 
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mobilized large numbers of people, mainly activists, and they could be expressed as public 
demonstrations on the street and other social mobilizations (as collecting signatures, etc.), 
sometimes including violence and/or illegal acts. 
 
B.4.1. Signature collection 
The SCRs revealed a number of occasions in which signatures were used to try to communicate 
public disquiet about a nuclear development. Collecting signatures appealing against the siting or 
the construction of nuclear facilities has become one of the usual instruments of the affected 
people and social movements (receptors). Sometimes the signatures are collected to ask for a 
referendum on nuclear issues. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In Sweden the social movements collected signatures for a plea for a referendum on nuclear 
weapons (Event 1); and also for a referendum on nuclear power after the TMI incident (Event 2). 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy 
“The group made a plea for a referendum on nuclear weapons, and started to gather signatures for their plea, but 
were not able to muster the necessary number of signatures. When this campaign failed, the group more or less 
dissolved.” (page 11). 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
In Germany people against the project of building a NPP collected and submitted 100.000 
signatures (Event 2). 
Event 2: Wyhl (planned but never built nuclear reactor) 
“A year later it became publicly known that a new site in Wyhl had been found, which was only a few kilometers away 
from the original site and caused direct opposition again, this time well organized. In 1973 and 1974 some 100,000 
signatures and appeals against the construction of the nuclear power plant were submitted, including to the federal 
minister of the interior, who at that time was Werner Maihofer (FDP, liberals).” (page 25). 
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In Spain, social movements against a NPP collected signatures among university experts, and 
several times they collected more of half a million of signatures (Event 2). 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
“They (Receptors) used a variety of protest actions as signature collection (over 150,000), and informative lectures.” 
(page 47). 
Event 5: NWR 
“Social movements pro NWR performed signature collection and demonstrations.”(page 58). 
 
In Sweden the social movements collected signatures also for a referendum on nuclear power 
after the TMI incident (Event 2). 
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
”The FMA had been established in March 1978 as an effort to create a national umbrella organization for the rather 
heterogeneous anti-nuclear movement. It encompassed a dozen organizations, some of which were non-political 
environmental or peace organizations, while others were political organizations.” (page 27).  
“To put political pressure behind the demand for a referendum the FMA in the beginning of March 1979 launched a 
nationwide campaign to collect signatures on a petition for a referendum.” (page 27) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Ukraine social movements (Greenpeace) collected signatures against the repeal of a 
moratorium and the construction of new reactors (Event 3). 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“Greenpeace, which established its local branch in Ukraine on the eve of the country’s independence, launched an anti-
nuclear campaign, with memorable activities such as  the  bus tour "No new reactors!" that aimed at informing people 
about the problems related to the pursuit of nuclear power in Ukraine and collected signatures against the repeal of 
the moratorium. They promote the collection of over 15,000 signatures against the construction of new reactors 
that were later transmitted to the Rada of Ukraine.” (page 45-46) 
 
B.4.2. Demonstrations and social mobilizations on the street 
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The main way in which the population has shown their rejection of NPPs and tried to influence the 
decision making on nuclear energy is through public demonstrations on the streets. All of the 
selected countries’ SCRs include references to this type of public action, often described as 
occurring with some degree of violence. Large protests and confrontations with police were 
continuously organised to show opposition to nuclear facilities and developments. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In the USA, in the 60’s, the public opposition of the Committee Against Nuclear Power Plants 
eventually influenced the withdrawing of the application for a construction permit of a NPP in New 
York (Ravenswood project) (Showcase, p. 22). During these same years public protests were 
crucial to Preserve Bodega Bay in California (protesters had grown to about 800 members 
opposing a NPP project).  
One of the first controversies concerned the application of the Consolidated Edison (ConEd), Inc. – one of the largest 
investor-owned electrical companies in the US that provides electricity to New York City, to build a 1,000 MW NPP in 
Ravenswood, Queens, only two miles from the UN.  (…)  The group “CANPOP” -- Committee Against Nuclear Power 
Plants -- formed to protest.  ConEd’s Ravenswood application made the AEC consider more systematically whether to 
permit the construction of nuclear power plants in large cities.  Eventually ConEd withdrew its application for a 
construction permit.(Mazuzan, 1986) 
(Showcase, p. 22) 
Public involvement was crucial here.  By December 1963 the Northern California Association to Preserve Bodega 
Head and Harbor had grown to about 800 members who opposed the station.  Many people believe its success had 
much to do with the efforts of its executive secretary, David Pesonen, a man who wrote extensively, including an 
editorial critical of Price-Anderson in New Republic in 1965.  Pesonen worked at the Sierra Club and represented it at 
hearings on Bodega Bay at the California Public Utilities Commission.  Personen noted that the reactor would be only 
a few hundred feet of the San Andreas fault, and even PG&E experts admitted that a major earthquake like the 1906 
San Francisco earthquake was possible within a century.  Yet those experts believed that they could build an NPP to 
withstand an earthquake of major proportions, and insisted on the “absence of active faults.”(Walker, 1990)  As 
protests grew, PG&E played hardball accusing the association of being a communist front organization. 
(Showcase, p. 23) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
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In Bulgaria, after Chernobyl accident, the lack of any information provided to the public led to 
protests against nuclear establishments (Event 3, p. 38). The creation of opposition voices was 
first leading to information request on the consequences that were not duly communicated – the 
issue of on time communication. A spontaneous reaction to environmental problems conformed 
Ekoglasnost as a social movement very influential in the country debates. 
Event 3: Reaction of the Green movement to the Chernobyl accident  
“Activists in Ekoglasnot demanded mainly information about the environmental pollution caused by big technological 
projects and the Chernobyl accident. It was the first free public reaction related to nuclear power program. In 1989 
started as spontaneous reaction to environmental problems. Regarding public participation, as Bulgarian green 
activists protested against the inadequate measures of the Communist party after Chernobyl accident and the lack of 
any information provided to the public. This led to protests against nuclear establishments in the state. Other 
mentioned activities that receptors did to protest about the criminal behaviour of the communist ruling elite finally shed 
light on the truth, being one of the themes was named Future without atom. From this moment onward, environmental 
problems became matter of public discussions and forums in otherwise closed totalitarian society.” (page 38). 
 
In the F.R. Germany the opposition against nuclear power has been specially strong and violent, 
and numerous protests and communication activities coming from opponents were repeatedly 
organised over the country (General narrative, p. 13; Showcase, p. 19). The site for an interim 
storage unit for dry cask storage was built between 1981 and 1983 in the face of massive 
protests and collisions with police (Event 4, p. 30-31), and ended with many injuries among 
protesters. Besides, in Germany (events 2, p.25; and 3, p. 27) site occupation appears as a kind 
of mechanism different of the demonstrations, or rather, a different operationalisation of this 
protest mechanism. (i.e. in 1974, at Wyhl, West Germany, 28,000 people occupied the site of a 
proposed nuclear station to stop its construction in a nature preserve, and people remained on 
site until the project was abandoned). 
General narrative 
”Historiography has given various reasons why the opposition against nuclear power was generally strong in Germany 
and also violent at times. Historians found answers in Germany’s national socialist past, which might have resulted in a 
strong skepticism towards the authorities as well as a lack of religious influences in the movement, as can be found in 
the United States.” (page 13). 
Showcase: Scientific-technical institute for reactor construction (WTBR) and research centre for limnology 
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“Soon criticism arose about the building of the fast breeder, based on doubts about the safety of nuclear energy, and in 
1974 around a thousand people, predominantly from the Netherlands, took to the streets. A mass rally three years later 
was attended by 40,000 people (some authors speak of 50,000 [Tompkins, Grassroot(s) 2016, 129] or even 60,000 
people, [Mende 2011, 332]) from France, the Netherlands and West Berlin. The police presence is regarded as the 
biggest in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The police were extremely violent and many demonstrators 
felt they were treated like terrorists.” (page 19).  
 
Event 2: Whyl (planned but never built nuclear reactor) 
“This did not change the political decision at first and on 17 February 1975 the construction of the first reactor was 
started even though the final license for the building of the nuclear power plant had not yet been granted. This 
provoked opposition again, mostly from local people, many of them wine farmers, who spontaneously occupied the site 
and were supported in their resistance by activists from the nearby town of Fribourg. Crucial to this resistance was the 
successful fight against the erection of a lead chemical plant in Marckolsheim in neighboring French Alsace on the 
other side of the river Rhine.” (page 25). 
Event 3: Wackersdorf (planned but never built reprocessing plant) 
“Even though other possible sites were debated, Wackersdorf was chosen because a “high potential of protest […] 
(was) not to be expected” (Schardinger 2012, 18). In 1985 the DWK finally decided on Wackersdorf as appropriate 
location for the construction site and announced the development plan. After the clearing of the woodland had started, 
a major demonstration with 30,000 people took place in Wackersdorf. Demonstrators occupied the building site, 
erected a hut village, and called it “Freies Wackerland” (free Wackerland) (Knoll 2006). Citizens’ initiatives, such as the 
Mothers Against Nuclear Power, raised objections to the reprocessing plant at a hearing in Neunburg. Here, they 
claimed for themselves and their families, especially their children, the fundamental right to life, health, physical 
integrity, and free development of their personality, which they did not see as being guaranteed if the reprocessing 
plant was build (Wurzbacher 1988, 1).” (page 27) 
Event 4: Gorleben repository site 
“The site for an interim storage unit for dry cask storage was built between 1981 and 1983 in the face of massive 
protests and collisions with police. Protesters suffered from fractured ribs, insured kidneys, fractured heads, and 
blinded eyes that were caused by water guns (Geisler 2010). Opponents of the transports were systematically spied on 
by police and the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counter Terrorism (Verfassungsschutz 2001). Because of 
litigations and massive protests, the plant only started operating in 1995 with the first so-called Castor (cask for storage 
and transport of radioactive material) transport.” (page 30-31). 
 
In Spain, anti-nuclear activist began to be more visible after the end of Franco’s dictatorship (mid-
seventies) with informative sessions, concentrations and parades (General narrative, p. 17). 
During this period, in Spain, big demonstrations in the street against nuclear projects were going 
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in parallel with terrorist attacks causing human victims and material harms (Event 2, p. 43; Event 
3, p. 47). 
General narrative 
“But even before Franco’s dead, there were unstructured informal social groups, with strong leadership from small 
group charismatic people, which pushed for the formal complaints by local authorities in most of almost 20 locations 
where there were talks for a nuclear project. Some civil strategies, illegal within the dictatorship -meetings, pamphlets, 
demonstrations, parades, voluntary confinement, etc. - would spring after the dead of the dictator in 1975. Opposition 
to nuclear power also came from people within the Franco’s regime (mayors, provincial governments, religious 
associations, agricultural unions, etc.).” (page 17).  
Showcase: Valdecaballeros NPP (built but never operative reactor) 
“The local government and the utilities tried to continue with the building of the NPP. According to the Mayor of the 
town: “Workers mobilized with strikes, people were very worried, some assemblies in the town hall, meeting with the 
government of Extremadura, we occupied the church… we did a lot of things but they weren’t useful at all” [they were 
protesting against the nuclear moratorium that stopped the NPP].” (page28-29). 
Event 2: Ascó 
“In March 1978, the opponents organised the first antinuclear demonstration in Barcelona, in which more than 50,000 
people took part, demanding a nuclear moratorium and a stop to Spain’s National Energy Programme. In June 1978, 
on the occasion of the International Day against Nuclear Energy, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in Barcelona 
against nuclearizing the country.” (page 42). 
With the support of an extreme left wing break-away circles a series of violent actions (about 30 actions from 1980 until 
1992) were perpetrated by the terrorists’ movement “Terra Lliure” (Free Land) against companies that owned the plant 
(page 41) 
“This resulted in campaigns which were directed towards international institutions and autonomous communities with 
the GCTPFNN as unifying group. Some of the mottos of the campaigns include: “Let’s not Nuclearize the Climate” (“No 
nuclearitzem el clima”, 2000), “Sustainable Nuclear? By No Means, 2001 (“Nuclear sostenible? de cap manera”, 2001), 
European Petition against the use of radioactive weapons) “Petició Europea contra la utilització d’armes radioactives. 
(page 43) 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement 
“Demonstrations of more than 50 thousand people took place these years (late 70s and early 80s) (some of the 
largest demonstrations in the Basque Country after the Civil War).” (page 47). 
“The whole period 1977-1983 settled with 13 deaths. To those ETA added other kidnappings, more than 300 bombs on 
the electricity network, Iberduero offices and, other companies involved in the construction of the plant. The clandestine 
sabotage of the works of the plant produced serious doubt on safety of ever operating the plant.” (page 47). 
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In the case of Sweden, several references to local opposition and large public demonstrations are 
identified. For instance, the referendum campaign became a mass movement of grassroots 
activists all over Sweden (Event 2, p. 17). Protests against a repository by local activists became 
a process of local mass campaigns but they also erected blockades and stolen materials (Event 
3, p. 47-48). And when Chernobyl accident took place hundred of demonstrations were arranged 
in many places all over Sweden, with thousand people demanding the phasing out of nuclear 
projects (Event 4, p. 50). 
Event 2: TMI and the referendum on nuclear power 
“The referendum campaign dominated political life and the mass media for several months. The Line 3 campaign 
became a mass movement of grassroots activists all over Sweden. They organized demonstrations, public meetings, 
distributed campaign newspapers, and knocked doors to talk with ordinary people.” (page 17) 
Event 3: Local protests against a repository 
”These local organizations primarily campaigned locally to get support for their opposition, but at a few times also used 
illegal methods, like erecting blockades and stealing materials from proof borings to let their counter experts analyze 
them.” (page 48) 
“These groups not only held meetings and created strong local oppositions; they also formed a network called the 
Waste Chain, which engaged critical geologists, chemists and engineers in a critique of the KBS method at large.” 
(page 47).  
“SKB was aware of the importance of the reactions of local population and their first strong reaction against the 
repository location, they changed their exploration site strategy towards a more public engagement process. SKB 
reached the conclusion that it would be impossible to establish a repository at a site where the local population was 
strongly against it. (page 47)  
Event 4: Chernobyl and its effects in Sweden 
“When the Chernobyl disaster occurred, the anti-nuclear movement was thus severely weakened after several years of 
decay. The disaster led to a revival. The former members put on their ”nuclear power – no thanks” badges again, and 
in mid May 1986, demonstrations were arranged in many places all over Sweden, and ten thousand people gathered in 
central Stockholm demanding an immediate start of the phasing out of nuclear power.” (page 50). 
 
In the UK, the environmental movement Greenpeace staged non-violent protests, blocking at-
sea-disposal by the UKAEA using their boat Rainbow Warrior. (Event 5, p. 43) 
Event 5: Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 1976 
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“Greenpeace staged non-violent protests, blocking at-sea-disposal by the UKAEA using their boat Rainbow Warrior. 
Greenpeace established links with the National Union of Seamen, whose members then refused to work on UKAEA 
boats carrying nuclear waste. This direct action changed UK policy from one of at-sea-disposal to one of dry-storage.” 
(page 43).  
 
In Ukraine, during the 3-4 years after the Chernobyl accident popular protests on the street 
increased, leading to a moratorium on the construction of new NPPs (Showcase, p. 38). Some 
years later, local public protests were organized also in order to protest against a NPP. Among 
receptors, the almost three-year-long cover-up of the impact and scale of the Chernobyl accident 
radioactive fall-out ended with an explosion of popular protests in 1989 (Event 2, p. 38). 
Showcase: Dealing with the Chernobyl disaster aftermath 
“Such environmental groups as Zelenyi Svit, Mama-86, grew rapidly in 1988-1990, and sought to establish an 
independent Ukraine as a nuclear free zone. Anti-nuclear mobilization on local level and in Kyiv contributed to a 
moratorium on the construction and commissioning of new nuclear power units by the Ukrainian Parliament in August 
1990.” (page 38). 
Event 2: Post-Chernobyl anti-nuclear protests and vote on the moratorium on the construction of the new nuclear 
reactors (1989-1991) 
“The extent of the disaster was finally revealed to the general public in 1989, an important mobilization took place to 
denounce the mismanagement of Chernobyl disaster by Soviet authorities and to claim better protection and 
compensation for affected population (page 38). 
 
In the USA, one of the first massive public protests against nuclear power gelled around the 
Diablo Canyon station. Eventually roughly 60 anti-nuclear groups and 30,000 people came 
together in protest. (Event 2, p. 33-34). Besides, the Clamshell Alliance, an umbrella organization 
of 15 anti-nuclear groups, was formed at a July 1976 with the goal of the halting the Seabrook 
NPP construction and to force cancelation of the project by any means necessary within the 
context of “non-violent direct action (Event 4, p. 44). Years later, in 1985, hundreds of 
demonstrators descended on the plant when PSNH began the first power tests in June 1985, with 
627 arrested for trespassing. 
Anti-nuclear groups worked together.  Eventually roughly 60 anti-nuclear groups and 30,000 people came together in 
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protest. 
(Event 2, p. 33) 
1981 Abalone Coalition Occupation of Diablo Canyon, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MPBtwfYcy-M (Irving, 1981) 
(Event 2, p. 33) 
One of the first public protests against nuclear power gelled around the Diablo Canyon station.  The Abalone Alliance 
(1977-1985) took its name from the multitudinous red abalone massacred in Diablo Canyon in 1974 when the utility 
carried out a hot flush of the reactor unit’s plumbing.  The Alliance, “a loose coalition of 60 anti-nuke organizations, 
staged blockades and occupations at the reactor site.  Nearly two thousand people were arrested during a two-week 
blockade in 1981, making this the largest number arrested at an anti-nuclear protest in the United States.  Perhaps as 
many as 30,000 protestors descended on the site.(Rogers, 1981) 
(Event 2, p. 34) 
In 1972 the company proposed to build two reactors on the Hampton-Seabrook estuary, of salt marshes and critical 
habitat for birds and other fauna, along the Atlantic Ocean in Seabrook, NH, the first to come online by 1979, the 
second in 1981, with a total cost of less than $1 billion. The plans generated extensive public opposition, protest, and 
occupation of the construction site by the Clamshell Alliance.  Protests continued into the 1990s.   
(Event 4, p. 43) 
In 1978 the Clamshell Alliance split after its Coordinating Committee (CC) agreed to call off a large civil disobedience 
planned at the power plant site in June, instead of obtaining input and consensus from regional Clam groups. The 
government of New Hampshire had negotiated the opportunity for the Alliance to hold pro-solar power and music 
festival at the Seabrook site to avoid bad publicity and the cost of law enforcement.  Twenty thousand people 
attended.  In response a more feeling that a massive arrest on the site would overwhelm the state, undermine support 
and finance for the Seabrook nuclear project, and also result in the costs of hiring police from neighboring states, 
incarcerating thousands of Clams and paying court expenses offered to let Clamshell hold a solar power fair and 
concert on the site. This proposal was eventually accepted by Clamshell and a highly successful rally of 20,000 people 
was held on the site with thousands of Clams also camped out on the Seabrook site. But the political consequences 
within Clamshell led to a split in the Alliance and the eventual formation of the Coalition for Direct Action that called for 
continued occupation. (Coalition for Direct Action, 1979) 
(Event 4, p. 44) 
In 1974, at Wyhl, West Germany, 28,000 people occupied the site of a proposed nuclear station to stop its 
construction in a nature preserve.  People remained on site until the project was abandoned.  Seeking similar results, 
The Clamshell Alliance, an umbrella organization of 15 anti-nuclear groups, was formed at a July 1976 meeting of 50 
people, almost all of whom were NH residents. The goal of the Alliance was to halt Seabrook construction and to force 
cancelation of the project by any means necessary within the context of “non-violent, direct action.”(Coalition for Direct 
Action, 1979) 
As soon as the NRC issued a construction license in summer 1976, 200 New England residents rallied at the edge of 
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the future power plant site, on the seacoast saltmarsh as the Clamshell Alliance, 18 of whom were arrested for 
“criminal trespass” and sentenced to time in jail. A week later, 188 other New England citizens returned to the 
Seabrook site; they too were arrested.  As one of the founders wrote, “By the early spring of April 1977, two thousand 
‘Clams,’ as they came to be known, had returned to the site to non-violently reclaim the land and declare the ocean 
front ‘nuclear free.”  Over the years dozens of clams were arrested for nonviolent civil disobedience at Seabrook in the 
effort to stop nuclear power, including two state legislators, one from Massachusetts and one from New 
Hampshire.(US NRC, 1979; Gunter, 1990) 
Hundreds of demonstrators descended on the plant when PSNH began the first power tests in June 1985, with 627 
arrested for trespassing.  The protesters included children and handicapped people.   
(Event 4, p. 46) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
According to the Spanish SCR, there where several examples about ecologist and social 
movements protesting in localities showing interest to host the facilities. (Event 5, p. 57) 
Event 5: NWR 
“People against the ATC made popular demonstrations, and information events..” (page 57) 
 
In Ukraine, environmental movements organized anti-nuclear pickets and public roundtables 
discusing the moratorium (in the 90’s), and they also hung a big banner on the cooling towers of a 
NPP to protest against the future development of nuclear power in the country. (Event 3, p. 46) 
Event 3: Vote on the repeal of the moratorium and relatively weak anti-nuclear protests (1993-1994) 
“Together with the members of such other NGOs as Zelenyi Svit and the Green Party of Ukraine they participated in 
numerous anti-nuclear pickets in Kyiv (in front of the Rada), wrote letters to the Rada, met with parliamentary 
representatives, and organized public roundtables discussing the moratorium (Pasyuk 2016; Tsvetkova 2016).” (page 
46).  
“In August 1994 Greenpeace Ukraine together with Zelenyi Svit activists in Nikopol hung a big banner “No more 
Chernobyls” on the cooling towers of the station to protest against the future development of nuclear power, and 
handed a protest note to the nuclear power plant management (Pasyuk 2016; Tsvetkova 20016; see also the video: 
Greenpeace Ukraine 1994).” (page 46). 
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B.4.3. Manifestos, books and other public communicative tactics 
Among the Receptors’ ‘public-initiated engagement’ we can also identify classic ways of 
disseminating messages and information, such as press releases, media interventions, edition of 
books, manifestos, etc. Social media deserves also a specific attention because it implies a fluid, 
reactive, constantly updating process, unlike traditional media communications which are one-
shot and indelible. Besides, sometimes mediatic celebrities or social significative persons were 
used by the Receptors to visibilize their demands. Hereby we show the initiatives of these kind 
found in the SCRs. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In Sweden the influence of some scientists writing articles in newspapers and contacting 
politicians seemed to have great influence in the decision making process (mainly from a 
perspective of maintaining peace) (General narrative, p. 15). 
General narrative 
“The single person that most strongly contributed to this shift was a scientist, Hannes Alfvén. He became increasingly 
critical of nuclear power and started writing articles in newspapers and contacting politicians. He even wanted to 
give a speech at the first UN conference on the Environment Alfvén soon became a very influential nuclear critique as 
his knowledge and insight could not easily be questioned. Also a number of other Swedish scientists and nuclear 
experts were influenced by the critique formulated by Alfvén and colleagues abroad, but as many of them worked 
(directly or indirectly) for the Swedish nuclear industry they were hesitant to formulate their critique publicly.” (page 14). 
“However, the growing criticism of nuclear power among scientists, politicians and environmental activists led to an intensive 
public debate. Many critical articles were published in large daily newspapers, the first critical books were published 
(Kågeson 1973) and environmental groups distributed many pamphlets and posters.” (page 15). 
 
Event 1: The atomic weapons controversy 
“It was very informal without any membership fees, no board and it was limited to the 21 people that joined from the 
beginning. These included some well-known authors, journalists and academics and the Arch Bishop. They had their 
sympathies with different political parties, but none of them was communist. One reason for not admitting more members 
was that AMSA did not want to be suspected to be a pro-communist organization. Moscow spurred communist parties in 
Western Europe to create peace organizations opposing nuclear weapons, and the Swedish Peace Committee was one of 
these.” (page 36). 
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 Period 1970-1990 
In the Spanish SCR there are references to articles and press interventions, books, support of 
celebrities, intellectuals, lawyers, etc. (General narrative, Events 2 and 3). 
General narrative 
The public voice could also be heard, especially in regions where building nuclear power plants had already 
commenced, and local press coverage brought lobbying by stakeholder groups into the public eye (page 17).  
The Environmental movements joined forces to write and distribute a book of over 600 pages explaining their position 
(page 31). 
Event 2: Ascó Nuclear Power Plant 
“The villagers did not react to this announcement until some of them came across an article by Mario Gaviria "La 
amenaza de la energía nuclear" (“The menace of nuclear energy” Triunfo, 2nd February 1974) on the potential danger 
of these installations. Some started worrying and founded a group that took a critical stance on the project during the 
ensuing pronuclear discussions. (…) Later the Comitè Antinuclear d’Ascó and the CARE drew up a new document in 
which they expounded their opposition to use water from the Ebro river to cool the NPP reactors.” (page 40). 
Event 3: Basque antinuclear movement: 
“Antinuclear activism hires a prestigious lawyer and began traveling through Europe seeking information, pursuing 
support from other municipalities in the province, from cultural organizations and, and from celebrities. (World’s 
renowned sculptor Eduardo Chillida designed the antinuclear logo).” (page 46) 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
The Spanish SCR includes also some cases of Internet social networks (twitter) and website 
resources used by actors pro and against a nuclear waste repository. 
Event 5: NWR 
“Actors pro and against the NWR sitting made a wide use of Twitter and website resources.” (page 57). 
 
In the USA report hundreds of activists sent letters asking state officials to oppose restarting 
Davis-Besse NPP (in 2004). Years later, in 2012, used a skit to protest in front of the NPP. 
In 2004 over 400 activists who sent letters last week asking state officials to oppose restarting Davis-Besse. In June 
2011 over 250 anti-nuclear protesters who braved the rain and wind to protest the continued operation of the Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant.  In January 2012 About 20 people participated in a skit in front Davis-Besse Nuclear 
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Power Station before they attended a public meeting about shield building cracks at the plant.  “We have nuclear-
grade duct tape, nuclear-grade Gorilla Glue and nuclear-grade spackling,” said Kevin Kamps, dressed as C. 
Montgomery Burns, the owner of the Springfield Nuclear Power Plant in “The Simpsons.” 
(Event 5, p. 49) 
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B.5. Other ways of influence on nuclear decision making: Legal, 
administrative and political routes 
The SCRs include some references to processes of legal actions and political pressures trying to 
influence the decision making on nuclear issues. Although these mechanisms do not imply a real 
participation because they do not allow a real debate among the actors, they are examples of 
other existing ways to influence decisions different to the engagement processes,  
In fact, in some cases the legal actions of affected municipalities (receptors) were able to 
influence decision making, even paralyzing certain projects. 
 Period 1950-1970 
In the USA, the relatively litigious American legal and administrative system permits interveners 
to exert influence on the technology assessment process, and many people have sought to 
participate in the regulatory process directly through petitions and lawsuits. (General narrative, p. 
18). 
The relatively litigious American legal and administrative system permits interveners to exert influence on the technology 
assessment process.  Building on the anti-war and environmental movements of the 1960s, and especially since the 1970s, 
the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and other 
regulatory and safety bodies, many American citizens have sought to participate in the regulatory process directly through 
petitions and lawsuits.   
(General narrative, p.18) 
Detroit Edison formed the Power Reactor Development Company (PRDC) to move Fermi ahead.  In the late 1950s the 
United Auto Workers brought suit to halt construction because of safety concerns, and lost eventually in the US Supreme 
Court, 7-2.  Other public concern was limited by AEC secrecy. (US SC, 1961) 
(Event 1, p. 29) 
Although the UAW lost the court case concerning Fermi, their legal activities helped establish strategies and procedures for 
future intervention.  The Fermi accident did not change AEC regulatory procedures or increase openness.  This would be 
some time in coming. 
(Event 1, p. 30) 
 
 Period 1970-1990 
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In the F.R. Germany, social movements opposing nuclear installations lodged in court against 
siting (Event 2, p. 26). 
General narrative 
“Since the opponents of the construction lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court, the German 
parliament's commission of inquiry ordered that construction be interrupted for four years in light of the safety 
concerns.” (page 21). 
Event 2: Whyl (planned but never built nuclear reactor) 
“In March 1977 the administrative court withdrew the construction license for .the plant. But two years later the 
administrative court of Baden-Württemberg opened up a second case. In 1982 the court of justice decided again that 
the construction of the nuclear power plant was legal and caused a rally of 30,000 opponents.” (page 26). 
 
In Spain, administrative and legal litigation by local authorities against chosen nuclear locations 
became the initial strategy in most cases in Spain (in early times) (general narrative). In other 
cases the main way to influence decisions was to co-opt the local governments (in Event 2 both 
promoters and receptors tried to do it). 
General narrative 
“Under the Francoism civil society could not manifest itself openly with police controls and press censorship in place. 
Even in the later, all the civil rights common to other Western countries did not exist. However, administrative channels 
offered the opportunity to show dissatisfaction.” (page 15) 
Democracy led to public debate and, from 1977 onwards, the government Energy Plan was reviewed, discussed, and 
approved in a multi-party parliamentary setting (page 16). Eventually municipalities in the influence area of NPP got 
organized. The origin of the Association of Municipalities in Areas of Nuclear Power Plants (AMAC) dates back to 1988. 
AMAC was legalized as such from a meeting held in Cofrentes (Valencia) in February 1990. From that moment, it has 
been working in monitoring the operation of NPP, in the implementation of the Nuclear Emergency Plans, the 
democratic management of radioactive waste and the creation of effective economic development policies for areas 
belonging to the Association (page 18).  
Event 2: Ascó 
“This strategy finally failed in the second democratic municipal elections (1983) when the FECSA compelled all its 
employees to take up residence in Ascó so that these could vote in local elections and in this way contribute to 
decisions which favoured the nuclear plant.” (page 41). 
“Between 1977 and 1979 Catalonia recovered its autonomous government, the first democratic municipal polls elected 
new mayors and mixed commissions had to be formed to address territorial questions. One of the most prominent 
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campaigners became the first democratically elected mayor of the village of Ascó on an anti NPP list.” (page 40)  
 
In the UK, the public inquiries constitute an interesting participative mechanism as it ensures that 
several viewpoints in conflict are able to be heard (Event 6, p. 47). 
Event 6: Sizewell B public inquiry 1982-5 
“The legalistic nature of the setting prevents a discussion about the general concepts of the installation from being 
discussed. For example, at the Sizewell inquiry, organisations such as Greenpeace were unable to discuss the 
benefits/disadvantages of nuclear power stations in general and instead had to demonstrate why the plans for that 
nuclear station in that particular location did not meet legislative standards.” (page 47). 
 
 Period 1990-2015 
In Spain, in the case of the siting of a nuclear waste repository, a participative process was 
promoted through the voluntary candidatures of municipalities (which had before to approve the 
candidature by voting in the city hall) (Event 5, p. 57). Besides, it is worth noting that an 
association (AMAC) made of municipalities hosting nuclear infrastructures was monitoring the 
management of nuclear issues, acting as a kind of check and counter-balance to the decisions 
made by promoters and regulators. 
Event 5: NWR 
“The proposal of Ascó was approved by an absolute majority in the City Hall Council. The same happened in the 
other candidate villages aiming to take in the NWR.” (page 57).  
 
In Sweden, several municipalities competed in hosting a nuclear waste repository in Sweden. The 
Public authorities sent a letter to all municipalities asking for their interest in the process, 
emphasizing that the process would be based in voluntariness (Event 5, p. 54). 
Event 5: A competition for getting a repository 
“In 1992 SKB sent a letter to all municipalities asking for their interest in the process and emphasizing that the 
process would be based on voluntariness. Eight municipalities in northern Sweden responded positively and two of 
these were chosen by SKB for test drillings, Storuman and Malå.” (page 54). 
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Annex II – Summary Tables 
In order to facilitate a comparative analysis, a series of synthetic tables with the main findings on 
perception and engagement for each country and for each historical period have been 
elaborated. It is a very schematic synthesis that corresponds to the broader data of the annex II. 
 
Table A.1: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in Bulgaria, by periods.  
BULGARIA 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
Engagement 
activities 
1950 – 1970 
 
(Neither risks nor benefits 
have been detailed in the 
SCR for this period) 
 
Dependency on the  
Soviet Union’s technology 
and development model 
Nuclear technology as 
symbol of scientific 
progress and national 
pride 
 
Some receptors feared to 
be accused by future 
generations for supporting 
nuclear 
Secrecy 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
Health and safety risks: 
Related to emergency 
situations (earthquake, 
Chernobyl accident): 
 
NPP workers’ concerns 
which eventually caused 
them psychological stress, 
and also feelings of 
insecurity and 
helplessness. 
 
Due to the earthquake, the 
Bulgarian authorities 
postponed the launch of 
The secrecy of information 
provided by public 
authorities framed the 
public perception of the 
government itself. 
The dependency on the 
Soviet Union’s nuclear 
technology was presented 
as a symbol of 
brotherhood between 
Communist countries 
Information flowed but only 
among selected people 
close to the government 
 
When the Chernobyl 
accident happened the 
government did not inform 
the population about its 
real scale and 
consequences, 
 
The media did not report 
the accident, until a year 
later a TV documentary 
mentioned the accident 
and the population 
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two additional reactor 
blocks and demanded 
additional safety 
measures. 
 
In economic terms, the 
Bulgarian 
promoters/regulators 
expressed their concern 
about the high cost of the 
nuclear program. 
 
became aware of its 
importance 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
after Chernobyl accident, 
the lack of any information 
provided to the public led 
to protests against nuclear 
establishments 
(Ekoglasnost) 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
 
International agencies 
expressed their concerns 
with the technical safety 
issues of NPPs (in 
contrast with the opinion of 
Bulgarian authorities) 
 
a public committee 
(Receptors) aimed to 
engage the public with the 
problem of the safety 
conditions of the existing 
NPP. 
 
Bulgarian 
promoters/regulators 
expressed their 
satisfaction with the 
technical safety issues, in 
contrast with the opinion of 
international agencies. 
 
Social trust is shaped by 
the political fight between 
pro and anti-European 
parties, which strongly 
conditioned the national 
nuclear agenda 
 
The building of a new NPP 
reactivated the debate on 
energy (and political) 
dependency because it 
might help to diminish the 
energy imports from 
Romania and Turkey, 
while increasing 
dependency on Russian 
technology 
 
A research consultation 
sponsored by the public 
authorities was used to 
decide how to proceed 
with the nuclear sector 
when joining the European 
Union 
 
A referendum was held in 
Bulgaria (2013), the 
question was: "Should 
nuclear energy be 
developed in Bulgaria 
through construction of a 
new nuclear power plant?" 
People replied affirmative, 
but it didn’t reach the 
minimum turnout of 60% to 
be valid. 
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Table A.2: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in Finland, by periods. 
FINLAND 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional factors 
(shaping social trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
Engagement 
activities 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
 
fishermen community fears 
that thermal pollution would 
damage the fragile marine 
ecology 
 
the safety culture of the 
Soviet Union was 
considered as less exigent 
than the Western one  
 
BENEFITS: 
 
bringing employment to 
rural areas  
 
nuclear developments 
promised better future by 
enhancing the development 
of modern industrial Finland 
 
the security of energy 
supply was one of the main 
arguments to take decisions 
about nuclear projects, and 
in Finland this was 
especially important 
because much of the 
country is located in the 
arctic environment 
 
promoters and regulators 
promised inexpensive 
electricity thanks to the 
Finland became member of 
the United Nations 
organization due to its 
participation in nuclear 
projects. The diplomatic 
relationship with the Soviet 
Union conditioned and 
interfered some decisions 
on nuclear programs 
 
difficulty of calculating 
nuclear risk (distance 
between experts and lay 
people) can be found 
 
 ‘unwillingness’ to be 
exposed to risk (as such the 
case of the residents of the 
town of Loviisa, where a 
NPP was proposed 
 
key role played by the 
‘national scientific pride’ in 
justifying the nuclear 
projects decisions 
 
Several municipalities were 
reluctant to the sitting 
decision because the 
project did not fit in its 
future development plans 
 
Threats to local identities 
were a source of public 
reactions against nuclear 
developments 
 
the Finnish nuclear program 
played a political role in the 
international position of the 
country 
 
The values of the post-war 
generation included a 
decision making on nuclear 
projects in Finland had 
been made for long time by 
a small group of politicians, 
engineers and corporate 
managers. Therefore, 
nuclear energy in Finland 
could never be a 
“democratic” decision. 
 
public opinion surveys had 
been used to get 
knowledge about public 
attitudes towards nuclear 
energy in general, or 
towards the sitting of a NPP 
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nuclear power. 
 
significant investments had 
to be made into research 
and education, and in high 
quality jobs in order to 
attract talent of those 
engineers studying abroad 
 
positive view of 
technological progress and 
of nuclear 
 
1970 – 1990 
BENEFITS: 
 
the promoters of the 
nuclear program argued 
that radiation could be 
useful for medical healthy 
uses 
 
new reactors to be built 
were considered far safest 
than those of TMI or 
Chernobyl 
 
 
opposition movements to 
be critics with the nuclear 
program appealing to anti-
nuclear weapons treaties 
and laws 
 
public authorities in Finland 
noted the country’s 
dependency on energy 
imports and that the level of 
self-sufficiency had dropped 
since the early 1960s 
meanwhile the demand of 
energy continued to grow. 
 
 
environmental movements 
promoted energy saving, 
environment protection and 
new life-styles grounded in 
the idea that less 
consumption required less 
energy 
 
 
- 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
the anti-nuclear movement 
put on the table the risk of a 
nuclear accident in a 
populated area as that of 
the capital  
 
environmentalists defined 
nuclear power as a non-
carbon-free source of 
energy 
 
But the Finnish parliament 
decided to support more 
sustainable and 
 
Finland has a governance 
system including 
authorities, nuclear 
companies and government 
agencies deciding together 
in closed cabinets, but 
having high levels of trust 
among public opinion 
 
The whole nuclear program 
is justified from the 
beginning and during 
several decades as a key 
factor to ensure energy 
 - 
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environmental friendly 
energy solutions 
 
post-industrial society 
needs flexible, sustainable 
energy systems that can 
respond quickly to the 
changing needs 
 
international prices of 
electricity have dropped 
questioning whether 
nuclear energy is today 
economically feasible 
 
nuclear power stations are 
capital intensive and 
investments in nuclear 
energy are deducted from 
renewable energy sources. 
 
the recent construction of 
the fifth reactor has been 
tarnished by delays after 
delays, and the costs have 
more than doubled. 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
radiation is a natural 
phenomenon and that most 
of the people are exposed 
to natural radiation 
everywhere 
 
new reactors are necessary 
if Finland is going to fulfill its 
commitments in the global 
fight against climate 
change.  
independency. The 
particular geostrategic 
position of the country 
during the Cold War, in-
between East and West, 
facilitate the political 
preferences for an energy 
source that could guarantee 
a high degree of energy 
independence. The energy 
dependence from the 
Soviet Union is presented 
as a reiterate concern 
 
some nuclear 
developments that would 
help to decrease energy 
imports (from Russia) and 
improve self-sufficiency 
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rigorous testing of materials 
and processes and safety 
rules imposed by authorities 
are presented as guaranties 
of safety. 
 
Nuclear development was a 
way of fighting against the 
unemployment crisis in the 
90’s. 
 
 
Table A.3: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in the F.R.Germany, by 
periods. 
F.R. 
GERMANY 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
Engagement 
activities 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
nuclear energy was 
criticised by receptors in 
economic terms focussing 
overall on the high cost of 
nuclear waste disposals. 
 
BENEFITS: 
having a powerful nuclear 
industry was crucial to the 
country’s overall economic 
competitiveness 
 
 
  
the promotion of “research 
centres” on nuclear issues 
had been part of the 
communicative efforts to 
make technology more 
acceptable (even among 
its potential promoters). 
But it is said that the plan 
to promote research to 
generate arguments 
against critics of nuclear 
energy worked only in 
part. 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
 
concerns about the 
location of the nuclear 
lack of trust in government 
and regulators seemed to 
be a popular point of 
criticism among the groups 
low controllability of the 
risks of the technology in 
the case of a Scientific-
technical institute for 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
people against the project 
of building a NPP collected 
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installation because of 
safety issues 
 
in the 1970s there was a 
shift of opinion towards 
more pessimistic views of 
the effects of the 
technology. Regulators 
developed into a critic of 
nuclear energy in the 
1970s. 
 
the interest of Promoters 
in nuclear development 
reduced once energy 
consumption rose slower 
than expected. 
Fluctuations in the overall 
economic context could 
influence the profitability of 
nuclear projects 
 
regulators do not take the 
project of a Research 
institute (Scientific-
technical institute for 
reactor construction -
WTBR- and a research 
centre for limnology) was 
the high costs their might 
suppose the 
commissioning and the 
further use of complex 
buildings 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
nuclear power as a clean 
and safe energy source 
that was not involved in 
against nuclear energy. 
Lack of trust in 
government’s willingness 
to seriously consider 
people’s concerns 
 
the proximity of political 
elections was the main 
factor that influenced the 
government to postpone 
the choice of the place 
where a NPP should be 
built 
 
 
reactor construction 
(WTBR) and a research 
centre for limnology 
 
regulators considered the 
commissioning as 
irresponsible, because the 
risks were ultimately not 
calculable 
 
being in support or against 
nuclear power is a matter 
of how to be seen by 
future generations: as a 
traitor or as a hero 
(identity) 
 
the search for a site raised 
concerns among receptors 
who demonstrated against 
the project (land conflicts 
were related to political 
territorial borders) 
 
locating a repository site in 
the economically 
underdeveloped 
hinterland. The 
government tried to avoid 
opposition against the 
project, which failed 
because the level of 
protest increased 
 
military aspects of the 
peaceful use of nuclear 
power in early West 
Germany 
 
and submitted 100.000 
signatures 
 
the opposition against 
nuclear power has been 
specially strong and 
violent, and numerous 
protests and 
communication activities 
coming from opponents 
were repeatedly organised 
over the country 
 
social movements 
opposing nuclear 
installations lodged in 
court against siting 
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any threats for the public 
(until the Chernobyl 
accident happened) 
 
 
1990 – 2015 
 
 
   
 
Table A.4: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in Spain, by periods. 
SPAIN 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
Engagement 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
(needs of large 
investments) importance of 
the financial support that 
Spanish electric 
companies (Promoters) 
received from foreign 
banks since early times. In 
this case, the nuclear 
program was seen as 
cheaper than expected. 
 
- - 
administrative and legal 
litigation by local 
authorities against chosen 
nuclear locations became 
the initial strategy in most 
cases 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
concerns about potential 
radiation released by the 
NPPs 
 
worries about potential 
water contamination 
related to a NPP, which 
would negatively impact 
agricultural and marine 
activities 
 
the promoters began 
building a NPPs without 
the compulsory reports 
and official permits. In all 
the cases the public 
authorities later legalized 
those illegal works. The 
legislation was adapted to 
the NPP interests 
generating great distrust 
among the public 
(receptors). 
territorial/regional identities 
played a crucial role in 
accepting or rejecting 
nuclear projects. In some 
instances, when the 
central government or 
other centralised authority 
took the location decision, 
the opposition to nuclear 
power became a fight for 
regional identity vs. the 
central government  
The communication flows 
between the government 
and the stakeholders were 
hidden to the public and 
instead developed through 
private initiatives and 
channels 
 
classic mass media 
(newspapers, TV and 
radio) had been used to 
announce the intentions of 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
235 
worries about safety, 
especially regarding 
emergency measures 
 
local environmental 
movements had a negative 
perception of the economic 
benefits that the NPP 
apparently provided, which 
they saw as conflicting 
with other activities in the 
territory 
 
the end of the lifetime of 
the NPP created economic 
uncertainties in the local 
population 
 
The economic costs had 
skyrocketed and could not 
be met. With the 
moratorium, the utilities got 
rid of their debts and 
obtained compensation for 
the estimated losses 
incurred from stopping 
their nuclear projects 
 
Nuclear energy became 
increasingly expensive 
because more and more 
safety requirements were 
demanded, and the oil 
crises made the 
construction of NPP much 
more expensive.  
 
BENEFITS: 
the NPP would increase 
surrounding temperature 
 
Some cases, Promoters 
did not tell the truth about 
their intentions when 
acquiring land for siting the 
NPPs 
 
the industry created its 
own rules by manoeuvring 
within the dictatorship and 
even ignoring the law in 
their dealings 
 
a political party expressed 
its anti-nuclear principles 
but later, when governing, 
changed opinion and 
maintained or supported 
NPPs; and the opposite 
happened between 
different territorial levels, 
even governed by the 
same political party 
 
(there is a conflict between 
a rural world which feels 
forgotten and an urban 
world that holds the main 
benefits) 
 
many of the anti-nuclear 
movements are difficult to 
distinguish from the anti-
dictatorship movement 
(The fact that the main 
nuclear developments took 
place during the 
dictatorship linked 
symbollicaly this 
technology to this political 
regime) 
 
there are some 
perceptions linked to the 
desire to maintain certain 
forms of life (such as a 
rural or fishermen's life) 
 
 anti-nuclear movements in 
the Basque Country had to 
deal with the dilemma of 
how much to accept that 
terrorist violence can be 
useful for its presumably 
peaceful purposes 
Promoters and Regulators 
of NPPs. Whilst national 
media was available to 
them, most of the 
Receptors instead had 
only access to local press 
to launch their mesagges. 
 
after the Vandellós I 
incident (1989) the 
Promoters began 
producing periodical news 
about the 
decommissioning process, 
which had also been in 
some degree publicised 
and informed through the 
website (Event 1). In some 
cases the Promoters held 
press conferences to 
present NPP construction 
projects, and announced in 
the press the NPP's entry 
into operation as a way of 
making the population 
aware of the irreversibility 
of the NPP 
 
quite a number of public 
opinion polls have been 
found (at the national and 
the local level) since 1978 
(not before), but with little 
consistency in terms of the 
survey design therefore 
limiting the possibilities for 
longitudinal analysis 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
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with positive effects for 
farming and touristic 
activities 
 
the technology is safe and 
effective. (After an 
incident) a major 
catastrophe did not 
happen due to the 
effectiveness of the high 
safety standards applied 
 
creation of jobs and the 
socioeconomic 
development related to the 
NPPs, both at local and 
national levels 
 
nuclear energy was 
necessary for the 
development of Spanish 
industry as a whole, as 
well as for the hosting 
regions. Promoters warned 
of the risk of a return to 
underdevelopment if the 
nuclear path was 
abandoned 
 
guaranty of energy supply 
(Showcase), because 
there are so many 
electricity demands in the 
country to meet up 
 
social movements against 
a NPP collected signatures 
among university experts, 
and several times they 
collected more of half a 
million of signatures 
 
big demonstrations in the 
street against nuclear 
projects were going in 
parallel with terrorist 
attacks causing human 
victims and material harms 
 
articles and press 
interventions, books, 
support of celebrities, 
intellectuals, lawyers, etc. 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
social movements 
mobilized against a 
nuclear waste repository 
argue concern by high 
there are cases in which a 
political change in the local 
and regional government 
halted the nuclear plans. In 
these cases (such as 
Promoters showed 
themselves proud of their 
knowledge and experience 
in decommissioning 
nuclear installations 
public authorities 
published reports on the 
decision about the siting of 
the nuclear waste 
repository in a special 
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potential costs to be paid 
with public resources 
 
BENEFITS: 
potential radiation 
emissions would be low 
and without any health 
risks since the radiation 
emitted by nature would be 
higher than that from the 
Waste Repository 
 
In the case of the 
repository, the Public 
authorities justified it on 
the grounds of ‘economic 
diversification’ (of a poorly 
developed rural area), and 
its stoppage was 
interpreted as a harm to 
the whole nation’s 
economy. 
 
 
those happened in the 
former period) the relevant 
issue is that policy makers 
changed their orientations 
and decisions towards 
concrete nuclear 
developments due to 
political strategies of the 
electoral arena, even 
contradicting themselves 
and their explicit political 
principles 
 
Promoters (and some 
Receptors) of a nuclear 
waste repository (Event 5) 
considered that nuclear 
developments would lead 
the country to scientific 
excellence, allowing high 
level scientific jobs in the 
area 
 
warnings on unequal 
distribution of risk among 
territories have been 
detected, with some areas 
treated as a landfill of 
dangerous and/or 
annoying infrastructures 
 
technological colonialism 
(at international level) and 
imposition over local 
society (at national level) 
were discussed  (the 
notion of “unwillingness” to 
be exposed to a risk) 
 
Promoters and Public 
Authorities expressed their 
views that people living 
near the NPP were coping 
with similar risks in their 
everyday life (such as road 
accidents) in order to 
minimize its importance. 
 
Receptors expressed 
beliefs about the familiarity 
of the local communities 
with the NPP because its 
website 
 
since 2009, the Promoters 
enabled a part of some 
NPP in a visitors centre 
trying to reach a more 
interactive communication 
approach 
 
Since 2000 local 
information committees 
have been created in all 
the NPPS, which included 
representatives of the 
main stakeholders. These 
are official participatory 
bodies.  
 
similar bodies (local 
information commissions) 
were created by the 
municipalities. Informative 
committees and Joint 
Commissions including 
mayors, social 
representatives and 
regulators were constituted 
in potential nuclear siting 
villages (Some 
environmental movements 
did not agree with the way 
in which such committees 
functioned) (they 
considered them biased) 
 
in the case of the siting of 
a nuclear waste repository, 
a participative process was 
promoted through the 
voluntary candidatures of 
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presence became part of 
their daily life (as some 
local governments said, 
other nuclear facilities had 
been in the area), or it is 
considered as similar risk 
as any industrial facility 
 
 
municipalities (which had 
before to approve the 
candidature by voting in 
the city hall) 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
social movements 
protesting in localities 
showing interest to host 
the facilities. 
 
Internet social networks 
(twitter) and website 
resources used by actors 
pro and against a nuclear 
waste repository 
 
Table A.5: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in Sweden, by periods. 
SWEDEN 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust & perceived 
risks and benefits) 
Engagement 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
 
no safety concerns were 
raised in the early years of 
the nuclear program, but in 
the 1960s criticisms both 
from technical experts and 
politicians about safety 
requirements of the 
reactors arose 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
social movements 
the public debate on 
atomic weapons was 
(strategically) neutralized 
by the regulators and 
political parties due to the 
coming elections (political 
games) 
 
national independence of 
energy supply was an 
aspect of nuclear 
development subordinate 
to the competitiveness or 
reliability of the nuclear 
Among regulators the 
controversy was based on 
the purpose for the atomic 
weapons research. The 
receptors directly related 
the development of atomic 
weapons with their 
security and also with a 
perceived increasing risk 
of war.  
 
At the political level people 
that were in favour of 
research on nuclear 
a study group representing 
both opponents and 
proponents of atomic 
weapons was created, 
generating 
recommendations for 
government policy 
 
the influence of some 
scientists writing articles in 
newspapers and 
contacting politicians 
seemed to have great 
influence in the decision 
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considered that NPPs 
could have positive 
environmental impacts 
(e.g. it would avoid other 
evident sources of river 
pollution) 
 
 
energy sector weapon argued that this 
would act as a deterrent 
by showing the world that 
the country was capable to 
build it. 
 
making process (mainly 
from a perspective of 
maintaining peace) 
 
social movements 
collected signatures for a 
plea for a referendum on 
nuclear weapons; and also 
for a referendum on 
nuclear power after the 
TMI incident 
 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
 
after learning (from the 
media) what happened in 
international incidents like 
TMI or Chernobyl, the 
population seemed to be 
worried about the 
possibility of accidents. 
This seemed to increase 
fears and anxieties among 
public perceptions. 
 
from 1972 onwards a 
dramatic shift took place 
and nuclear power was 
criticized from groups of 
scientists, politicians and 
environmental activists. 
Potential environment 
dangers were among the 
factors leading to this 
growing opposition 
 
the economic framework 
of the nuclear program 
changed towards a 
scenario of rising costs 
Public authorities opened 
the involvement of the 
public in nuclear decisions 
(referendum), but later 
decided to continue 
nuclear expansion 
importance for the country 
in terms of its good 
position in the international 
community. (milestone for 
the country in terms of 
technological development 
and the beginning of a 
new epoch) 
 
looking for repository sites 
involved, at local level, 
specific protests with a 
NIMBY emphasis. This 
was a first step towards a 
more general critique of 
nuclear developments, 
which included the 
defense of local territories 
 
one of the objections 
expressed by some 
Receptors was the need to 
advance towards other 
energy models based on 
renewable sources and 
efficiency measures ( a 
request for a more 
sustainable development 
to cope with the Chernobyl 
impact on public opinion, 
the regulators organised 
and participated in 
numerous communication 
activities through the 
media trying to calm the 
general public 
 
Opinion surveys were 
used in Sweden to gain 
knowledge of public 
attitudes towards nuclear 
power after the Chernobyl 
accident 
 
An advisory referendum 
was held in Sweden 
(1980), partly in response 
to the TMI accident. 
Despite the result, a full 
phase out did not occur 
 
information meetings with 
experts of pro and anti-
nuclear issues were 
organized, sometimes 
leading to the conclusion 
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and availability of different, 
cheaper energy sources 
 
The Receptors that were 
against the development 
of atomic weapons were 
also concerned about the 
high costs for their 
development as well as for 
related research; therefore 
they rather propose to 
invest instead in other 
human activities like 
development aid 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
Regarding the impact of 
Chernobyl: Receptors in 
favour of nuclear power 
argued that the technology 
used in Sweden was very 
different and safer than the 
one used in Chernobyl 
and, therefore, there was 
no need to revise Swedish 
nuclear policy 
 
Independent experts 
expressed concerns about 
the suitability of a nuclear 
waste repository 
 
some Unions argued that 
a shutdown could increase 
electricity tariffs  
But other trade unionists 
claimed for sustainable 
growth and renewable 
energy 
model, which refers to 
alternative worldviews) 
of giving up a siting 
process 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
social movements 
collected signatures also 
for a referendum on 
nuclear power after the 
TMI incident 
 
the referendum campaign 
became a mass 
movement of grassroots 
activists all over Sweden  
 
Protests against a 
repository by local activists 
became a process of local 
mass campaigns but they 
also erected blockades 
and stolen materials  
 
when Chernobyl accident 
took place hundred of 
demonstrations were 
arranged in many places 
all over Sweden, with 
thousand people 
demanding the phasing 
out of nuclear projects 
 
  
 
 
D4.3 : Case studies reports: in-depth understanding of the mechanisms for effective interaction 
with civil society: selected case studies  
241 
 
the Public authorities 
(Regulators included) 
argued that it would be an 
enormous economic loss 
not to use the reactors that 
had been built or were 
under construction 
1990 – 2015 
BENEFITS: 
 
when talking about a 
competition between 
several cities for getting a 
repository, environmental 
risks became the dominant 
argument. But Promoters 
explicitly focused on 
geology as a key criteria 
for minimising 
environmental risks 
 
Promoters of a nuclear 
waste repository gave 
assurances that they had 
the appropriate technology 
to build a safe repository, 
and that the country had 
appropriate geological 
areas to do it 
 
job creation, considered as 
one of the main factors in 
the negotiations among 
the municipalities 
competing to be selected 
as a repository site 
 
 
 
‘familiarity with the 
technology’ seems to play 
a role in the absence of 
strong opposition, 
according to the 
Promoters 
Due to past reactions on 
the suitability of places to 
host repositories, the 
Regulators changed their 
strategy by a more 
engagement oriented 
strategy with local 
municipalities that were 
willing to host the facility 
 
a local referendum was 
also organized by local 
politicians in the two 
municipalities’ proposed 
as candidates to host a 
nuclear waste repository, 
and in both places a clear 
majority voted against it 
 
Regulators strived to 
engage the local receptors 
in their studies. In the first 
failed strategy, the two 
selected municipalities 
showed a local opposition, 
but in the two 
municipalities which 
already had local power 
plants, the strategy was 
successful and many 
locals were actively 
involved in deliberations. 
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several municipalities 
competed in hosting a 
nuclear waste repository in 
Sweden. The Public 
authorities sent a letter to 
all municipalities asking for 
their interest in the 
process, emphasizing that 
the process would be 
based in voluntariness 
 
Table A.6: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in the UK, by periods. 
UK 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust & perceived 
risks and benefits) 
Engagement 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
 
the population seemed to 
be concerned about 
potential chronic health 
effects from a specific 
incident releasing radiation 
 
a case of released 
radiation is described 
(Windscale), including 
comments on the financial 
damage generated to 
farmers and about the 
compensatory economic 
measures adopted by the 
government 
 
 
Although the Windscale 
fire (Event 3) had little 
impact on the nuclear 
power programme at the 
time, the combined impact 
of the incident itself, the 
government’s handling of 
it, and the secrecy 
surrounding it, led to a 
decrease in trust in the 
institutions involved. This 
generated notable criticism 
of the government and 
changes to the manner in 
which nuclear power was 
debated and perceived 
 
Nuclear energy offered a 
chance to reduce British 
reliance on coal and 
the cause of the incident 
was a “human error by 
well-trained but 
unfortunate plant staff”, 
which inform of a weak 
point on the confidence 
granted to the 
controllability of the plant 
 
concerns about potential 
pollution of local food 
products were raised by 
the Receptors (conflict 
between economic 
activities and land uses in 
the area) 
 
maintaining the country’s 
place at the ‘top table’ of 
international politics in 
series of government films 
were published presenting 
nuclear energy as 
somewhat necessary for 
the country’s future and 
showing that Britain was 
ready to lead the scientific 
and political world 
 
after the Windscale fire 
concerns raised locally 
were addressed by public 
meetings organised by the 
promoters’ staff, as well as 
in meetings with local 
farmers concerned about 
potential risks to their 
livestock. These meetings 
provided feedback on the 
perceptions and 
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expensive imported oil 
amongst concerns of air 
pollution and a fuel crisis 
Cold War times seems to 
have been the motive for 
appealing to nuclear 
weapons 
 
early movements started 
with a growing concern 
about nuclear weapons 
throughout the 1950s 
 
public reactions were 
towards the use of nuclear 
weapons but not on the 
nuclear power, in a period 
of public trust on political 
institutions.  
 
experiences of locally 
affected people 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
 
there were a pressure on 
the decision by the 
growing concerns about 
the environment from the 
Receptors side 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
public Authorities made 
decisions based on the 
assumption that British 
citizens required 
confidence that their 
government had chosen 
the safest available 
nuclear technology, which, 
according to its safety 
standards, turned out to be 
British nuclear technology 
 
 
The UK is the country 
where the Regulators 
seemed to have been 
trying to achieve more 
trust from the public. They 
emphasized the need of 
guaranteeing the choice of 
the safest available 
nuclear reactor technology 
 
public authorities 
implemented an intensive 
advertising campaign in 
newspapers about 
alternative reactor types 
with the aim of generating 
(supposedly) public 
confidence 
 
Opinions surveys were 
conducted in the UK to 
find the degree of public 
support for new nuclear 
 
public inquiries constitute 
an interesting participative 
mechanism as it ensures 
that several viewpoints in 
conflict are able to be 
heard 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
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 the environmental 
movement Greenpeace 
staged non-violent 
protests, blocking at-sea-
disposal by the UKAEA 
using their boat Rainbow 
Warrior 
 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
 
Public authorities 
recognized the need for a 
large amount of economic 
resources, and concluded 
that nuclear power might 
result an unattractive 
option due to economics 
 
environmental concerns 
were detected among 
some Receptors who saw 
little progress in the 
solution of nuclear waste 
management,  
 
BENEFITS: 
some Receptors seemed 
to agree with a ‘reluctant 
acceptance’ of nuclear 
power because it could 
help in advancing towards 
a low-carbon energy 
system and coping with 
the climate change 
challenges 
 
growing importance of 
tackling climate change 
 
some receptors showed a 
lack of trust in the reactor 
management performed 
by private companies 
following a culture of 
secrecy. The receptors 
demanded more public 
information about power 
stations, and this was 
especially the case in local 
communities affected 
 
an extensive consultation 
was organised by the 
regulators in order to 
address concerns about 
nuclear energy and 
provide more information, 
based on citizen’s panels 
and focus groups, which 
indicated public 
acceptance of companies 
investing in nuclear power 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
Moreover, receptors led by 
the environmental 
organisations did not 
attend them believing the 
decision had already been 
taken.  
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Table A.7: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in Ukraine, by periods. 
UKRAINE 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust & perceived 
risks and benefits) 
Engagement 
1950 – 1970 
 
 
   
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
 
following the Chernobyl 
accident public concerns 
with respect to human 
health arose, together with 
public demands for 
compensation for families 
exposed to radiation 
 
Public Authorities 
(indirectly) recognized the 
damage for Chernobyl’s 
workers in order to 
achieve future safety 
 
Environmental concerns 
appeared during this 
period, allowing a social 
mobilization with 
nationalist aims to develop 
following the Chernobyl 
accident 
 
Independent experts 
stated that the Public 
Authorities established an 
unacceptable threshold in 
defining the safe situation 
in polluted areas, avoiding 
paying compensations, 
which allowed the State 
Public trust seemed 
severely damaged in 
Ukraine by the event and 
the associated secrecy 
surrounding its 
consequences and 
management, which 
played a key role in the 
resistance of Ukraine 
against Soviet rule.  
 
However, key changes in 
the political scene in 
Ukraine led also to 
changes of public attitudes 
towards nuclear power, in 
the sense that they 
reacted less once Ukraine 
was constituted. 
 
Regarding how regulators 
managed information, the 
receptors perceived a lack 
of flow of information to act 
adequately in an 
emergence status 
 
the Chernobyl case, 
treated by the Public 
authorities as “an external 
enemy that Soviet people 
must fight”  
 
the use of military rhetoric 
and images was pervasive 
in the Soviet media at the 
time. Soviet troops and 
military equipment were 
heavily involved in the 
Chernobyl clean-up and 
evacuation operations 
lack of information flow 
regarding the Chernobyl 
accident (general 
narrative) and even a 
falsified narrative about 
how the management was 
done 
 
the reality of the situation 
was falsified by the 
narrative provided by 
public authorities 
(promoters / regulators). In 
this case the lack of 
communication was not on 
the accident itself but 
about its serious 
consequences 
 
many experts proposing 
informational and 
educational work with 
receptors as a method to 
address such mistrust, 
reflecting the knowledge 
deficit model of gaining 
support through the 
provision of scientific facts 
to create a better informed 
public and therefore 
overcome societal 
concerns 
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and the Promoters to save 
economic resources but 
threatened people’s lives 
 
 
a variety of ‘information 
units’ were established in 
many territories after the 
Chernobyl accident 
providing information 
about levels of 
radioactivity and educating 
the public on nuclear 
technology in a broad 
sense (Event 2), thus, the 
regulators were making 
constant press-releases 
 
In Ukraine post-Chernobyl 
surveys about public 
attitudes towards nuclear 
power had been also used 
in order to better 
understand the protests 
and the moratorium vote 
trends 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
The antinuclear local 
mobilization from the 
receptors contributed to 
the moratorium on the 
construction and 
commissioning of new 
nuclear plants 
 
 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
 
environmental activism 
insisted that completion of 
two pending reactors 
lacked economic efficiency 
at regulators level, the 
debate was on the 
European West-East 
distrust situation.  Ukraine 
officials were disappointed 
by the Western partners 
anti-Chernobyl protest 
became part of a broad 
independence movement.  
Chernobyl became a 
symbol of colonial power 
and fuelled the 
In order to achieve a better 
public image, the 
Promoters of NPP tried to 
introduce rules of 
transparency and 
accessibility to the nuclear 
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as the most efficient to 
compensate Ukrainian 
energy system for the 
closure of the Chernobyl 
NPP 
 
However, some people do 
not agree very much, 
thinking that they were still 
far away from Western 
European standards 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
The nuclear Promoters 
said that the new reactor 
models were very different 
from the Chernobyl type, 
and therefore safer.  
 
 
Promoters stressed the 
economic viability of 
nuclear power, requesting 
an end to the moratorium.  
 
 
 
who, according to the 
Ukrainian side, failed to 
fulfill their 1995 
commitment to assist the 
country in exchange for 
closing the Chernobyl 
plant 
 
After Ukraine gained 
political independence, the 
perception of the 
Chernobyl NPP turned 
from being a sign of 
colonial domination by 
Russia into an important 
source of the electricity 
production that crucially 
contributed to the nation’s 
economic survival and 
independence 
 
independence movement.  
 
However, the issue of 
“reluctant acceptance” for 
nuclear power like a 
condition for national 
survival was raised among 
receptors  
(even if the negative 
consequences of 
Chernobyl continue to 
haunt Ukraine) 
 
sites 
 
While the information 
centres expanded and 
developed new 
infrastructure and 
exhibitions, much of this 
came from local initiatives 
without common 
communication strategies 
directed to outside 
communities. 
 
 The information centres of 
each of 4 operating 
Ukrainian power stations 
announce artistic 
competition every year. 
Children living within 30 
and up to 100 kilometres 
diameter zones are 
encouraged to send their 
works. The drawings seem 
to circulate quite widely 
 
public opinion survey was 
done in Ukraine to know 
the support of people to a 
NPP project 
 
a  local referendum was 
held in the towns near a 
NPP (1994) 
 
Several public hearings 
were organized by 
regulators and promoters 
in the villages situated in 
the vicinity of the proposed 
NPPs. Ukrainian 
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environmental and anti-
nuclear NGOs actively 
participated in these 
meetings, but some of 
these movements also 
organized alternative 
hearings 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
environmental activists 
illustrated the supposed 
lack of safety of nuclear 
installations by putting out 
constant press-releases 
 
social movements 
(Greenpeace) collected 
signatures against the 
repeal of a moratorium 
and the construction of 
new reactors 
 
environmental movements 
organized anti-nuclear 
pickets and public 
roundtables discussing the 
moratorium (in the 90’s), 
and they also hung a big 
banner on the cooling 
towers of a NPP to protest 
against the future 
development of nuclear 
power in the country 
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Table A.8: Key factors underlying public perception and engagement in the USA, by periods. 
USA 
Perceived risks & 
benefits 
Political-
institutional 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust) 
Socio-cultural 
factors 
(shaping social 
trust & perceived 
risks and benefits) 
Engagement 
1950 – 1970 
RISKS: 
 
insurance sector was not 
able to cover the potential 
damages in case of 
nuclear accident, and for 
that reason the guarantee 
has to be provided by the 
state with public money, a 
trend that started in the 
50’s and lasts until today. 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
since the 50’s the 
Regulator (AEC) promoted 
nuclear power and 
encouraged the private 
sector to join in, offering 
funding to private 
companies for conducting 
research and development 
on proposed reactor 
designs 
 
 
Lack of public trust in 
regulators: first, because 
in early times the AEC 
commissioners were fully 
beholden to military 
interests; second, the 
agency looks as it was 
“captured” by the industry 
it was meant to regulate. 
 
Other sources of distrust 
were found in the 
promises made by 
Promoters and Regulators 
that later were not fulfilled 
or turned out to be false. 
(in the design and 
construction of the Fermi 
reactor, and in spite of the 
reassurances by the 
scientists that a serious 
accident could not happen, 
one did occur). 
Importance of the prestige 
of scientists owing to their 
success in the Manhattan 
Project and in role in the 
unfolding Cold War 
military-industrial struggle 
with the USSR 
 
the United Auto Workers 
opposed the NPP (Fermi) 
because it would endanger 
Detroit, the auto industry 
and auto workers 
themselves (conflict 
between different 
economic activities in the 
same territory, by 
defending concrete ways 
of living) 
 
in Cold War times being 
pro or against nuclear 
energy was sometimes 
interpreted as being pro or 
against the national 
sentiments. For this 
reason, some cases of 
early protesters were 
qualified (and pursued) as 
communists. 
the accident of the Enrico 
Fermi Atomic Power Plant, 
Unit 1, was kept secret at 
the time (1966) 
 
regulators and public 
authorities made during 
the 50’s and 60’s a long 
series of films about 
nuclear energy, which 
were seen by millions of 
people 
 
poll surveys on public 
opinion about nuclear 
energy were already done 
in the 50’s (showing a 
large majority of people 
having no fear of having a 
plant located in their 
community). 
 
the relatively litigious 
American legal and 
administrative system 
permits interveners to 
exert influence on the 
technology assessment 
processn, and many 
people have sought to 
participate in the 
regulatory process directly 
through petitions and 
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lawsuits. 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
in the 60’s, the public 
opposition of the 
Committee Against 
Nuclear Power Plants 
eventually influenced the 
withdrawing of the 
application for a 
construction permit of a 
NPP in New York 
(Ravenswood project)  
 
During these same years 
public protests were 
crucial to Preserve 
Bodega Bay in California 
(protesters had grown to 
about 800 members 
opposing a NPP project 
 
1970 – 1990 
RISKS: 
 
potential catastrophic 
impact of nuclear 
accidents in large 
populated areas 
 
anti-nuclear groups (as 
such as Friends of the 
Earth, Critical Mass, UCS) 
raised public awareness of 
safety issues 
 
substantial cost overruns 
characterized the building 
of NPP, and social 
movements consider 
the Regulator (AEC-NCR) 
was seen as low 
trustworthy due to several 
non-congruent behaviour.  
 
First, for its supposedly 
inefficient functioning (in 
the aftermath of the TMI 
accident, “the Kemmeny 
Report indicated the poor 
oversight and regulatory 
operations of the NRC”) 
 
Second, the licensing of 
the Diablo Canyon NPP 
revealed the ad hoc nature 
of the regulators treatment 
some environmental 
movements (such as 
Abalone Alliance) critized 
the direct relationship 
between civilian and 
military nuclear power 
(supporters) the message 
that nuclear power 
represents progress has 
been deployed by images, 
meanings and messages 
set forth in TV, 
newspapers and journals, 
cartoons, and opinion 
columns 
 
surveys testing the public 
opinion towards nuclear 
energy had been reported 
several times in the SCR 
 
substantial majorities of 
the public still favored 
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nuclear projects too 
expensive. (recurrent 
design failures and the 
need to build in 
redundancies in safety 
systems multiplies some 
nuclear projects costs) 
 
economic costs caused by 
the TMI accident, both in 
terms of total cleanup 
costs, as well as in terms 
of the increased budget 
devoted to regulatory 
activities in the aftermath 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
supporters diminishing the 
importance of radiation 
impacts on human health 
 
of seismic characteristics  
 
the Regulator (NRC) lost a 
great deal of trust among 
people when it accepted 
an industry-sponsored 
emergency evacuation 
plan, in a place where 
geographic and 
demographic 
characteristics make it 
difficult to evacuate safely  
 
nuclear power, even as 
anti-nuclear referenda 
appeared on ballots in 
eight States 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
one of the first massive 
public protests against 
nuclear power gelled 
around the Diablo Canyon 
station. Eventually roughly 
60 anti-nuclear groups and 
30,000 people came 
together in protest 
 
1990 – 2015 
RISKS: 
 
Receptors finds that 
nuclear technology leads 
to the disruption of nature, 
and data about 
environmental impacts 
were mentioned (i.e. the 
heated effluent water 
damage fishes and other 
aquatic organisms) 
 
series of incidents 
indicates the challenges 
faced in mastering nuclear 
technology, assuring the 
public about safety, and 
the risks that are reveal in 
some critic groups (such 
as the Union of Concerned 
Scientists) considered that 
the license-renewal 
process “was designed to 
limit the scope that could 
be considered, specifically 
the ability of the public to 
intervene”, growing 
distrust among some 
social groups 
 
supporters of nuclear 
energy emphasize the 
facts that nuclear power 
will help secure US energy 
independence  
 
 
Poll research to test the 
social support for nuclear 
energy was also 
mentioned in the USA 
SCR 
 
PUBLIC-INITIATED: 
 
hundreds of activists sent 
letters asking state officials 
to oppose restarting Davis-
Besse NPP (in 2004). 
Years later, in 2012, used 
a skit to protest in front of 
the NPP 
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station operation that may 
begin from the mundane 
and move quickly to the 
near catastrophe 
 
opponents to nuclear 
energy consider that 
nuclear power is more 
costly that supporters 
contend, and that there 
appears to be great 
support in Congress for 
the nuclear sector in spite 
of the history of cost 
overruns 
 
BENEFITS: 
 
the promotion of the 
nuclear sector was 
interpreted as a strategic 
sector that deserves to be 
subsidized by the state 
 
supporters of nuclear 
energy emphasize the 
facts that nuclear power 
does not produce 
greenhouse gases that 
contribute to global 
warming 
 
 
The “Megatons to 
Megawatts” partnership 
provided enough fuel to 
generate 10% of 
America’s electricity needs 
(but it could be also 
interpreted as a way of 
losing energy autonomy) 
 
 
 
 
